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Although in recent years studies on secession and self-determination have increased, research 
on why secessions succeed remains limited. This thesis contributes to filling this gap by 
arguing that a secession can be regarded as successful when it results in the creation of a 
recognised and viable entity. In order to examine this assumption empirically, the thesis 
applied a process-tracing methodology to the case study of Kosovo, a case that had both an 
unsuccessful attempt to secede in 1991 and a far more successful one in 2008. It discovered 
that changes taking place at four different levels, local, state, regional and global, from 1991 
to 2008, created the conditions for Kosovo to ensure international support from influential 
states that would promote its international recognition and would support its internal viability 
after it unilaterally declared independence for the second time. Finally, this thesis, recognising 
that Kosovo’s statehood is still contested, has expanded the initial assumption of international 
recognition and internal viability and concluded that a unilateral secession is successful when 
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The purpose of the thesis 
The phenomenon of globalisation, along with the creation of new regional and international 
organisations facilitating co-operation in multiple dimensions of international relations, has 
not diminished the frequency or the violence of struggles for self-determination and secession 
(Danspeckgruber, 2002). On the contrary, such demands continue to constitute a 
contemporary and world-wide phenomenon, encountered in several regions of the globe 
(Cordell, 2015). To name but a few examples, South Ossetia and Abkhazia seek to secede 
from Georgia, Chechnya from Russia, Somaliland from Somalia, Tibet from China, 
Bougainville from Papua New Guinea and Quebec from Canada. Even European Union (EU) 
countries are confronted by secessionist movements; Spain is concerned with Basque and 
Catalan demands, while the United Kingdom had only recently had (2014) a referendum on 
Scotland’s independence. Notwithstanding the significant differences the aforementioned 
cases have, as a common characteristic they all present a desire for separation from the state 
to which they belong and the will to establish a new one. Notably, during the years 1956-
2004, seventy-eight armed conflicts for self-determination had taken place (Khosla, 2005), 
while seventeen of the forty active conflicts world-wide in 2014 were fought over territorial 
secessionist demands (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).  
 Despite the plethora of secessionist attempts and the serious implications they induce 
for the state involved and the security of the region in-question, secession studies are neither 
sufficiently extended nor well-known. This is not to imply that secession is completely 




issues closely related to secession, such as the creation of de facto states, the recognition of 
states in the international system and how and under which circumstances the right of self-
determination is to be implemented, with the latter to be also closely related to the issue of 
territorial integrity and state sovereignty. However, more often than not, these studies are 
conducted under the prism of international law, and debates centre on the legality and validity 
of the actions under study. Although international law provides valuable and necessary tools 
for the settlement of conflicts deriving from secessionist demands, studies based on 
international law often lack explanatory ability for various questions arising from secessions, 
such as when and why desires for secession emerges or why some secessions succeed and 
others fail.  
 In the discipline of international relations there are few recent studies addressing 
secession directly and systematically. Again it would be inaccurate to claim that secession in 
general is neglected by international relations’ scholars. Nonetheless, secession studies are 
often part of wider research projects on war and conflict, being case specific, with limited 
theoretical contribution (Zurcher, 2007, Liotta, 2001, Ganguly and Macduff, 2003). On the 
opposite side, studies that address secession from a theoretical perspective are frequently 
exclusively conceptual, focusing on the morality of secession and addressing issues such as 
whether and when a secession would be justified (Beran, 1984, Miller, 1997, Weinstock, 
2000). These studies, however, addressing secession almost as a philosophical issue, have 
little practical applicability. Finally, there is also some notable academic research addressing 
secession in a systematic and comprehensive way, seeking to answer fundamental questions 
that would enhance and deepen the understanding of the causes and consequences of 
secession and how the phenomenon is to be practically and effectively managed. Even these 




taking for granted that a secession is successful when the seceding entity has achieved 
international recognition (Pavković and Radan, 2007, Bahcheli et al., 2004).  
 This thesis contributes theoretically to secession studies by arguing that a secession, in 
order to be regarded as successful, needs to result in the creation of an internationally 
recognised and internally viable entity, and it examines the conditions that lead a secessionist 
movement to this outcome. International recognition is of critical importance as it offers the 
opportunity to the newly-created state to interact with other states, sign agreements, be 
admitted into international organisations, attract investments, and ask for loans and financial 
aid. Thus, formal recognition provides these states the opportunity to operate in the 
international system, enabling and facilitating their long-term survival. In contrast, 
unrecognised states have limited, if any, chances to participate in the above procedures. Due 
to a lack of legal personality, or internationally recognised official documents, they suffer 
from political and economic isolation. Consequently, their very survival is contested and 
dependent on patron states that provide for them.  
Despite the significance of international recognition and the important role it plays for 
the welfare and sustainability of a state, it is not enough to ensure the success of a secession; it 
is also essential that the seceding entity creates a viable state. The most recent case of the 
creation of a new state was South Sudan, which seceded uncontested from Sudan in 2011. 
South Sudan, however, although recognised, is far from being viable or functional. 
Acknowledging that there is no concrete definition either of when a state is viable or when it 
is considered failed, the thesis examines this issue and adopts the view that a state can be 
considered as viable when it meets the minimum requirement for its government to be able to 




Having set the thesis’ theoretical approach, the research continues by investigating the 
factors that facilitate the conditions for a secessionist movement to produce a recognised and 
viable entity. In order to conduct this study, it uses Kosovo as case study; a case that 
experienced both a failed attempt to secede in 1991 and a far more successful one in 2008. 
This study will investigate the changes that took place during the years 1991-2008 and that 
created the conditions for Kosovo to establish a viable and widely recognised entity after its 
unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.  
Nonetheless, this thesis acknowledges that Kosovo does not fully meet the criteria of 
international recognition and internal viability, as its statehood remains contested by Serbia, 
as well as by two permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, and 
some eighty United Nations (UN) member states. In addition, Kosovo internally is still 
institutionally and economically weak.  
Even with these conditions, Kosovo is the most suitable case for the purposes of this 
study for two main reasons: First, Kosovo is a case of unilateral secession, as it declared its 
independence without the consent of the parent state. This is the type of secession that is 
usually doomed to fail, with the secessionist entities to remain in the margins of the 
international community, being recognised by no or just a handful of other states. The 
international system does not lack examples of unilateral secession that had this fate; South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia are recognised only by four states, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) only by Turkey, while Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Somaliland by none. 
Kosovo, however, has been recognised by one hundred and nine UN member states as of May 
2015. Not only that, but it has managed to build a fairly viable and functional state, despite 
the challenges it confronts. Thus, this thesis seeks to answer the question of why did 




Second, by employing a case of unilateral secession and researching why it succeeded, 
this thesis seeks to enhance the applicability of the findings, as methodologically the selection 
of a “least-likely” case study is believed to strengthen the validity of an assumption or a 
theory. The “least-likely method selects cases in which the predictions of a theory are quite 
unlikely to be satisfied because few facilitating conditions are satisfied” (Levy, 2002: 442). 
However, if those or some of those assumptions are found to be valid under those 
unfavourable circumstances then it is quite possible that they will be also valid for other cases 
with more favourable conditions. 
In the research of secession, the least-likely cases to be successful are the cases of 
unilateral secession, as in the vast majority of those cases the states of the international system 
refuse to provide formal recognition; therefore, by definition the criterion of international 
recognition is not fulfilled. By examining why Kosovo, although an outcome of unilateral 
secession, managed to achieve such an extent of international recognition and internal 
viability, this thesis seeks to produce findings that can be applied in cases that secede under 
more favourable circumstances.  
Thus, this research focuses on Kosovo’s unilateral secession and examines the 
following questions: 
1. Why did Kosovo’s secession succeed in 2008?  
2. What changes taking place from 1991-2008 created the conditions for Kosovo’s 
second secession to succeed?  
The thesis argues that Kosovo’s unilateral secession succeeded because it managed to 
secure qualitative international support in favour of its independence. Qualitative international 
support refers to the support of influential countries able to back Kosovo’s secession 




secession promoted its international recognition after it unilaterally declared independence. 
This way Kosovo acquired a considerable quantity of international recognitions, necessary for 
its participation and eventual acceptance in the international system. Furthermore, 
international actors have financially and technically supported Kosovo’s institution and state-
building process.  Thus, again through qualitative external support Kosovo has managed to 
build a viable state, fulfilling to a significant extent the second criterion of successful 
secession.   
This thesis also demonstrates that events occurring during the years 1991-2008 have 
secured qualitative international support in favour of Kosovo’s secession and have created the 
conditions for its international recognition and internal viability. It shows that changes taking 
place across four different levels prepared the ground for Kosovo’s future successful 
secession, with these four levels being the local, the state, the regional and the global. At the 
local level, the thesis refers to the seceding entity, thus Kosovo; the state level is the parent 
state, in this case Serbia; the Balkans are considered to be the regional level of analysis; 
finally, the global level refers to all other relevant international actors involved. This thesis 
will show how events taking place at all levels changed the conditions in favour of Kosovo 
shaping the positive outcome of its secession.  
 
Clarifications 
For the sake of clarity it is necessary to explain some of the terms and concepts used 
throughout this thesis. 
To begin with, the changes at four different levels that this thesis identifies can easily 
be confused with the neo-realist approach Kenneth Waltz (1959) introduced when he used a 




This thesis could not stress enough that the changes in four levels identified in this study do 
not imply any adherence to the Waltzian neo-realist approach to international relations. In the 
neo-realist approach the different levels would be regarded mostly as “black boxes” that 
interact with each other. However, in this study the levels of analysis do not constitute a 
structure in which the levels interact with each other as solid units. They are rather the events 
and the actors at each level that interact with one another, both inside the same level and 
across different levels and shape the outcome of secession. Thus, the levels of analysis are not 
used in this research as a rigid structure, but as a tool for the thorough analysis of the case 
study. 
Another scholar who used levels of analysis was Singer (1961), who employed two 
levels of analysis, i.e., the national state and the international system. Brown (1993) employed 
both a three and a two level-of-analysis model to explain ethnic conflict, while Cordell and 
Wolff (2010) proposed a four levels-of-analysis approach, also in order to address ethnic 
conflict.  
The thesis draws on the idea of the four levels of analysis proposed by Cordell and 
Wolff (2010). The reason for this is that the distinction between four levels instead of two or 
three enables the more detailed examination of factors affecting secession. In the case of 
Kosovo the division of the state level, into two levels, the local and the state, allows the 
analysis of events and actors both in the seceding entity and the parent state. This way, for 
example, the actions and reactions of the local secessionist movement, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, and the central government of Milošević in Belgrade can be analysed, determining 
how they affected the final outcome of Kosovo’s secession. Similarly by dividing the 
international level into regional and global this thesis can investigate how particular events in 




assessment of how events and actors in the international system affected the outcome of 
Kosovo’s attempt to secede.  
Furthermore, this thesis exclusively examines unilateral secession as a phenomenon of 
international relations. The scope of the thesis is neither to explore alternative ways of 
territorial settlement of a conflict nor to propose any alternative solutions to secessionist 
demands. Consequently, this research is limited to the examination of cases where the aim is 
separation from the central state and the creation of a new one. Thus, it also does not analyse 
cases demanding other forms of self-government, such as territorial autonomy or federation. 
Similarly it is beyond the purpose of this research to investigate annexations and irredentas, 
i.e. cases where a region secedes and joins a different -usually neighbouring- state.  
Secession is different to the decolonisation process that reached its peak in the middle 
of the previous century. Decolonisation involves granting independence to areas under foreign 
rule, called also Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, usually separated by the 
metropolitan state not only ethnically but also geographically by sea or ocean (Harvey, 2010, 
UNGA, 1960, Pavković, 2012). In addition, in the decolonisation process the colonial power 
eventually voluntarily withdrew its authority from dependent territories following the relevant 
principles and decisions of the UN organs (UNGA, 1960, UNGA, 1952). In secessionist 
cases, however, it is the seceding territory that seeks to abolish the authority of the parent 
state and establish an independent state, with this territory to be an integral geographical part 
of the central state.    
What is more, this thesis is deliberately limited to the research of the success of the 
unilateral secession of Kosovo. The intention of the research is neither to endorse nor 
condemn Kosovo’s secession. Similarly, this research will take no position either in favour or 




understanding of why Kosovo’s second attempt to secede succeeded when the first one had 
failed. Any expression against or in favour of its action would, thus, undermine the 
impartiality of the research.  
 Moreover, it is emphasised that the thesis perceives Kosovo as the most successful 
contemporary case of unilateral secession, i.e. secession without the consent of the parent 
state. This thesis, therefore, recognises two things: first, there have been other recent 
successful cases of secession; however, they were not an outcome of unilateral act. On the 
contrary, they were a result of an agreement between the state and the seceding entity. An 
example of such a case is East Timor that gained its independence in 2002 with the consent of 
Indonesia. Nonetheless, this thesis seeks also to produce inclusive findings that can explain 
the success or failure of unilateral secessions. Thus, due to the lack of other cases of 
successful unilateral secessions, the thesis employs Kosovo as the most suitable case for this 
research. Second, this work acknowledges that historically the unilateral secession of East 
Pakistan –now Bangladesh- from (West) Pakistan in 1971 is considered to be the most 
successful case of unilateral secession. However, Bangladesh would be inadequate for a study 
of contemporary phenomena of secession for several reasons, including that it obtained its 
independence more than forty years ago in the time of the Cold War and in a completely 
different international system. In addition, the three main entities involved, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India, were all a result of decolonisation. It can be argued, therefore, that the 
secession of Bangladesh was a belated consequence of the decolonisation process and thus not 
adequate for the purposes of this study. 
 This work perceives success as the extent to which a seceding entity has managed to 
separate from the central state and create a recognised and viable state. Other definitions or 




extent to which Kosovo’s secession was successful from a cultural, social, economic or 
humanitarian point of view.  
 It is stressed once more that the research remains limited to the answer of the research 
questions and the investigation of the factors that rendered Kosovo’s secession successful. 
Hence, analysis of the construction of the Albanian and Serbian identities and in-depth 
analysis of the origins of the conflict in Kosovo is out of the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the background of events that had played a major 
role for Kosovo’s successful secession, but only to assess how and to what extent they 
facilitated this outcome. For example, it is out of the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed 
examination of the reasons that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia or the reasons that led 
NATO to proceed to the air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  
 In terms of language, this thesis observed that the word secession is often an 
undesirable term, viewed negatively and usually with purpose to denounce or oppose such 
attempts. For this reason, the word secession and its derivatives are mostly used by states, 
scholars and in general those condemning secessionist movements. In contrast, secessionist 
movements and those endorsing their demands mostly use the more positive word 
independence, offering a sense of justice and nobility to the secessionist cause. Nonetheless, 
this thesis will use the two terms interchangeably free of positive or negative nuances, as at 
least in the frame of this thesis the meaning, the practices and outcomes each word produces, 
coincide.   
Furthermore, this thesis often uses the term “entity,” a vague term aiming to describe a 
de facto independent region or system of governance being usually either in transition or in 
limbo. An exact definition of such a situation seems to be absent, thus, this research 




The word “entity” is preferred to other alternative terms, as it has a more encompassing 
meaning including territory, population, as well as societal, political and economic function. It 
is also used to describe unrecognised regions that have achieved a level of self-governance, 
either as self-administered territories inside the borders of an existing state or as de facto 
independent states that have received no or limited recognition. They are also sometimes 
referred as “seceding groups” or “seceding movements.” The states from which entities seek 
to secede are interchangeably referred in this thesis as “existing states”, “central states” or 
“parent states.”  
 This thesis often uses “international community” as a euphemism for the West. 
Nevertheless, in cases where appropriate or when there is a clear division in the international 
system the thesis refers to individual actors or alliances in specific.  
 As final clarifications in terms of names and language used, the term Kosovar refers to 
Kosovo Albanians, whereas the word Kosovan refers to the citizens of Kosovo regardless of 
ethnicity. Kosovo is referred with this name instead of its Albanian pronunciation Kosova, 
with the exception of when an interviewee cites it as Kosova. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also 
referred to as Bosnia. The names of places and cities are referred with the names used in 
English language and literature, for example, Belgrade instead of Beograd.  
 
Methods of research 
This thesis seeks to contribute theoretically and empirically to the field of secession by 
examining the assumption that secessionist attempts succeed when they achieve international 
recognition and internal viability. It also seeks to reveal what creates the conditions for these 
two criteria to be fulfilled. Thus, this thesis, by having set an assumption on when a secession 




combines deductive and inductive approaches to research. The deductive approach, beginning 
with a theory or an assumption and continuing its examination and final confirmation or 
rejection, concerns the first part of the question, i.e. the pre-conditions of the success of 
secession. The second part of the question requires an inductive approach, enabling the 
investigation of reasons that result in a certain outcome. After all data are gathered and 
analysed, then the inductive approach is used to produce a tentative theory or assumption; in 
the case of this thesis that is the observation that changes in four different levels may lead to 
the successful outcome of a secession. Hence, this thesis blends these two approaches as their 
combination enables the accommodation of the overlapping processes of theorising and 
researching (Wallace in Blaikie, 2007).  
 This research develops under the ontological assumption of “cautious realist” as 
defined by Blaikie (2007). In view of that, this thesis accepts reality as being independent 
from humans’ understanding and acknowledgement. However, it also accepts that human 
senses are imperfect, and recognises that observation and research are interpretive processes. 
Therefore, at also assumes that reality cannot be observed accurately and a cautious attitude 
needs to be adopted.  
Consequently, this study agrees to a large extent with the epistemological paradigm of 
critical rationalism, as introduced and developed by Popper (1935/2002). Critical rationalism 
assumes that due to imperfect human nature it cannot be known whether a theory is true, but 
only the contrary, i.e. whether it is false. Thus, theories can only be tentative and need to be 
liable to tests of falsification. In case that the test fails, then the theory needs to be amended. 
Thus, theories need to be addressed critically instead of dogmatically. This study proposes 




either tentatively accepted or amended. They will also be further applied in future research 
projects.  
In order to conduct the research this thesis uses Kosovo as a case study, a case that had 
both an unsuccessful and a successful attempt to secede in two different points of time in less 
than twenty years. Hence, this thesis adopts a process tracing method combined with a within-
case comparison. The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal chain 
and mechanisms that shape the outcome of the issue in-question (George and Bennett, 2005). 
The process tracing method traces the steps in a causal chain and explains the causes and the 
outcome of a situation through an intensive analysis of the events (Levy, 2002). This thesis 
having 1991 as starting point investigates and analyses the events that created the conditions 
for Kosovo’s second secession to succeed in 2008. The thesis also engages in a within case-
study comparison (Levy, 2002) comparing Kosovo’s two attempts to secede. The second of 
the empirical chapters explains why Kosovo’s first attempt to secede in 1991 failed, while the 
last empirical chapter explains the reasons that turned it successful after it declared 
independence in 2008. Finally, recognising that Kosovo’s demands for secession did not 
suddenly appear in 1991 the thesis shortly examines the historical background preceding the 
first declaration of independence.  
By employing a three-stage research method, including the placement of the research 
into its historical context, followed by the conduct of within case comparison and process-
tracing, this thesis seeks to maximise the depth and the explanatory capacity of this study. 
Nonetheless, it is also acknowledged that the single-case study methodology has often been 
accused of lack of generalisability (Yin, 1994, McNabb, 2004, Kerlinger, 1986, Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Bearing this in mind, this thesis needs to clarify that its aim is to generate assumptions 




this research and the application of its finding to other relevant cases. This way by using the 
findings of single case studies as examples for further research “one can often generalize on 
the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via 
generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 228). 
Acknowledging the inevitability of subjectivity and interpretation, this thesis uses 
three techniques of data collection, seeking to provide as accurate answers as possible to the 
research questions. The use of different techniques of data collection enables triangulation and 
enhances the possibility that no relevant data are missed. Triangulation can be defined as 
“studying a phenomenon in two or more ways to substantiate the validity of the study 
findings” (McNabb, 2004: 366), a process especially important in studies where a level of 
interpretation from both the researcher and the participants of the research is unavoidable. 
Thus, data was collected through primary and secondary sources and elite interviews. The 
information gathered from each source was checked against each other as to reduce the degree 
of deception (Gallagher, 2013). 
Primary sources used in this thesis include constitutions, government documents, 
peace agreements, court resolutions and advisory opinions, politicians’ speeches, interviews 
and public statements, legal documents and resolutions adopted by the organs of the United 
Nations as well as other international organisations. Primary sources also include reports 
publicised at the time of research by international governmental and non-governmental 
organisations located on the ground and aiming to observe and describe the situation. The 
documents have been mainly retrieved from the internet through the online archives of the 
institutions and organisations involved. In addition, a number of documents regarding the 
diplomatic efforts to settle the crisis in Kosovo, the military action against the FRY, as well as 




compilation, where significant original documentation is reproduced without any interference 
or analysis by the editor.  
Secondary sources used in this thesis include books, academic articles, newspaper 
articles and conference papers, either in electronic form or hardcopy, as well as documentary 
films. Most of the secondary sources were acquired through access provided by the University 
of Birmingham; however, some sources were also obtained from the library of the Serbian 
Academy of Science and Arts, the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the premises of 
the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade.  
Furthermore, the research data is supplemented through the conduct of field research 
and elite interviews. In total, thirty-four interviewees participated in the research in four cities; 
Prishtina, Gračanica, North Mitrovica and Belgrade. The interviews varied greatly in time, 
lasting from forty-five minutes to two hours. The interviewees comprised both international 
personnel, including diplomats and international organisations’ personnel, and local 
representatives of civil society, think-tanks and non-governmental organisations in the 
aforementioned cities. The participants were predominantly male -twenty-six out of thirty-
four; however, as the interviewees were approached on the basis of their professional role and 
this thesis is not concerned with gender-related issues, it is considered that this imbalance 
between male and female participants does not interfere with the research findings. A detailed 
list of interviewees is attached in Appendix I.     
The field trips took place over two different time periods. The first field trip was 
conducted in Kosovo and was followed by a trip to Belgrade eight months later. In the 
intervening time the data from the first field trip were coded and analysed. During this process 




perspective. Thus, a second field trip to Belgrade followed, aiming also to include the Serbian 
point of view of the events.   
The interviewees were selected on the basis of their professional capacity and the 
expectation that their experience in certain events would provide a valuable insight into the 
research. Thus, the participants were selected predominantly because of their direct personal 
participation in certain events, such as the Rambouillet accords and the Vienna negotiations. A 
further reason for selection was the central role their country or hiring institution had played in 
the settlement of the Kosovo issue throughout the years. Finally, Kosovo Albanians and 
Kosovo Serbian civil society activists were interviewed to present their own perspective of the 
background of Kosovo’s secession.  
The interviewees were initially identified either by the web-page of the relevant 
institutions and international organisations or through suggestions from scholars having 
already conducted research in Kosovo. International organisations’ personnel and ambassadors 
were mainly identified and contacted through the details provided on-line, while civil society 
activists were contacted through personal introductions by other researchers.     
Acknowledging that elites have limited time and heavy schedules, the organisation of 
the field trip started two months in advance. Potential participants were contacted by e-mail 
introducing myself, explaining the purpose of the research and why they were selected as 
interviewees, as well as the main points of the interview questions. The participants were also 
asked whether they wished to be recorded or not and whether to be cited or remain 
anonymous. In the e-mail a participant information sheet was attached and included further 
details about the research project, the policies of the University of Birmingham regarding the 
storage of data, issues of confidentiality and the interviewee’s right to withdraw from the 




In the beginning of the interview the interviewees were asked to sign a form declaring 
their consent to participate in this study according to the terms detailed in the participant 
information sheet and reiterated in the consent form. In cases where a participant agreed to be 
interviewed but refused to sign the consent form due to reasons of anonymity and 
confidentiality, they were informed and was agreed that they may be contacted in all 
confidentiality by the University of Birmingham if necessary to verify their participation in the 
research. In addition issues concerning their anonymity were discussed in person. The 
majority of the interviewees -nineteen out of thirty-four- preferred to remain anonymous. In 
this case, a suitable title was agreed with each of the participants, in case their statements were 
mentioned in the thesis. These citations are referred in the thesis with the title agreed and the 
number of the respective interview, for example, “Interview 1, Former NATO Officer.” 
Furthermore, the majority of the interviewees -twenty-two- agreed to be recorded, but they 
reserved the right to stop the recording at any time. In cases where interviewees preferred not 
to be recorded, handwritten notes were taken. All data were stored in accordance with the 
University of Birmingham Code of Practice for Research (2014). Electronic data, i.e. audio-
recordings were stored on a password-protected USB stick, which remained locked in a secure 
compartment when not in use. Likewise, hard-copies of data, i.e. printed transcripts and hand-
written notes also remained locked in a secure compartment when not in use.   
The interviews were predominantly semi-structured, with open-ended questions. Semi-
structured interviews allowed some control over the course of the interview, providing also 
space for the interviewee to mention whatever they believed to be important and relevant to 
the matter (Berry, 2002, Kvale, 2006). This type of interview is considered to be most suitable 
when conducting elite interviews where there is a certain imbalance in the power dynamic 




researcher as the knowledge-seeking novice (Burnham et al., 2004). In addition, elites used to 
presenting the rhetoric of their government or organisation often diverted from the topic in 
question. Therefore, asking a set of questions was helpful for limiting the interview to the 
purposes of the thesis. Although, the questions were constantly modified depending on the 
position of the interviewee and the reasons why they were invited to contribute to the research, 
a sample of the interview questions can be found in Appendix II.  
After the end of the interview a follow-up e-mail was sent thanking the participants for 
their time and input and also asking them to suggest further potential interviewees. This way it 
was possible to obtain personal e-mails or telephone numbers of potential participants and 
avoid the various gate-keepers elites may have. A “snowball technique” (Mikecz, 2012) was, 
thus, used to gain access to relevant additional participants. Hence, although both field trips 
were planned well in advance, admittedly more progress was made after the research on the 
ground had commenced.  
All recorded interviews were transcribed, while all handwritten notes were typed and 
included in the same document. Printed, hardcopy documents of interviews’ transcript were 
manually colour coded twice. In the beginning each colour corresponded to each question. 
After themes emerged, the transcript were colour coded again with colours corresponding 
respective patterns. After the second coding was complete, findings were summarised in form 
of tables.  
Finally, a process of triangulation followed including data from interviews, primary 
and secondary sources. Data included in the thesis were cross-checked and verified. 
Mismatches between the interview findings and the primary documents findings were not 
uncommon. In such cases, the findings from the primary documents were incorporated in the 




contradicted secondary sources the thesis included both approaches. Finally, in case where 
secondary sources contradicted primary sources, primary sources were again prioritised and 
included in the final document.   
 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured in two main parts; the first provides the conceptual foundations of the 
research, while the second is devoted to an empirical examination of the case study.  
In more detail the first part comprises Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Two 
introduces the term of successful secession, explains its meaning and sets the criteria of 
international recognition and internal viability. Taking into account that the ultimate goal of 
secession, unilateral or not, is the creation of a state, this Chapter also explains how this thesis 
perceives the state. It continues with demonstrating the significance of international 
recognition for newly created states and seceding entities. Finally, it explains how the thesis 
defines the internal viability of a state.  
Chapter Three places the thesis in the theoretical framework of secession. The Chapter 
begins with an overview of the principle of self-determination, its meaning and evolution, also 
presenting the ways in which it was applied through the years. The chapter continues with 
secession as a form of exercising the right to self-determination, and reviews the main theories 
expressed in the literature. It then assesses how existing theories of secession attempt to apply 
and explain the case of Kosovo. The chapter shows that existing theories fail to explain why 
Kosovo’s secession succeeded to such an extent, revealing the theoretical contribution of this 
thesis.  
The second part of the thesis follows, comprising Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven and 




portraying the relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo from the Balkan Wars (1912-
1913) to the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
analyse in-depth the origins and the reasons of the conflict in Kosovo. The purpose of this 
chapter is rather to constitute an introduction to the following empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Acknowledging that Kosovo’s demands for further autonomy, independence and/or 
unification with Albania were part of a longstanding process, this chapters seeks to 
demonstrate the nature of relations between the two ethnic groups, the changes that shaped the 
dynamics between them and present the historical context in which Kosovo’s first declaration 
of independence took place in 1991.   
 Chapter Five explains why Kosovo’s first attempt to secede failed. In order to explain 
this outcome, the thesis examines the context in which the declaration of independence took 
place. It analyses how the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989 and the 
characterisation of the Kosovo issue as an internal Serbian matter had a negative effect on the 
outcome of its first attempt to secede. It also evaluates how the peaceful situation in Kosovo, 
at a time when the wars in the north of Yugoslavia had already started, undermined the success 
of its attempt. Finally, this chapter reveals how the changes in the international system and the 
end of the Cold War affected Kosovo’s first attempt to secede.  
 Chapter Six investigates the changes that occurred from 1991 to 1999 and turned 
Kosovo from a Serbian internal matter to a major international (in)security issue that triggered 
NATO’s military intervention, demonstrating how those changes affected the success of 
Kosovo’s unilateral secession in 2008. This chapter examines Ibrahim Rugova’s non-violent 
resistance and the parallel society the Kosovars established under his guidance. It shows that 
the failure of this approach to gain a seat at the negotiations table at Dayton, the process that 




Army (KLA); an armed movement that pursued independence by military means. The chapter 
also analyses how Milošević’s misrule, ironically, positively affected the outcome of Kosovo’s 
second secession. Lastly, this chapter examines the role of the Rambouillet negotiations, the 
consequences of their failure and the impact of NATO’s subsequent military intervention on 
the outcome of Kosovo’s secession.  
 Chapter Seven explores how the position of Kosovo under international administration, 
following the NATO’s air-campaign, and certain events that occurred during this time, 
affected Kosovo’s secession. This chapter presents the structure and the duties of the 
international administration, evaluating its efficacy and identifying its drawbacks. In addition 
this chapter reveals how the riots against the Serbs in 2004 accelerated the process of 
Kosovo’s secession, leading to the Vienna negotiations and the Ahtisaari plan. Following this, 
the chapter examines the course of the negotiations, exploring why they failed and what their 
impact was on Kosovo’s unilateral secession, which took place shortly after their conclusion.  
 Chapter Eight presents and evaluates Kosovo’s progress towards international 
recognition and internal viability after it seceded unilaterally in 2008. The chapter examines 
the first international reactions following the unilateral declaration of independence. 
Subsequently, it investigates how and why the stance of certain states, including Serbia, has 
changed through the years until 2015. Moreover, the chapter assesses Kosovo’s progress 
towards internal viability, highlighting the major steps forward it has achieved in seven years 
of independence. Nevertheless, the chapter also depicts the shortcomings and emphasises the 
areas in urgent need of improvement.  
 The final chapter recollects the findings of the empirical chapters and integrates them 











































DEFINING SUCCESSFUL SECESSION 
 
Introduction 
The main research question this thesis seeks to answer is why the unilateral secession of 
Kosovo in 2008 succeeded. The thesis acknowledges that Kosovo remains a contested case, 
neither globally recognised nor a UN member state. Thus, chapter two explains the choice of 
this particular case study for this thesis. It also sets the criteria under which a secession can be 
regarded as successful and demonstrates that Kosovo is the most successful case of unilateral 
secession since Bangladesh in 1971.  
 This thesis defines successful secession with the use of two criteria: a) the international 
recognition the seceding entity has achieved and b) its internal viability. International 
recognition is of major importance, because it offers the opportunity to newly created states to 
interact with other states. Recognised states can enter into international organisations, sign co-
operational agreements, and attract investments, while they can also ask for loans and financial 
aid. In contrast, unrecognised states have limited, if any, chances to participate in the above 
procedures. However, being internationally accepted is not enough; it is also essential that the 
seceding entity creates a viable state. There are numerous states, such as Somalia, South Sudan 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), that although recognised are far from being 
viable or functional. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the literature on when a state is 
viable – or contrariwise failed. Thus, this thesis will accept as a minimum requirement for an 
entity to be considered viable that its government is at least able to exert control over its 




The criteria of external recognition and internal viability will be treated as two separate 
conditions that both need to be fulfilled. Nonetheless, this thesis acknowledges and 
demonstrates that there is a strong interaction between them. International support, which is 
more likely in the event of external recognition, enhances the chances for internal viability, by 
creating favourable conditions for the economic, institutional and infrastructural development 
of the newly created state. There are also arguments in favour of the view that evident internal 
viability and compliance with Western standards of democracy, with the term to be used in its 
widest definition, lead to international recognition (Caspersen, 2012, Caspersen and 
Stansfield, 2011). This thesis agrees that it would have been easier for the international 
community to accept entities that honour international norms. Nevertheless, drawing on 
examples of secessionist entities with demonstrated internal viability, which remain 
unrecognised or with limited recognition, this thesis claims that evident internal viability does 
not automatically result in international acceptance.  
 Examining Kosovo in light of these two criteria of successful secession this thesis 
argues that it has achieved a remarkable degree of success. Although for the moment its 
entrance into the UN remains blocked, as it is not recognised by two permanent members of 
the UN Security Council and it also confronts internal problems stemming mainly from weak 
institutions and an immature political system, the thesis argues that Kosovo has achieved such 
a degree of success that constitutes its secession irreversible. Furthermore, Kosovo is the most 
successful case of unilateral secession since Bangladesh in 1971. There have been other 
successful secessions since, but they were outcomes of state dissolutions, decolonisation or 
mutual agreement between parent state and secessionist entity. Kosovo, however, is the only 
case since 1971 that seceded unilaterally and achieved such a degree of success.1 
                                                                
1 Some examples of unilateral secessions that have failed to achieve a significant degree of success: Nagorno-




The following sections will analyse in detail the criteria of international recognition 
and internal viability. In addition, as the goal of the seceding entity is to establish its own state, 
this chapter will also explain how this thesis perceives the state. The chapter will thus be 
divided into three parts: the first part will explain how the state is defined in this thesis; the 
second part will analyse the theory and practice of international recognition; the third part will 
analyse the notion of the internal viability of a state. The chapter will conclude with an 
evaluation of the extent to which Kosovo meets the standards of a successful case of 
secession, explaining also why Kosovo is the most relevant case study for the purposes of this 
thesis.  
 
Defining the state 
Secession is defined in the thesis as “the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a 
territory and its population where that territory was previously part of an existing state” 
(Pavković and Radan, 2007). If the seceding entity seeks annexation to another state, instead 
of creating its own, then it falls in the category of irredenta (Ambrosio, 2001, Horowitz, 
1985). As the principal purpose of secession is the creation of a new state, this thesis needs 
first to explain how it perceives the state. However, there is no clear definition of what a state 
is (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, Pierson, 2011). Therefore, the following section will review 
a number of approaches presented by the literature on what the state is, concluding in the end 
to the most relevant for this study. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
both remain unrecognised. Similarly the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) although successfully 
exerts de facto sovereignty over the northern part of Cyprus, it is recognised only by Turkey, while Abkhazia 





i. What is a state: political theory concepts 
In antiquity the state was presented as a room where citizens could exercise their political 
rights. The ideas of state and society were intermingled and the state was defined mostly by its 
inhabitants (Aristotle, 4th Ce.B.C./1993, Plato, 4th Ce.B.C./2009). For instance, in documents 
of the time the term “Athens” is rarely mentioned to describe this particular city-state. In 
contrast, the term “Athenian” was widely used for both the state and its inhabitants.    
Later, the state was presented as a voluntary association between citizens and 
government. These theories are known as “contract theories,” the main representatives of 
which were Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Hobbes (1651/1996) argued that the state and the 
monarch saved humans from savagery, a “state of nature” in which they would have 
otherwise to live because of their violent nature. Locke (1689/1980) believing that humans are 
neither good nor bad introduced in his writings the meaning of “property.” Property was not 
seen only as ownership, but as a combination of rights that the contract would have to fulfil in 
order to be valid. Rousseau (1762/1973), on the contrary, claimed that humans were happy in 
the state of nature. However, as societies started to develop, humans had to create laws in 
order to survive and live peacefully. His social contract would give humans the opportunity 
both to protect themselves and remain free, since the contract would be made by them and it 
would be valid for as long as it served them.   
Common to all three aforementioned theorists is their argument that humans 
established societies/ states because they had something to gain. Regardless of the form of 
government that each theorist considered to be optimal, all converge at the idea that by 
belonging to a state, humans gain and protect some of their rights. Thus, there is a reciprocal 




protection of rights, and in exchange citizens agree to reduce their freedom and submit to the 
state’s laws and authority.   
In contrast to the theories presenting the state as a voluntary association there are those 
that perceive the state as a result of the domination of a group of people over the rest of the 
population (Kouskouvelis, 2004). Domination is achieved through force or violence and has 
as main purpose the control of the labour process and the exploitation of the working class 
(inter alia, Marx, 1962, Brewer, 1986, Steiner, 1984, Roemer, 1982). Apart from dominating 
and controlling the means of production, this form of state also presents the interests of the 
rulers as if they were interests of the ruled. In this way, the needs of a ruling minority are 
fulfilled as demands of the citizens (Kotzias, 1993).  Consequently, the state is presented as a 
mechanism of coercion, creating a one-sided relationship in favour of its ruling agents. 
Furthermore, the state is presented as an entity that “possesses a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919: 1). Similarly, for Tilly 
states are relatively centralised, differentiated organisations, whose officials more or less 
successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population 
inhabiting a large, contiguous territory (Tilly, 1999: 170). 
Douglas North, working on a neoclassical theory of the state, suggests that the state is 
the organisation that has comparative advantage in violence over a specific territory, whose 
borders are defined by the state’s authority to impose taxes (North, 1981). North and Wallis 
(2010) by reviewing and comparing their own previous work to that of Weber, admit that the 
assumption that the state somehow possesses a comparative advantage in violence was 
inadequate. Although they recognise that there is no comprehensive theory of the state, they 




it. Thus, they suggest that the state is the organisation that has the ability to organise other 
organisations.  
By closely examining the above theories it is observed that they have a common 
characteristic in their analysis. In all of them, the state is the source of authority or “legitimate 
power” (Weber, 1919). In other words, the state combines both the right and the power to 
rule. Whereas power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others through various means, 
authority is based on the right to do so. This legitimacy is rooted in an acknowledged 
obligation to obey rather than any form of coercion or manipulation. Authority then is “power 
cloaked in legitimacy or rightfulness” (Heywood, 2000: 15), exercised by a government and 
extended over a population, inhabiting a specific territory.  
Nonetheless, the aforementioned theories of the state fail to answer what a state is in 
practical terms. They extensively address philosophical issues about the nature of the state, 
how it works and how it exercises its powers. Yet, the question of what constitutes a state 
remains unanswered.     
 
ii. What is a state: international law perspectives 
Jellinek (1914) seeking to offer a straightforward definition of what constitutes a state, argued 
that a state needs three elements in order to exist: territory, population and government. 
Building his argument on those elements he described the state as “the organisation, which is 
equipped with power to rule over a permanent population of a territory” (Jellinek, 1914: 180). 
A further attempt to establish a concrete definition of the state was made in the 
Montevideo Convention (1933), which comprised Jellinek’s three elements and added one 
more, namely “the capacity to enter into relations with other states.” Thus, according to 




possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” Currently, this is the 
most widely accepted legal definition of statehood (inter alia, Akpinarli, 2010, Crawford, 
2006, Schoiswohl, 2004).  
However, the “capacity to enter into relations with other states” as a constitutive 
element of statehood is often disputed (Kimminich and Hobe, 2000, Malanczuk, 1997). It is 
argued that this capacity is a requirement of the government or a requirement of independence 
or even a consequence of independence, but not a constitutive element of a state (Akpinarli, 
2010, Dugard, 2000). Likewise, Crawford argues that the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states is rather a combination of the requirement of government and independence 
(Crawford, 2006: 74), meaning that states are capable of entering into relations with other 
states and this characteristic is a consequence rather than a prerequisite of statehood 
(Giorgetti, 2010). Moreover, the existence of the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states can be interpreted in different ways. For instance, for a newly established state this 
capacity could be interpreted as independence or recognition. For an existing state, however, 
the same criterion could be interpreted as an aspect of effective government (Akpinarli, 2010).  
It is also worth noting that Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention affirms that the 
political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. It is also 
added that even before recognition, the state has the right to defend its integrity and 
independence, to provide for its prosperity and consequently to organise itself as it sees fit. 
Yet, given the fact that without recognition states cannot enter into relations with other states,2 
the Montevideo Convention contains serious controversies and limitations regarding the 
creation of a new state. Thus, although what a state is seems straightforward at first sight, 
                                                                
2 The exception is Taiwan or the Republic of China, which while being recognised only by twenty-one states, 




when it comes to newly created states it remains unclear when they officially come into 
existence.  
This thesis claims that if an entity has obtained through secession a permanent 
population, territory and effective government then it has achieved de facto statehood. 
However, without international recognition its government does not have the opportunity to 
interact freely with all the actors of the international system, but its relations are limited to the 
countries and organisations that have either recognised it or unofficially support it. Thus, for a 
secession to be entirely successful it needs to create a recognised state3 fulfilling all four 
criteria of the Montevideo Convention.  
 
International recognition  
Recognition and secession are closely associated. For more than a hundred years, recognition 
has provided the “imprimatur of statehood to seceding entities” (Dugard and Raič, 2006: 110). 
Certainly with the passage of time the meaning of secession has significantly changed. In the 
nineteenth century when Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and other nations demanded independence 
from the Ottoman Empire they eventually received assistance from the Great Powers in 
support of their purpose (Rodogno, 2012). The Great Powers of the time also recognised the 
newly created states when they reached the standards for de facto statehood (Fabry, 2010). 
Hence, during the ninetieth century and the early years of the twentieth, secession primarily 
meant national independence from an empire or from colonial rule. Later in the era of 
decolonisation when people under colonial rule had the right to self-determination and 
                                                                
3 The threshold for a state to be regarded as recognised is considered to be the same with the one required for 
admission into the UN. Hence, for a state to be globally recognised it needs to have the recognition of the two-
thirds of the UN members states, as well as the recognition of nine of the fifteen members of the UN Security 




secession, international recognition was quickly granted to the new state, provided that they 
respected the uti possidetis4 principle.  
However, outside the frame of decolonisation and the uti possidetis principle any 
attempt to redraw existing boundaries is viewed as a violation of the principle of territorial 
integrity. Similarly, the recognition of a new state that is created from the territory of an 
existing state without its consent, is viewed as a violation of international law (Dugard and 
Raič, 2006).  
In addition, granting diplomatic recognition may have serious implications, leading on 
the one hand to the official division of a previously recognised state, and on the other hand to 
the acceptance of a new entity into the club of sovereign states (Paquin, 2010). Recognition, 
hence, is both the confirmation of statehood and the act that transforms a secessionist entity 
into a state (Dugard and Raič, 2006, Heraclides, 1991). 
 International recognition, though, is difficult to achieve. Until the end of the Cold War 
the international community recognised only new states that emerged from decolonisation, 
with the exception of Bangladesh (East Pakistan at the time) in 1971, which unilaterally 
seceded from (West) Pakistan. Even Bangladesh, however, achieved uncontested statehood 
and was admitted in the UN only after it was recognised by Pakistan in 1974 (Pavković and 
Radan, 2007, UNGA, 1974).  
At this point the significance of acceptance to the UN should be noted, as it seems to 
be an indicator of uncontested statehood5 (Owtram, 2011). Entrance into the UN demonstrates 
                                                                
4 The uti possidetis juris is defined as the “principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization” 
(ICJ, 1986). Thus, states emerging from decolonisation are supposed to maintain the colonial administrative 
borders they had at the time of independence (Ratner, 1996). Accordingly, when a territory gains 
independence, the new international boundaries shall be drawn along the administrative boundaries of the 
former structure (Watson, 2008).  
5 Exceptionally, East Germany first entered the UN and then achieved uncontested statehood. In 1973 West 
and East Germany entered the UN as two different states achieving, thus, international recognition. However, 




that the majority of the world’s sovereign states recognise the new state as equal and it is 
subsequently protected by the Charter’s principles. Therefore, admission into the UN 
constitutes one of the priorities of states. The only exception has been Switzerland, which 
although being a recognised state, was unwilling to participate in the organisation for more 
than fifty years, considering membership to be incompatible with neutrality. However, even 
Switzerland eventually declared UN membership to be a “strategic goal” and entered the 
organisation in 2002. 
Returning to seceding entities seeking recognition, after the end of the Cold War 
several entities took advantage of the collapse of the communist regimes and demanded the 
creation of their own state. All those, who were constituent republics of their former state, 
such as the six Constituent Republics of Yugoslavia or the fifteen Union Republics of the 
former Soviet Union, gained full recognition. Nonetheless, some entities that were 
autonomous republics or autonomous regions within the constituent republics of those states 
also declared independence. Most of them however, gained limited, if any, recognition, 
verifying the assertion that international recognition is far from easy to obtain outside the uti 
possidetis principle. Kosovo seems to be an exception to this rule.  While still not universally 
recognised, with one hundred and nine official recognitions, it has certainly achieved a 
remarkable level of international acceptance. This level is even more noteworthy, considering 
the fact that Serbia as former parent state still refuses to recognise its independence, a stance 
that is supported by two permanent UN Security Council members Russia and China.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
the establishment of diplomatic relations to follow a year later in 1974. In addition, France, UK and the US 
refused to recognise East Berlin as the capital of East Germany and the latter entered the UN under an explicit 
relevant provision. Finally, the two Germanys, although they had normalised their relations through a series of 




i. Theories of international recognition 
International recognition is of crucial importance for a seceding entity. Recognition is the 
element that transforms a unilaterally seceding entity into a state. After its recognition, the 
newly created state has the opportunity to interact with other states and international 
organisations, while it is protected by the principles of non-intervention and territorial 
integrity (Caspersen, 2011). Moreover, recognition allows access to markets, loans, capital 
investments, and resources necessary for the development of the economy (Mulaj, 2011a, 
Mihalkanin, 2004). Finally, official documents and passports issued by recognised states are 
internationally accepted and thus citizens have the opportunity for free movement and access 
to a globalised world. Therefore, the pursuit of recognition has been a priority for states newly 
created through secession (Lewis, 2008). 
 However, there is still not a uniform answer to the questions of when an entity has 
achieved statehood and what the role of international recognition in this outcome is. The 
debate on those issues revolves mainly around two theories of statehood: the constitutive and 
the declaratory theory. The former perceives recognition as “a necessary act before the 
recognised entity can enjoy an international personality”, while the latter sees it as “merely a 
political act recognizing a pre-existing state of affairs” (Dixon et al., 2011:158).  
In the constitutive approach, the question of “whether or not an entity has become a 
state depends on the actions of others, i.e. recognition of existing states” (Grant, 1999: 2). In 
other words, a seceding entity turns into a state only when it achieves international recognition 
and is able to enter into relations with other states, meeting thus all four criteria of the 
Montevideo Convention. Support for this view comes from the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
ruling regarding the Quebec Case, declaring that “the ultimate success of a [unilateral] 




consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the 
conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition” 
(Supreme Court of Canada, 1998 §155). Thus, even where an attempt is unilateral, 
international recognition may create a new state.  
Nevertheless, the constitutive theory has certain limitations. First, the fact that one 
entity may be recognised by some states, but not by others, is an evident deficiency of the 
constitutive theory. A partial recognition would mean that an entity is simultaneously regarded 
by some as a state and by some others as a non-state (Dugard and Raič, 2006) and accordingly 
a partially recognised state both has and does not have an international personality (Brierly, 
1963, Crawford, 2006). Second, the question that arises is how many recognitions are enough 
for a state to be created. Kosovo has currently been recognised by 109 out of 193 UN member 
states (May 2015). The question is whether 109 recognitions are enough according to the 
constitutive theory for Kosovo to be considered a state, and if not, then where the threshold 
lies for the minimum of recognitions required.6Although this is a question that falls in the 
purview of international law to answer, it still may have political implications for Kosovo and 
for other entities seeking uncontested statehood.  
In order to overcome the limitations of the constitutive theory, most contemporary 
scholars have accepted the declaratory approach (Watson, 2008). In the declaratory approach 
statehood arises from the empirical existence of sovereignty, not from juridical recognition of 
its creation by other states (Lynch, 2002). When recognition is granted, other states merely 
acknowledge the pre-existing situation, that of the existence of a state (Vidmar, 2012). A state 
therefore may exist without being recognised; a view that coincides with Jellinek’s three- 
elements doctrine.  
                                                                
6A possible answer to this question would be the UN criteria for admission (see, footnote 4). However, there 




Yet, the declaratory theory also creates logical and practical inconsistencies. On the 
one hand this view alleges that a state can exist, even without recognition. On the other hand, 
unrecognised entities that have otherwise demonstrated sufficient state capabilities continue to 
be treated as illegal personalities (Bartmann, 2004).  
In this way, the so-called de facto states are created. These are entities that have 
emerged most frequently through secession, but did not achieve uncontested statehood 
because of the unwillingness of the international community to accept them. They perform the 
normal functions of a state over their territory and they have, to a large extent, the support of 
their population (Bahcheli et al., 2004). Most of them have demonstrated viability and 
stability (Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2008). Nevertheless, they are not “de jure” states, because 
they are not approved by the international order (McGarry, 2004: 10). 
Contrary to the de facto states are the quasi-states. Jackson defines quasi-states or 
pseudo-states as entities that, although they are recognised, “do not disclose the empirical 
constituents by which real states are ordinarily recognised” (Jackson, 1987: 527). He claims 
that although they enjoy equal sovereignty with other states, they lack established legal and 
administrative institutions (Jackson, 1987: 528-529). Therefore, they are insufficient, unstable 
and incapable of protecting their sovereignty (Mihalkanin, 2004) and they only came into 
existence because of changes in the world order during decolonisation (Jackson, 1990). In 
short, Pegg (1998) argues that “the quasi-state has recognition but lacks capabilities, whereas 
the de facto state has capabilities but lacks recognition” (Pegg, 1998: 5). It seems, hence, that 







ii. The political implications of international recognition 
In addition to its legal effects, recognition is also a political act (McCorquodale, 2005). 
Unrecognised states are non-existent in the eyes of the organised international community 
(Bartmann, 2004). Their claims are perceived by most other states as matters of domestic 
conflict to be resolved within the parameters of the sovereign authority of the challenged 
state. Recognition, however, would legitimise their struggle, would guarantee protection for 
the inhabitants and prestige and power for their leaders (Caspersen, 2013). In addition, the 
new state could afterwards enter into formal relations with other states and be accepted in 
international organisations, while it is also considerably easier for a recognised entity to 
request financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(Paquin, 2010). 
 Failure to gain widespread recognition has often resulted in the failure of secessionist 
attempts; to name but a few, Republika Srpska Krajina (Detrez, 2003), Republika Srpska 
(Zahar, 2004) and Biafra (Radan, 2008). The denial of recognition imposes serious constraints 
on the capacity of the entity to function as a modern state. The government has no access to 
international financial institutions or direct bilateral assistance; trade is impeded by the lack of 
recognised regulatory controls; foreign investors are reluctant to invest in a territory whose 
very survival is in danger. Hence, the lack of international recognition undermines the viability 
of the de facto state.       
 However there is also a paradox to be observed: there are entities that despite 
remaining unrecognised have existed for more than twenty years, such as Nagorno Karabakh 
and Transnistria. Kolstø (2006) identifies at least five reasons that contribute to their viability, 
with them being strong internal strategies of nation-building, militarisation of the society, 




community, and support from an external patron. Rowland (2008) and Popescu (2006) also 
emphasise the importance of a patron state, which provides the necessary goods and 
guarantees that these entities will not be re-annexed by force to the parent state. They mention 
respectively the examples of Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, which are still not 
recognised by any country in the world, but Armenia and Russia provide for their security and 
sustainability.  
Consequently, this thesis claims that for a de facto state to reach uncontested statehood 
it needs first to achieve quality recognition, meaning recognition by major powers, able to 
influence other states to accept the new entity. For centuries state recognition has been led and 
shaped by the great powers, whose official acceptance bore more weight than recognition by 
other states and actually, less powerful states have looked to the great powers for direction in 
this regard (Fabry, 2010). When major powers recognised a new entity, the smaller powers 
would follow, producing a “snowball effect” (Fawn and Mayall, 1996: 209). This snowball 
effect leads then to the necessary quantity of recognitions that a newly created state needs in 
order to be considered as a full state and join international organisations. Simply put, the 
argument goes as follows: Quality of recognition  Snowball of recognitions  Quantity of 
recognitions  Uncontested statehood.   
Currently, recognition by the USA seems to have a greater impact on the process of 
secession than recognition by any other state. An official recognition by the US demonstrates 
publicly its support to the secessionist entity. Due to its power and influence in the global 
affairs, an official US acceptance can persuade its allies to recognise the new entity, leading to 
the snowball of recognitions and the process outlined above (Paquin, 2010). The Kosovo case 




powers have also accepted it as a state. Now, seven years after its declaration of 
independence, Kosovo has 109 recognitions (May 2015).  
The argument strengthens if compared with other secessions with similar demands. 
Nagorno Karabakh, for example, while having survived because of the support Armenia 
provides, remains completely unrecognised by other states. One of the reasons for that may be 
the absence of a hegemonic foreign power with enough influence to back it and make its 
secession a fait accompli, as it was in the case of Kosovo (Cheterian, 2012). Other cases such 
as South Ossetia and Abkhazia do have support by Russia, unquestionably a major power, but 
they have achieved only limited recognition. The difference between US and Russian 
recognition is perhaps that the former has a network of allies, whereas Russia is a powerful 
but currently isolated player in the international arena on this particular issue. In the time of 
the former Soviet Union, the latter could convince in similar situations its allies to recognise 
entities seeking recognition. East Germany is an example of such a case which was 
recognised by the Soviet Union and its associates first, before achieving widespread 
recognition by the West and de facto recognition by West Germany (Childs, 1977). For the 
moment, however, Russia’s only allies that were willing to recognise South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were Nicaragua and Venezuela7 (Al Jazeera, 2009, The New York Times, 2008).  
Finally, although Russia has recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent 
and sovereign states, it still deals with similar internal problems. Chechnya has demanded 
independence since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, providing similar reasons as South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. While Russia supports the latter movements, it militarily re-annexed 
Chechnya in 1999 (Pavković and Radan, 2007). By supporting secessionist movements in 
other states, speaking in favour of self-determination and against human rights violations and 
                                                                
7 Nauru has also recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia after receiving £30.74 million in humanitarian aid from 
Russia (The Guardian, 2009). In addition Nauru has also recognised Kosovo, therefore, it is questionable 




discrimination, when at the same time domestically suppressing ethnic groups and denying 
them rights similar to those it emphatically defends in the international scene, Russia presents 
itself as an untrustworthy player that uses double standards according to its interest.  
 On the other hand, the US and major European states recognised Kosovo days after its 
declaration of independence. They also provided arguments that Kosovo should be regarded 
as a sui generis case, trying to ensure that it would not be used as an example to be repeated 
by other secessionist cases8 (inter alia, US Department of State, 2008, Vrbetic, 2013, Jia, 
2009). Perhaps this stark differentiation between Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’s 
acceptance in the international community demonstrates that for the moment the US, followed 
by its allies is the only power able to provide quality recognition that is able to determine the 
outcome of a secession.  
 
Internal viability 
Apart from being recognised, the new entity needs also to be viable for its secession to be 
successful. Internal viability is essential because without it the efforts to secession will most 
probably fail. If a state is not viable sooner or later insecurity and conflict will erupt with the 
most likely scenarios to be the following: if the entity is internationally unrecognised, or with 
limited recognition, it will probably return eventually to the control of the parent state; or, if 
the state has achieved international recognition it will most likely continue to exist as failed 
state, and a source of instability and lawlessness. 
 According to both Emmanuel (1976:3) and Bartmann (2004:15) viability is “surviving 
and functioning in a changing environment.” In the case of a seceding entity, viability refers 
to the extent to which there is confidence in its ability to continue to exist and function in the 
                                                                
8 To what extent they achieved the objective Kosovo to be considered as a unique case providing no precedent 




foreseeable future. However, there is no consensus in the literature on the characteristics that 
make a state viable or not. This section seeks to overcome this vagueness and clarify when a 
state will be considered as viable in this thesis.  
 Although internal viability is a distinct criterion and equally important with 
international recognition for the success of secession, it is also acknowledged that it is 
inextricably connected with international support. It can be claimed that internal viability 
derives from external support, because the latter creates favourable conditions for the 
economic, institutional and infrastructural development of the seceding entity. This link, its 
causes and its implications will be evident throughout this thesis.  
 There are also arguments in favour of the view that evident internal viability and 
compliance with Western standards of democracy may lead to international recognition 
(Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011, Caspersen, 2012). This view was largely encouraged by the 
“standards before status” policy adopted for Kosovo. In 2003, the UN Interim Administration 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) introduced a number of key conditions that Kosovo had to meet before a 
decision on its final status could be made9 (Ker-Lindsay and Economides, 2012). Thus, there 
was the indication that international recognition could be achievable even without the consent 
of the parent state if a democratic and effective entity was created (Caspersen, 2012). 
Nonetheless, Kosovo’s recognition was based mainly on the “unusual combination of factors” 
including the historical context of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the human rights violations and 
the extended period of UN administration rather than on the progress made in institutions 
building and meeting those standards (US Department of State, 2008). 
                                                                
9 The reforms covered the following areas: the existence of functioning democratic institutions; enforcement of 
the rule of law; freedom of movement; sustainable returns of displaced persons and respect for the rights of 
communities; creation of a sustainable market economy; fair enforcement of property rights; dialogue with 






 This thesis does not reject the possibility that a seceding entity demonstrating evident 
internal viability and liberal democratic institutions is more likely to be recognised than one 
that does not fulfil those standards. Recalling, however, other cases of secession which have 
established effective but unrecognised de facto states, this chapter argues that internal viability 
does not necessarily produce international recognition. For instance, since 1997 Somaliland 
has experienced a steady and increasing rate of stability and democratisation (Schoiswohl, 
2004). While Somalia still finds itself in chaos, Somaliland has developed a growing economy 
and has established functional democratic institutions (Paquin, 2010). Similarly, Nagorno-
Karabakh has been characterised as “an oasis of good governance, respect for law and decency 
by comparison with most of the rest of the post-Soviet Union” (Gardner, 2008). Finally, 
Taiwan, an “extreme success story” (Kolstø, 2006) has achieved remarkable economic 
development, being one of the major Asian traders and one of the world’s most significant 
producers of computer technology. In addition, in the early 1990s Taiwan made the transition 
to democracy, and the Guomindang’s monopoly on power ended completely in 1996 (Tien 
and Chu, 1996). Nonetheless, despite their achievements these entities are still either 
unrecognised or maintain few formal diplomatic relations.  
 This section continues with an analysis of when a state can be considered as viable. 
The study will be divided into two parts: the first part will examine whether the size, the 
economy and the system of government of a seceding entity render it by definition unviable. 
The second part will review various definitions of failed states. Taking into consideration the 
findings of both sections and using a reductio ad absurdum approach this section, will 






i. (How) do size, economy and system of government matter? 
This section investigates possible factors that render a state and a seceding entity unviable. 
More specifically it examines whether the size, the economy and the system of government 
are factors that determine the viability of a state. This section examines those specific factors 
as they are often discussed as parameters that could have a negative effect on the viability of a 
seceding entity (Sala-i-Martin, 1998, Alesina, 2003, Beran, 1984, Caspersen and Stansfield, 
2011). This section seeks to show that none of those factors pre-determines that a seceding 
entity would be unviable as a state. 
 Beginning with the factor of the size of the state, it is acknowledged that large states 
have certain benefits. A state with large population and territory has more influence on events 
outside its frontiers, more prestige and a larger element of choice in respect to the domestic 
policies it pursues (Vital, 1967/2006). The costs of public goods are lower in larger countries, 
where more taxpayers can pay for them and also the size of the population affects the 
capacities of their markets. Furthermore, a larger country is less subject to foreign aggression 
(Alesina, 2003).  
However, there are also small states and microstates whose population does not 
exceed one million citizens, who despite their small size function normally in the international 
arena (Hey, 2003, Clarke and Payne, 1987). They are participants in international negotiation 
settings and they have also developed techniques in order to promote and defend their 
interests (Panke, 2011). Significantly, their statehood is not contested because of their small 
size. The very existence of numerous microstates such as Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus, 
demonstrates that even a Lilliputian state cannot only be viable, but flourishing.  
Still, microstates are unable to defend themselves militarily and therefore they depend 




and Oest, 2010, Wivel, 2010). France provides forces in the Comoros, Djibouti and Gabon, 
while the USA remains responsible for the defence of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and 
Palau (Bartmann, 2002). Microstates manoeuvre, thus, within the international system to 
obtain help from others (Handel, 2006). Through participation in international organisations 
and integration in international institutions they ensure their security (Wivel, 2010). Thus, the 
most important condition for the security of small states is their ability to appeal to other 
states for support (Handel, 2006). That means that the main danger for a small state’s security 
is its exclusion from the international community. Hence, the fact that seceding entities are 
being isolated and treated as non-existent is what can render them not viable. Otherwise they 
would have the chance to lobby, urging other states to support them, guaranteeing their 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
 Moving on to the issue of whether economy is a factor that can condemn the viability 
of a state, it is observed that de facto states often have limited economic capacities. Therefore, 
it is sometimes objected by scholars or opponents of secession as to whether they would be 
viable economic entities in the competitive international system (Sala-i-Martin, 1998, Mulaj, 
2011a).  
 However, the fact that some of the de facto states are poor or have limited economic 
opportunities does not preclude a possible viable future as recognised states; in contrast, 
exactly because of their status as unrecognised entities, do they suffer from financial 
difficulties. It is not uncommon for de facto states to suffer from international embargoes and 
international isolation, practices that condemn them to poverty (Bartmann, 2004). 
Unrecognised states are usually not entitled to loans from the World Bank, nor have they 
access to international and regional development programmes, such as the United Nations 




Investors are reluctant to invest in places whose very existence is uncertain. Furthermore, 
unrecognised stated have restricted access to international markets. Many unrecognised states 
are heavily dependent on their patron states for the necessary imports and exports of goods 
(Gorgulu, 2014). Due to isolation, lack of foreign investments and restricted access to 
international markets, unrecognised states are unable to benefit significantly from whatever 
natural resources they may have or make considerable use of any potential touristic 
capabilities (Mihalkanin, 2004). Were sanctions and isolation lifted, de facto states would 
enjoy access to technical assistance, new sources of foreign investment and access to global 
market. Thus, poor de facto states that are sustained by their patron states would have good 
chances of economic viability as recognised states, with the economic and trading benefits 
uncontested statehood produces. 
 Finally, arriving at the last point for examination, to what extent the system of 
government renders a state unviable, it is observed that merely the system of governance does 
not turn a state unviable. There is a great variation in the systems of government among 
existing states. On the one hand, there are democratic states, with the numerous strands 
democracy can have, whereas on the other hand, there are also monarchies, one-party 
government systems and other authoritarian regimes. Although authoritarian regimes are often 
condemned for lack of respect of human rights and absence of liberties often provided in 
Western democracies, their viability remains indisputable. China and Saudi Arabia, followed 
by the majority of the Gulf States are only few of the world leading non-democratic states.  
Moreover, although the West in the various state-building missions it has established 
around the world seeks to impose democratic systems of government, in terms of state 
viability, democracy does not appear to be more stable than autocracies. In contrast, countries 




state failure, as it will be discussed in the following section, while in several cases autocracies 
have demonstrated equal level of stability as well-established, full democracies (The State 
Failure Task Force, 2000).10 Therefore, the type of the governance cannot be considered as a 
factor sufficient to render a state viable or not and consequently the viability of a secessionist 
entity cannot be precluded merely on the event that it may not possess democratic structures.  
 Thus, the size, the economy and the system of government are not factors that 
necessarily render a state and consequently a seceding entity unviable. The following section 
will examine what leads to state failure. By a counter-analysis of when a state can experience 
failure, combined with the observations from this section, this thesis will reach a conclusion 
regarding what preserves a state, i.e. what makes it viable.  
 
ii. When do states fail? 
Considerable research has been undertaken on failed states in recent years. Nevertheless, there 
is still no consensus on which states belong in this category (Yoo, 2011). However, a brief 
review of this field of studies shows that there is an agreement on the basic characteristics of 
failed states. Lack of authority, break-down of law, failure to control territory, resources and 
population, inability to provide services and extended violence are predominant elements of a 
collapsed state. Although some scholars (Rotberg, 2003, Milliken and Krause, 2002) claim 
that state collapse and state failure are different categories, with collapsed states to be extreme 
cases of failed states, this thesis will use the terms interchangeably. This is only because the 
                                                                
10 In response to a request from Vice President Al Gore in 1994, the CIA established “The State Failure Task 
Force,” a group of independent researchers to examine comprehensively the factors and forces that have 
affected the stability of the post-Cold War world. The Task Force’s goal was to identify the factors or 
combinations of factors that distinguish states that failed from those, which averted crises over the last 40 
years. The study represents the first empirical effort to identify factors associated with state failure by 
examining a broad range of demographic, societal, economic, environmental, and political indicators 
influencing state stability. The Task Force found that three clusters of variables had significant correlation with 




distinction makes no difference for the argument of the thesis, as both failed and collapsed 
states are considered to be unviable for as long as they find themselves in this situation.  
 According to Rotberg (2003) a failed state is unable to provide political goods to its 
citizens. He claims that the primary political good is the security of its territory and the 
physical safety of the population. After security has been assured, the state can promote other 
political goods, such as participation in the political process, access to health care and 
education, construction of physical infrastructure and establishment of institutional contexts 
within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals.  
 Zartman (1995: 5) claims that a state has collapsed “when the basic functions of the 
state are no longer performed.” He asserts that a state is supposed to be a sovereign authority, 
an institution and the security guarantor of a populated territory. He argues that the weakening 
of one of those functions also impacts on the others. According to Zartman a state finally 
collapses when governance, law and order have broken down.  
Krasner (2004), reaffirming Zartman and Rotberg,  argues that a state has failed when 
its governance structures cannot exercise competent and constructive control over the 
country’s population and territory. In such states he claims “infrastructure deteriorates; 
corruption is widespread; borders are unregulated; gross domestic product is declining or 
stagnant; crime is rampant; and the national currency is not widely accepted” (Krasner, 2004: 
91). In addition, paramilitary organisations outside the control of the government operate 
within the state’s boundaries, while corrupted leaders take advantage of the widespread 
disorder to make personal profit.  
The State Failure Task Force (SFTF) defined state failure and state collapse as 
situations of severe political crisis, where the institutions of the central state can no longer 




(The State Failure Task Force, 1998, 1999, 2000). Admitting, however, that the instances in 
which central state authority collapsed for several years are too few for accurate statistical 
results, the SFTF included in their research four categories of severe political crisis that they 
also identified as state failure, which would be violent regime change, followed by ethnic war, 
revolutionary war and genocide (The State Failure Task Force, 2000).  
In summary, it can be maintained that there is an agreement that a failed state cannot 
provide order (Herbst, 1997). The government is unstable with little political authority and 
ability to impose the rule of law (King and Zeng, 2001), while non-state actors control 
resources and population. Furthermore, the state cannot provide public goods, the economy 
has usually collapsed, physical infrastructure decays and living standards decline rapidly 
(Yoo, 2011). This lack of capacity frequently leads to extensive violence and human rights 
abuses, while it excludes the population from access to basic social services and condemns the 
majority of the population to poverty (Krasner, 2004). Hence, a state collapses when it is 
unable to control its territory, fails to uphold the monopoly of violence and is incapable of 
providing the services for which it exists (Eriksen, 2011). Common ground between the 
abovementioned views is that whether a state has failed or not is to be decided according to its 
performance in certain aspects. Thus, a state is characterised as failed when it cannot carry out 
those tasks that allegedly belong to a state to fulfil.  
However, Weber argues that a state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. He asserts 
that  
 
there is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and 
there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those 




those associations which have been the predecessors of the modern state. Ultimately, 
one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means 
peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force 
(Weber, 1919). 
 
Weber argues that any aspect of social and political function can also be performed by 
organisations other than the state. However, he claims that what distinguishes the state from 
the other organisations is not the tasks that it performs, but the mechanisms that it has 
available to use. Thus, the state as a political association can only be defined by its capacity to 
exercise physical force. Weber also argues that the state is the only organisation that has the 
right to use violence over the population of its defined territory. Thus, the state holds the 
monopoly of legitimate violence upon the territory it controls.  
In addition, “the failure of states to perform certain functions can be, but need not be, a 
symptom of state failure” (Wolff, 2011: 960). For instance, a state can be unwilling or unable 
to provide its citizens or some of its citizens with public goods and social services, without 
the state necessarily being a failed one. In India the state is unable to guarantee the security of 
its female and child population, while it fails to prosecute even known perpetrators of serious 
abuses (HRW, 2014, 2012). Although the country suffers from poverty, corruption and 
inadequate public healthcare, not only it is not characterized as a failed state, but on the 
contrary, it is considered to be a rapidly emerging regional and global power.  
Hence, it could be more adequate if a failed state would be characterised not by its 
capacity to carry out certain goals, but by whether or not the state controls the means to 
deliver its ends (Wolff, 2011). According to Weber the means a state exclusively possesses is 




Thus, a state has failed if it is unable to guarantee that it is the sole actor that has the right to 
use violence over the territory for which claims sovereignty. The failure to secure these means 
is the most fundamental one and precedes any other subsequent failure i.e. to guarantee 
security and provide public goods. Thus, this thesis adopts the minimal view that failed states 
are those that cannot successfully claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory and over a given population; in other words those states who lack 
empirical sovereignty in all or parts of a territory for which they claim juridical sovereignty 
(Wolff, 2011). 
 
iii. Combining the pieces: when is a state viable 
Through a reductio ad absurdum approach this section has led to the following conclusions. 
First, a state can be viable regardless of its size. Small states and microstates confront certain 
limitations; however, they are neither insurmountable, nor sufficient to render a state and 
consequently a seceding entity of small size unviable. Second, it was also shown that there are 
poor states that are viable nonetheless, as well as that the very fact that unrecognised entities 
remain excluded from the international community endangers their economic viability. These 
seceding entities therefore can be poor but this could change if they had the chance to interact 
more freely in the international system. Third, the chapter explained that different systems of 
governance can result in equally stable states. Hence, this thesis recognises the possibility that 
viability can be achieved even outside the liberal-democratic system of governance the West 
endorses.  
 Furthermore, this thesis adopts the minimal view that failed states are those that 
cannot successfully claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given 




this thesis will accept as viable a state whose governmental system has the ability to control 
the means of violence securing order over a given territory and population.  
 Combining the findings of those two sections this thesis accepts that a state can be 
viable regardless of its size, economy and political system for as long as its government is 
able to ensure domestic order. Applying these findings to cases of secession, an entity that 
demands independent statehood can produce a viable state if its government can provide 
order, effectively ruling over its population and territory.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to establish when a unilateral secession can be considered as 
successful, arguing that a unilateral secession is successful when it results in the creation of a 
recognised and viable state. This chapter analysed this statement by examining, first, how the 
state is perceived in political theory and international law; second, it reviewed the theory and 
practice of international recognition, and finally it explained how this thesis defines the 
viability of a state.    
 Beginning with the conclusion of what is a state, this chapter accepts that there are 
numerous definitions. Acknowledging this, this section adopts the most concrete definition, 
i.e. the Montevideo Conventions’ four criteria of statehood. Thus, the thesis claims that for a 
secession to be entirely successful it needs to create a state that has a specific territory, a 
permanent population, an effective government and international recognition. Without the last 
criterion of international recognition, the seceding entity is considered to have a level of 
success, creating a de facto state. However, the lack of formal acceptance deprives the de 




limitations to its functions. Thus, without international recognition a secessionist attempt 
cannot be considered as completely successful.  
Continuing with the role of international recognition in the outcome of secession, this 
chapter demonstrated the significance of official acceptance and support by other states, 
highlighting the critical role of the quality of recognition. It was demonstrated that it is 
essential for the seceding entity to be recognised by influential states, which can persuade 
others to accept the new entity, creating a snowball of recognitions. This leads eventually to 
the quantity of recognitions necessary for the seceding entity to be accepted to international 
organisations and function normally in the international system.   
This thesis also claims that a secession is successful when the newly-created state is 
internally viable. This chapter was led to the conclusion that a seceding entity can be 
considered as viable when its government is at least able to provide order, effectively ruling 
over its population and territory. Without internal viability the efforts to secession will most 
probably fail, as insecurity and conflict will eventually erupt. In this case, if the entity is 
internationally unrecognised, or has limited recognition, it is probable that it will eventually 
return to the control of the parent state.  If the state has achieved international recognition, it 
will most likely continue to exist as failed state, being both dysfunctional and a source of 
instability and lawlessness. 
Applying the findings in the case of Kosovo, it can be observed that Kosovo is neither 
fully recognised nor fully viable. Its statehood remains contested by Russia and China, two 
Security Council permanent members that block its entrance into the UN. Belgrade although 
it has relaxed its rigid position, still remains far away from granting formal recognition. 




dependent on EU and NATO forces for the maintenance of order especially in Northern 
Kosovo. 
However, Kosovo remains the most suitable case study for this thesis, as it is the most 
successful case of unilateral secession since Bangladesh in 1971. Other current secessionist 
attempts have gained either limited or no international acceptance and they seem to be 
isolated and in stalemate. Kosovo, on the other hand, has 109 formal recognitions (in May 
2015). Reflecting also on the years since 2008 when its unilateral declaration of independence 
took place it is evident that the number of recognitions each year rises. This can be an 
indication that recognition will continue to rise in subsequent years as well. In addition, 
Kosovo is far from being isolated. It maintains close ties with countries that refuse to 
recognise it; Russia, China, Slovakia, Rumania and Greece all have liaison offices in Prishtina 
promoting friendly relations and on the ground cooperation; China and Serbia are two of 
Kosovo’s most important trading partners, while Greece is also gradually increasing its 
involvement.  
Internally Kosovo is a viable state. Certainly it owes a large degree of its viability to 
the international community. However, Kosovo is building and strengthening its institutions 
constantly, increasing at the same time the governmental authority over the whole of 
population and territory.  
Finally, Kosovo has achieved such a degree of external recognition and internal 
viability that render its secession irreversible. Serbia has excluded the option of use of force to 
re-occupy Kosovo and there is also the firm commitment by the international community on 
the ground that it will defend Kosovo against any such threat. As Kosovo is highly unlikely to 
be willing to return voluntarily under Belgrade’s rule, the continuation of its independence is 





SELF-DETERMINATION AND THEORIES OF SECESSION 
 
Introduction 
Building on the framework set out at the end of Chapter Two, this chapter aims to set the 
theoretical underpinnings of the thesis by reviewing and evaluating the most relevant 
secession theories. This chapter will demonstrate that existing theories of secession are 
occupying themselves mainly with normative questions on the issue, exploring predominantly 
if and when secessions are justified. Although these studies cover a wide range of cases and 
possibilities of when secession would and should be allowed, they leave other dimensions of 
secession unexplored. This chapter shows that there is little research done on the question of 
when secessions succeed, whose answers would provide innovative findings on the subject. 
The chapter will conclude with presenting a novel approach towards the understanding of 
secession, constituting the theoretical contribution of this thesis.  
 This chapter is structured as follows. It first analyses the idea of self-determination, its 
evolution through the years and its use as an underpinning for various secession theories. 
More specifically, in the following pages a brief historical review of the concept of self-
determination will follow, beginning from the Wilsonian idea of self-determination, 
continuing with its implementation during the Cold War period and finally concluding with 
the character of the concept after 1991 and the end of the Cold War.  
At the same time it will also review the most important international legal documents 
dealing with self-determination. These documents stem mainly from the UN charter and 
resolutions, but there are also important documents originating from other international 




provisions the right of self-determination could be exercised. Then the variation of internal 
and external self-determination is introduced and discussed.  
Inextricably connected to the idea of self-determination, but also controversial in its 
relationship, is the principle of territorial integrity. The regular inclusion of both principles in 
legal documents has generated heated debates about which of the two principles should be 
taken into account and under what conditions. Through this debate secession theories 
emerged, attempting to explain how and when secession would be justifiable. These theories 
are based on the assumption that secession is a manifestation of the right of self-determination 
and more particularly of the right of external self-determination. However, since there is no 
general law and no specific applicable criteria to regulate secession, there is also no general 
theory of secession. Secession theories are broadly divided into three main categories, the 
remedial right theories, the primary-right theories and the nation-orientated theories, though 
this chapter also reviews alternative theories that do not fit in the frame of those categories.  
Finally, this chapter assesses how existing theories of secession apply and explain the 
case of Kosovo. It concludes that although existing theories can persuasively present reasons 
why Kosovo would have the right to secede and under what conditions, they fail to explain 
why its secession succeeded to such an extent. Thus, this chapter concludes by proposing a 
novel approach that would explain Kosovo’s success, contributing, at the same time, 
theoretically to the general understanding of the phenomenon of secession.  
 
The idea of self-determination 
The purpose of this section is to present the origins of the idea of self-determination as it was 
first expressed in the beginnings of the twentieth century. The concept of self-determination, 




Lenin and Woodrow Wilson in the beginnings of the twentieth century (Falk, 2002). Yet these 
two leaders had a different vision of the concept. 
For Lenin, self-determination was an indispensable condition for peace in the world; 
in his words “the liberation of all colonies, the liberation of all dependent, oppressed and non-
sovereign peoples is necessary for the maintenance of international peace” (Cassese, 1986: 
131). Things changed, however, when Lenin welcomed, in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the 
yielding to Germany of parts of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Byelorussia (Cassese, 
1995). His argument was that in order for socialism to thrive the principle of self-
determination for these peoples needed to be set aside. Thus, the principle of self-
determination for Lenin was initially a means to further the class struggle; in the end, 
however, it was abandoned in favour of socialism. 
Wilson, on the other hand, regarded self-determination as equal to self-government, 
and specifically to national self-government (Cassese, 1995, Mancini, 2012). In his Fourteen 
Points speech he had implicitly set the basic principles of self-determination, applicable to 
ethnic groups that were nationally mobilised and seeking independence from their rulers 
(Moore, 1998). Although nowhere in the document is the specific term to be found, half of the 
points are referring to post-war territorial adjustments based on the principle of nationality 
(Friedlander, 1975, Wilson, 1918).  
Wilson explicitly referred to boundary alterations on the European continent, not only 
those deriving from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, but also in 
relation to Belgian, French and Italian territories. The other points were referring to the free 
navigation and access to the seas, the removal of economic boundaries, the reduction of 
national armaments and finally the creation of an international organisation that would 




spoke of territorial adjustments based on nationality, he explicitly defined to whom he was 
referring. By being specific he left little room for vague self-determination demands that were 
not included in his speech, this way not undermining colonial rule after the First World War 
(Falk, 2002).  
After the end of the Wilsonian era the principle of self-determination was included in 
the UN Charter. Yet, it was significantly different from Wilson’s specific points. On the 
contrary, it was an unclear statement, the ambiguity of which made its implementation 
problematic and potentially dangerous for the existing status quo. The next sections follow an 
analysis of the definition and the meaning of self-determination and its implementation over 
the years.  
 
Self-determination after World War II 
This section shows how the principle, and then right, of self-determination has been 
implemented during the Cold War. After the end of the Second World War, the principle of 
self-determination was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. In Article 1(2) it is 
stated that one of the purposes of the UN is “to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to 
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”  
Later on, in the same document, Article 55 affirms that “with a view to the creation of 
conditions of stability and well-being, which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, the United Nations shall promote: higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development; solutions of international 




cooperation; and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (UN Charter, 1945, 
Art. 55).  
Although it is important that the principle of self-determination was included in the 
document, its definition was, and remains, unclear in a number of aspects. First, of all it 
considered self-determination to be a principle not a right. It was only later, in the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that it was considered to 
be a right (UNGA, 1960) and it was also confirmed as such by subsequent resolutions 
(UNGA, 1966, UNGA, 1970, UNGA, 1983, UNGA, 1996, UNGA, 2007, UNGA, 2012).  
It also remained unclear how the principle or right of self-determination would be 
exercised and by whom. Furthermore, it was uncertain whether an ethnic group had the right 
to secede from the parent state and establish a new one, or whether self-determination needed 
to be exercised within the boundaries of an existing state. In addition, another question that 
arose is who the people are that are entitled to self-determination. Moreover, it remained 
unclear whether people were to be defined in ethnic or in territorial terms, or perhaps in a 
combination of factors including aspects of both. 
The situation becomes more complicated when the principle of territorial integrity of 
the state is taken into account. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter states that “all members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations” (UN Charter, 1945). It is also reaffirmed in the Declaration 
of Friendly Relations that “any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity 
and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and the principles of 




Exploring how the right of self-determination can be exercised, Judge Dillard in his 
separate opinion on the Western Sahara case stated that the right of self-determination should 
guarantee the “free and genuine expression of the will of the people” and resolved that “it is 
for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the 
people” (ICJ, 1975: 114/122). Weller (2005), analysing Judge Dillard’s statement, claims that 
according to the latter’s view, theoretically, people must overcome territorial divisions and be 
able to shape their destiny through collective decisions. That means that if a state was created 
through peoples’ will, then a collective revocation of that will, should also undo it. Weller 
adds, however, that the reality is very different. He observed that the international system has 
prioritised the maintenance of stability and order, defending the principle of territorial 
integrity over the right of the peoples to decide about the state they want to live in.  
 Additionally, the principle of state sovereignty, emphasising on the integrity of 
borders, defends the view that the state is generally entitled to react according to its discretion 
to internal matters and thus against self-determination movements (Williams et al., 2003, 
Barkin and Cronin, 1994). The UN trying to reduce the unaccountability of states towards 
their citizens, only recently adopted resolution A/63/677 according to which each state is 
responsible to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity (UNGA, 2009). The General Assembly also decided that if a state 
“manifestly” fails to protect its population from the four specified crimes, the international 
community then can take action, through the Security Council and in accordance with the 
principles of the UN (UNGA, 2009, Art. I, 1). 
Hence, nowadays the principle of sovereignty does not protect states from external 
intervention when the crimes against their citizens reach the level of genocide, war crimes, 




cases where violations do not reach this level or when a state discriminates against citizens 
due to their ethnic background or denies them basic human rights and freedoms. Even when 
the crimes reach this level, the international community can take action only through the 
Security Council, this meaning that all five permanent members should agree in favour of 
intervention, which can be difficult and time-consuming. The adoption of this resolution, 
thus, by raising the bar so high as genocide and crimes against humanity, prioritised state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity over self-determination.  
In the era of the Cold War on which this section focuses, the right of self-
determination was reserved for states emerging from decolonisation and more specifically 
what is called as salt-water decolonisation. The salt-water decolonisation foresaw the granting 
of independence to areas under foreign rule usually separated by the parent state not only 
ethnically but also geographically by sea or ocean (inter alia, Hilpold, 2009, Wolff and Rodt, 
2013, Cassese, 1995, Harvey, 2010). Former colonies had the right to independence from 
their colonial ruler and the right to uncontested statehood (UNGA, 1952). 
However, even in those cases the former colonial boundaries had to be respected 
(Danspeckgruber, 2002). At the peak of decolonisation, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) in its constitutive act also confirmed that one of the objectives of the Union is to 
“defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States” and to 
“promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.” Subsequently, in Articles 4(a) and 
4(b) it is affirmed that the Organisation will act according to the principles of “sovereign 
equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union” and the “respect of borders 
existing on achievement of independence” (OAU, 1963). The OAU, therefore, maintained the 
artificial borders of colonisation and denied ethnic and tribal claimants the possibility of 




The first successful secession outside the frame of decolonisation occurred when East 
Pakistan -today, Bangladesh- separated from (West) Pakistan in 1971. Bangladesh accusing 
Pakistan of grave discrimination and genocide against Bengalis proclaimed independence in 
1971. After months of a war which cost the lives of thousands of civilians and caused the 
displacement of millions, Bangladesh, supported militarily by India, managed to secede. Its 
acceptance into the UN took place three years later after it was first recognised by Pakistan 
(UN, 2014, Pavković and Radan, 2007). 
  The case of Bangladesh is the first to implement a new way of exercising the right of 
self-determination, as it was stated in the Declaration of Friendly Relations, adopted one year 
before its secession took place. In this document seven principles were outlined regulating 
relations among states. The fifth principle in  paragraph four stated that “the establishment of 
a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent 
State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute 
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people” (UNGA, 1970).  
Three paragraphs later, the document reaffirmed the importance of territorial integrity 
of the state. However, a significant alteration had been made in the definition. In paragraph 
seven it was stated that  
 
nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 




In this section, the territorial integrity of the state is protected, for as long as the latter 
functions under the principles of the UN (Pavković and Radan, 2007). That would be for as 
long as the state respects human rights, fundamental freedoms, provides equal opportunities 
for employment, economic and social progress, health, culture, education, with no 
discrimination of race, sex, language or religion (UNGA, 1970). Hence, should the state fail 
to comply with the above, the “people” have the right to establish a sovereign, independent 
state or join another state.  
However, even after the inclusion of the fifth principle in the Declaration of Friendly 
Relations and the new condition on the principle of territorial integrity in paragraph seven, 
international practice defended the right of states to territorial integrity against dismembering 
states on the basis of a claim to self-determination. A general right to secession could have 
several implications internally and internationally, opening the way to all kinds of secessionist 
claims. This would have as a result the possibility of the endless division of a state, since very 
few states are ethnically homogeneous and secessionist territories are not usually ethnically 
homogeneous either; thus, the problem of “trapped” minorities arises as well as the danger 
that secessions might lead to the creation of non-viable state entities (Buchheit, 1978, 
Heraclides, 1991, Moore, 1998).  
Hence, the international community continued to view the achievement of self-
determination through secession as relating solely to freedom from colonial rule. Even in that 
case, its purpose was not to restore ethnic or tribal links among populations that were 
artificially divided by the colonisers (Weller, 2005). Instead, the principle was to be applied 
within the existing colonial boundaries and the accommodation and the treatment of ethnic 




However, the combination of this variation of the right to self-determination in the 
Declaration of Friendly Relations and the events in Bangladesh, were crucial for future 
studies in the field. These studies were further enriched after the dissolutions of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. A discussion also emerged about how the terms “internal” and 
“external” self-determination could and should be implemented. Moreover, the term “people” 
was elaborated and attempts were made to define it.  
 
Self-determination in the post-Cold War era 
This section examines how the right of self-determination has changed after the end of the 
Cold War and the creation of several new states following the dissolution of communist 
regimes. During the Cold War, the rigidity of the system limited the possibility ethnic groups 
to strive for independence and statehood outside the frame of decolonisation 
(Danspeckgruber, 2002). However, as soon as the communist regimes of Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia collapsed, various secession movements emerged in different places of the globe. 
To name but a few: the Chechen movement still demanding independence from Russia, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia demanding independence from Georgia, Transnistria from Moldova 
and certainly Kosovo, which is the only case that had achieved a significant level of success 
in its efforts.  
 The international community did not react immediately to the emergence of new 
entities after the collapse of the communist regimes, expecting perhaps that it was a matter 
that could be regulated according to domestic law of their former structures. Indeed, both the 
constitutions of the Soviet Union (USSR) and Yugoslavia granted the right of secession to 
their republics (Sakwa, 2003, Coppieters, 2003, Mertus, 1999). More specifically Article 




from the USSR11 (Constitution USSR, 1977). The Yugoslav constitution on the other hand 
was not that clear. Article 1 of the 1974 Constitution mentioned the right of every nation to 
self-determination, including the right to secession (Harbo, 2008, Budding, 2008). However, 
the language the document had used was vague and it remained unclear to whom this right 
belonged and how it could be exercised12 (Iglar, 1992, Primoratz and Pavković, 2006). It was 
unclear, therefore, whether the constituent nations of Yugoslavia, as communities sharing 
ethnic characteristics, were to enjoy the right to self-determination and secession, or whether 
the right was reserved for the Republics as territorial entities13 (Detrez, 2003). Finally, further 
questions arose around the issue of whether the right to self-determination or secession would 
expand to the autonomous provinces inside the republics, and thus to what extent these new 
states could divide themselves (Sakwa, 2003).   
 Eventually the international community resolved those issues by applying the colonial 
uti possidetis principle to the borders of the former federal republics. The uti possidetis juris is 
defined as the “principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization” (ICJ, 
1986). According to that, “states emerging from decolonization shall presumptively inherit the 
colonial administrative borders that they held at the time of independence” (Ratner, 1996: 
590). Thus, when a territory gains independence, the new international boundaries should be 
drawn in line with the previous first-order internal administrative boundaries (Watson, 2008). 
                                                                
11 Article 71/1977 states that Union Republics were the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Azerbaijan Soviet 
Socialist Republic, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, the Latvian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, the Armenian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.  
12 Article 1/1974 states that “the nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-
determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will, freely expressed in the common 
struggle of all nations and nationalities in the common interest, have together with the nationalities with which 
they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal 
community of working people- the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”  




Therefore, any new international boundaries and any conflicts over them are expected to be 
resolved according to pre-existing colonial borders (Anstis and Zacher, 2010).  
This principle, applied to internal frontiers of former federal units means that the new 
states would keep existing administrative boundaries. Applying the principle of uti possidetis 
to Yugoslavia meant that the new states were to be created according to the borders that each 
of the six federal republics had in the time of the Former Yugoslavia (Horowitz, 1998). 
Hence, according to the uti possidetis principle, Kosovo, by not being a constituent Republic 
of Yugoslavia, but an autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia did, not have the right 
to turn its internal borders into external ones and create an independent state (Hilpold, 2009).  
In this way internal frontiers had replaced external ones as the basis for territorial 
integrity (Caspersen, 2008). As a result, the new states and the international community 
refused the right of independence to peoples trapped within these new boundaries (Falk, 
2002). Thus, these entities that previously demanded the right for secession, protected 
afterwards their territorial integrity against similar aspirations (Weller, 2005). The only 
exception to that rule is Kosovo, which although being an autonomous province in the 
Republic of Serbia, managed eventually to secede and progress significantly with the 
establishing of a recognised and viable state.    
 
Defining “peoples”  
This section explains how the thesis will define the “peoples” who are entitled to the right of 
self-determination. Although there are various references concerning the “right of self-
determination of peoples” in the UN Charter and international law, these documents do not 
provide a clear definition of who the peoples are that have this right (Borgen, 2008, Sterio, 




without first defining to whom it was intended to apply, the term remained considerably 
vague (Kirgis, 1994).  
In 2007 the UN referred to the right of self-determination of indigenous peoples, 
limiting the respective rights to those entities that could be identified as such (UNGA, 2007). 
Based on the characteristics that the UN attributes to indigenous peoples, it could be inferred 
that a restrictive definition of peoples includes groups who share: a common history, a 
common racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, common religion or 
ideological affinity, territorial connectedness and a common economic life  (Demissie, 1996).  
At various points in international legal history, the term “people” has been used to 
signify either citizens of a nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being 
decolonized by a foreign power (Borgen, 2008), or an ethnic group, sharing a common 
ethnicity, culture, language, religion, and social values (Sterio, 2008).  
In its wider definition, “peoples” being entitled to self-determination would include 
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic communities (Vyver, 2000). Yet, the latter 
definition is usually rejected, because it detaches the group seeking self-determination from 
the condition of historical and cultural connection with the territory they demand. Considering 
also that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of minority groups around the globe potentially 
seeking self-determination, such a wide definition would result in complete chaos.14  
Margalit and Raz (1990) argue that only “encompassing groups” should have the right 
for self-determination. With this term they mean a group, with a shared culture, which define 
its members with its character. Thus, membership in these groups is not achieved by 
accomplishments, but derives from ascriptive criteria; one belongs there because one shares 
                                                                
14 “Just as the concept of individual human liberty carried to its logical extreme would mean anarchy, so the 
principle of self-determination given unrestricted application could result in chaos” Roosevelt, in Cassese 




these characteristics. Additionally, through these characteristics, members identify and 
recognise themselves as such.  
Tamir (1991) argues that the right to self-determination belongs to nations, where she 
defines as nation “a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of 
solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness” (Seton-Watson, 1977: 1). She adds 
that these characteristics allow members to recognise each other and also to exclude non-
members. Tamir (1991) distinguishes the terms “nations” and “peoples,” arguing that the 
existence of a nation depends on a shared national consciousness and on the will of the people 
to define themselves as members of the group. A “people” on the other hand, exists 
independently of the awareness of its members. She places “people” in the same category 
with “family” and “tribe” and she asserts that its members share some objective 
characteristics such as relations of blood, race, or a defined territory.  
As the majority of the literature does, this thesis will use the terms “nation” and 
“people” interchangeably. It is argued that for a people to desire to secede, they need to have 
the resolute belief that they belong to a nation. There are numerous studies and definitions of 
what constitutes a nation (inter alia, Gellner, 1983, Smith, 1986, Guibernau and Rex, 2010, 
Brubaker, 1996, Eriksen, 2001, Anderson, 1983). This thesis will accept that being part of a 
nation means that apart from the objective characteristics that a group may have, there is a 
psychological bond within its members that subconsciously unites them and differentiates 
them from all other people (Connor, 1994). Thus, it is “the self-view of one’s group rather 
than the tangible characteristics that is of essence in determining the existence or non-
existence of a nation” (Connor, 1994: 43).  
Hence, accepting the intangibility and subjectivity of being part of a nation and also 




thesis will define as “peoples” who could potentially have a right to secession, a group whose 
members “share a common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and 
cultural heritage” linked with the “territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming” 
(Nanda, 1981: 276, Brilmayer, 1991, Scharf, 2003: 380, Coppieters and Sakwa, 2003). In 
addition, the members of the group itself should have a collective consciousness of their 
common characteristics and perceive themselves as a distinct people (Scharf, 2003). 
Therefore, the right to self-determination, potentially expressed through secession, is intended 
to apply to groups with common identity, shared recognition of this identity and connection to 
a specific territory.  
In the case of Kosovo, it is certain that Kosovo Albanians are a distinct people, 
different than Serbs and other Slavs: they share a common ethnicity, culture, language, 
religion, and social values that distinguish them clearly from the Serbs (Sterio, 2008: 15). 
This distinction was constitutionally established since the time of the Former Yugoslavia, 
when Kosovo Albanians were considered to be a nationality inside the state15 (Coppieters and 
Sakwa, 2003). Hence, Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians would be qualified for the right of self-
determination. The next section will examine various approaches on how the right of self-
determination can be exercised inside and outside the frame of an existing state.   
 
The right to internal and external self-determination 
This section presents different ways in which the right of self-determination can be 
manifested. This section identifies two main categories, first, the application of the right of 
self-determination within the borders of the state, widely known as the right to internal self-
                                                                
15 Kosovo Albanians were a “nationality” inside the Former Yugoslavia and not a “nation.” The main criterion 
for an entity to be characterized as a nation was whether its state was located within the borders of Yugoslavia 
or not. For instance, the Croats were a nation, because their state was located within the borders of Yugoslavia. 




determination. Second, there is the right to external self-determination, where the right for 
self-determination is manifested through secession and the creation of a new state.  
Even in modern, liberal states, different communities within them may wish to 
distinguish themselves from the wider society they inhabit: although accepting financial, 
political and institutional inter-dependence with the state and the majority communities within 
it, they may be eager to maintain their communal language, values and tradition 
(Danspeckgruber, 2002). The state, acting according to internationally recognised human right 
values is expected to respect the right for self-determination of these distinct communities. 
That means that its members should have the freedom to speak their own language and profess 
their own religion, as well as have equal opportunities to education, employment and social 
progress. In addition to the safeguarding of these fundamental rights, the state needs also to 
provide the possibility of access to governmental mechanisms on an equal footing with the rest 
of the population (Orentlicher, 2003). Thus, communities can exercise their right to self-
determination within the state they belong to, democratically among others through self-
government, autonomy and free association (Scharf, 2003).  
 This exercise of the right of self-determination, within the borders of the state, has 
been known as the right to internal self-determination. In its wide sense internal self-
determination includes democratic choice and election of government. In self-determination 
studies, in particular, internal self-determination refers to the various forms in which the right 
of self-determination can be implemented in the frame of the state. Internal self-determination 
would not threaten the territorial integrity of the state and would encompass inter alia federal 
systems, decentralisation, autonomy and self-government (Henrard, 2008, Philpott, 1995).  
These arrangements would provide the possibility to a group considering itself 




internal self-determination, though, is the introduction of policies promoting recognition and 
accommodation, instead of assimilation in a society or state. Accordingly, states have the 
obligation not just to prevent discrimination, but to create favourable conditions in order to 
enable persons belonging to different communities and minorities to express freely their 
characteristics, i.e. culture, language, religion, traditions, ensuring also the participation in 
society's institutions (Bell and Cavanaugh, 1999). 
 Tamir (1993) distinguishes between self-determination and self-rule by claiming that 
the former concerns a way in which individuals define their personal and communal identity, 
while the latter reflects the procedure through which individuals try to achieve their purposes. 
She disagrees with the assumption that national self-determination is solely about civil rights 
and rights of political participation, freedom of speech, press, assembly and association. Tamir 
emphasises the cultural dimension of the right of self-determination and claims that its core is 
the recognition of the differentiation of certain groups seeking self-determination. She argues 
that according to this cultural version of the right the state needs to secure the ability of 
individuals to express their identity and culture and allow them to create political institutions 
and manage communal life in accordance with their customs and traditions (Tamir, 1991). 
In short, internal self-determination encompasses the right of various segments of a 
population to preserve their cultural identity and also participate in the political, economic, 
social and professional life of their country in equal terms without discrimination (Müllerson, 
2009). In that way the cultural and democratic dimension of self-determination is promoted 
and applied within the borders of the state.  
 What happens, however, when the state does not fulfil its obligations towards an 
ethnically different group? As noted above, the UN Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970) 




expression of self-determination, in case that the state does not comply with UN principles. 
Based on this provision, there is theoretically a right to external self-determination, i.e. 
secession, when the group is collectively denied civil and political rights and is subject to 
egregious abuses (Meester, 2012), when, in other words, its right to internal self-
determination, is not being met by the central government (Scharf, 2003, Sterio, 2010, 
Cassese, 1995, Caspersen, 2008).  
Nonetheless, the entity wishing to secede is rarely “utopian” (Philpott, 1995: 355). A 
utopian entity would be democratic, ethnically homogenous, occupying a defined territory -
without enclosed minorities-, unanimously desiring independent statehood as the way to 
realise self-determination. Secessionist movements, though, are rarely homogenous and are 
sometimes illiberal, include other distinct entities (Horowitz, 1998), and/or with a part of its 
population reluctant to secede (Philpott, 1995).   
 In addition, even if a group approximates the ideal utopian standards, the methods that 
it employs to achieve its purpose are rarely liberal and democratic. There are numerous 
separatist movements around the globe, whose methods are little different from terrorist 
movements (Williams and Heymann, 2004). The Basque ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/ 
Basque Country and Freedom) and the Kurdish PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/ Kurdistan 
Workers' Party) are two separatist movements officially designated as terrorist organisations 
(US Department of State, 2012). In addition, few would disagree with the argument that the 
various separatist movements operating in Chechnya use predominantly terrorist methods 
(Kramer, 2005). Even the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was initially characterised as a 
terrorist group by the United States special envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard (BBC, 1998). 
It is acknowledged, however, that eruption of violence may be an outcome of years of fruitless 




have been exhausted. For instance, KLA in Kosovo emerged after the peaceful approach of 
President Rugova had failed, as Chapters Five and Six will demonstrate in detail. Should there 
have been a general right to external self-determination, Rugova would have achieved the goal 
of independence much earlier and with considerably lower levels of violence. 
Furthermore, only a few secessionist attempts have been peaceful. Most of them have 
resulted in violent conflict and waves of refugees and internally displaced persons. Most of 
them continued for years and if they were brought to an end, it was only after a bloody and 
decisive victory of one conflict side (Weller, 2005). In that way, they affected not only the 
lives of those desiring secession, but also the lives of those that were against it. Moreover, 
war affects the lives of civilians both in the seceding group and in the parent state, while 
refugee influx affects and destabilises neighbouring states. 
Horowitz (1998, 2000, 2003) adds that a right to external self-determination would 
reduce efforts for coexistence such as federalism or regional autonomy. Central governments 
would be reluctant to proceed to such arrangements if there was an established right for a 
situation of autonomy or devolution to turn legitimately into secession. He claims that, since a 
central government would oppose to a secessionist attempt, the outcome would be in the end 
an escalation of violence at the expense of potentially fruitful efforts for internal political 
accommodation of the issue (Horowitz, 2003).  
Taking into consideration the potential cost of external self-determination on so many 
levels, the issues that are fore-fronted are whether and when secessions are justified, who has 
this right to external self-determination and under what conditions. These are the questions 
that most of the literature about secession tries to answer. In the following sections a brief 
review of the most important theories of secession will follow, most of which are normative in 




Remedial secession theories 
The remedial secession theories, also known as just cause theories, critically challenge the 
traditional thinking on territorial integrity and sovereignty. In recent years, the idea that states 
have absolute freedom to any action within their sovereign jurisdiction has been largely 
questioned (Ker-Lindsay, 2012). After the World Summit of 2005 the UN announced that 
sovereignty no longer exclusively protects states from foreign interference, but it is a charge 
of responsibility that holds states accountable for the welfare of their people (UN, 2005). This 
announcement was an official articulation of the already emerging doctrine of Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) as was demonstrated in previous events of use of force against sovereign 
states16 under the justification of protecting civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
terrorism. After the announcement of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the already 
existing theories of remedial secession were elaborated and expanded, arguing that an entity 
has the right to secede due to grave human rights violations it suffered in the past.  
According to Allen Buchanan, one of the first theorist of secession, “remedial right 
only” theory posits that a group has a general right to secede if and only if it had suffered 
certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort (Buchanan, 
1997, 1991). He identifies those injustices as threats of the physical survival of the group by 
actions of the state or other violations of its basic human rights. In addition, he believes 
secession to be warranted in cases that the group’s sovereign territory was previously unjustly 
taken by the state. In later works, he had also added the condition of constant violation of 
agreements allowing a minority group some form of self-government within the state 
                                                                
16 The NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was promoted under the rhetoric of 
protecting the Kosovo Albanians from Serbian oppression and escalating military offensive (Clinton, 1999). 
Similarly, the invasion in Iraq in 2003 had according to president’s Bush statements a threefold purpose, to 
disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the 





(Buchanan, 2004). However, he accepts that different remedial right theories identify different 
injustices that authorise secession.  
In general Buchanan considers secession to be based on the same theoretical 
foundations as the Lockean revolution. He also believes the remedial right to secession to be a 
supplement to Locke's theory. According to the latter the people have the right to overthrow 
the government if and only if their fundamental rights are violated and more peaceful means 
have been to no avail (Locke, 1689/1980, in Buchanan, 1997: 35). The main difference 
between the right to secede and the right to revolution is that the right to secede applies to a 
part of the population concentrated in a specific territory of the state. Thus, the goal of 
secession is not to overthrow the government in general, but annul the control of the 
government over that territory.  
Coppieters (2003: 192) argues that due to structural affinities between the moral 
analysis of the use of force and that of unilateral forms of secession, it is possible to apply the 
criteria derived from the just war tradition to cases of secession. In just war theory, the 
relationship between war and justice is assessed by a set of criteria referring to moral 
constraints on starting military operations (jus ad bellum) and on the military operations 
themselves (jus in bello). Subsequently, Coppieters explores how these criteria may also be 
used to determine to what extent unilateral secession is morally justified. Thus, the jus ad 
bellum criteria of just cause, legitimate authority, right intentions, last resort, proportionality 
and chance of success are used in order to assess the justification for independence. 
Combining the arguments of the aforementioned scholars, Bolton and Visoka (2010: 
5) propose the following conditions that could facilitate -or block- remedial secession: a) 
violations of autonomy agreements by the host state; b) unjust annexation of territory; c) 




status outcome; e) support of powerful countries; f) exhaustion of negotiations; g) a 
commitment from the seceding entity to uphold minority rights. 
All conditions that Bolton and Visoka propose are useful and set suitable terms under 
which secession would occur. However, their argument would be more comprehensive if they 
separated their conditions into two different categories. The one would be when secession 
would be permissible or not, with the relevant criteria to be a) violations of autonomy 
agreements by the host state, b) unjust annexation of territory, c) human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the host state and f) exhaustion of negotiations. The other category would be 
when a secession would be feasible with the respective criteria to be d) international 
intervention to mediate a status outcome, e) support of powerful countries, g) a commitment 
from the seceding entity to uphold minority rights. 
This classification would also lead to different approaches to secession. The first 
criteria dealing with the permissibility of secession would reveal if an entity has a right to 
secede based on remedial arguments. In the case of Kosovo, three out of the four apply, i.e. 
the violation of autonomy agreements, since Kosovo autonomy was unilaterally abolished by 
Milošević; grave human right abuses occurred under his rule; and finally negotiations 
eventually reached a stalemate in late 2007. 
The second set of conditions would examine if secession is likely to be successful. In 
the case of Kosovo the international intervention in late 1990s was a significant factor that 
gave eventually Kosovars the power advantage against the Serbian state. Afterwards it was 
because of international support that Kosovo survived institutionally and financially as an 
entity. After it unilaterally declared its secession powerful states supported this decision by 




influential powers, the conditional sovereignty conditions lifted in 2012, although little 
progress had been made towards specific aspects (BBC, 2012, Cani, 2012). 
Birch (1984) sets four conditions, of which at least one must be present in order for 
the secession to be justified. First of all, the seceding region should have been unjustly 
annexed in the first place in the state, and the citizens of this territory should have 
continuously expressed their disagreement with the union. Second, the central government 
should have failed to protect the basic rights and the security of the seceding group. A third 
reason would be the central government to have failed to protect the political and economic 
interests of the region. Fourth, the national government has ignored or rejected a settlement 
proposed by the seceding region that aimed to preserve essential interests of this certain 
region and that might have been outvoted by a national majority (Birch, 1984).  
Birch argues that if any of the above conditions is met and if the majority of the voters 
in the region are in support of this action, then the region should have the right to secede. He 
adds that this right is independent from the outcome of the secession. That means that the right 
is granted even if there are concerns about the viability of the new state, the situation of the 
minorities inside it or about potential harm to strategic and economic interests of the parent 
state.  
Costa (2003) studies secession as part of the broader debate on minority rights within a 
multinational state. Although he does not defend the right to secession in general and he 
suggests that there are other ways to achieve self-determination, he considers as a just cause 
for secession the failure of the state to meet “meaningful multinational arrangements” (Costa, 
2003: 64). With the latter he refers to the official recognition of the state as multinational and 




groups. He introduces, thus, the term of “ethnocultural justice” and he argues that the inability 
to protect the rights of minorities should be considered as a valid reason to justify secession. 
Horowitz (2003, 1998) by critically reflecting on the remedial secession theories, 
points out that secession rarely creates homogenous states. This has as a result the continuation 
of conflict inside the new state, in view of the fact that minority oppression is most likely to 
continue, this time in the frame of the new state. Further to this argument, in assessing the last 
resort argument of the remedial theorists he comments that “if independence can only be won 
legitimately after matters have been led to extremes, then, by all means there are people 
willing to carry them to extremes” emphasising this way the human rights violation and the 
escalation of violence the very right to remedial secession might cause (Horowitz, 2003: 12).  
In conclusion, common ground among the remedial secession theories is that an entity 
might have the right to secede after the parent state have repeatedly and manifestly failed to 
respect and protect vital human rights of the members of this entity, with each theorist to set 
their own criteria of what constitutes vital human rights. Finally, secession is viewed as last 
resort, being only allowed when all other means of co-operation and co-existence have been 
exhausted and failed.  
 
i. Kosovo under remedial secession theories 
In the case of Kosovo it is undeniable that Kosovo Albanians’ human rights were abused in 
the early years of the former Yugoslavia when Aleksandar Ranković, the Secret Police Chief 
and Vice-President of Yugoslavia, ran Kosovo as little more than a district of Serbia. Serbs 
occupied most administrative posts and Serbian was the principal language of administration 
and higher education. Kosovo Albanians suffered ethnic harassment by Serb-dominated police 




limited opportunities for advancement in the senior party-state levels (Petrović and Stefanović, 
2010). Kosovo Albanians were similarly discriminated after 1989 under Milošević’s control 
(Watson, 2008). During this time, Albanians were dismissed from their jobs, Albanian 
language newspapers and television programs were banned, as well as the Albanian language 
teaching. In addition, Albanian family planning were introduced and also incentives for them 
to seek employment elsewhere (inter alia, Judah, 2000c, I.I.C.K., 2000, Malcolm, 1999).  
However, from Ranković’s removal in 1966 to 1989 when Milošević abolished 
Kosovo’s autonomous status, Kosovo Albanians enjoyed equal rights with any other 
nationality and nation inside Yugoslavia. After the constitutional amendments of 1968 the 
Kosovars had the opportunity to visit Albanian-language schools, the University of Prishtina 
was founded in 1969, as well as institutes for Albanian literature and culture. Cultural ties 
between Albania and Kosovo were permitted and the importation of Albanian books was 
possible (Mertus, 1999). Furthermore, the Yugoslav government provided considerable 
federal funds for the development of the region (I.I.C.K., 2000).  
At the federal level, with the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, the autonomous provinces 
of Kosovo and Vojvodina were elevated to the status equivalent to that of the other six 
republics, which included a full representation on the main federal Yugoslav bodies. Thus, 
Kosovo became a “virtual republic,” with its own parliament, constitution, police force and 
central bank (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003). Official documents were translated into 
Albanian and public institutions were recruited in a way such that they could address the 
Albanian-speaking population’s needs (Petrović and Stefanović, 2010). In addition the 
University of Prishtina’s courses were also adapted to the needs of the Albanian population, 
since Serbs already had the opportunity to attend a university in central Serbia (Petrović and 




Yet, these changes had as a result that gradually the Serbs felt discriminated and 
excluded. The Serbs complained that the Albanians received preferential treatment in terms 
employment (Blagojevic and Petrovic, 1992). Furthermore, while the initial promotion of the 
Albanian language in public institutions made perfect sense as a means to achieve equal 
treatment, it gradually reached a point where services in Serbian were not provided. In rural 
areas, Kosovo Serb peasants “bitterly complained that after 1966 they were subjected to 
myriad acts of ethnic harassment from younger members of the Albanian majority” (Petrović 
and Stefanović, 2010: 1097). 
Thus, after 1966, it was Serbs who began to leave, moving to Central Serbia and 
Vojvodina. Census figures of 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 demonstrate the demographic 
change in the region. In 1961 Kosovo was inhabited by 67,1% Albanians, 23,5% Serbs and 
9,4% others (mainly Roma and Turks). Ten years later, the Albanians constituted the 73,7% 
of the population, whereas Serbs and others constituted the 18,4% and 7,9% respectively. In 
1981 the Albanian population increased to 77,4%, while the Serbian population had decreased 
to 13,2%. Finally, in 199117 the Albanians composed the 81,6% of the total population, 
whereas Serbs made up the 9,9% and others the 8,5% (SOK, 2008). This demographic growth 
of the Albanian population is, on the one hand, due to the high child birth rates of Albanian 
families (SOK, 2008). On the other hand, figures show a massive exodus of Kosovo Serbs, 
because of the marginalisation they experienced (Petrović and Stefanović, 2010, Blagojevic 
and Petrovic, 1992).   
It can be observed then that the relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs had not been those of co-existence and cooperation. On the contrary, they seemed to be 
relations of domination, in which the group which gained power suppressed the other one 
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(Guzina, 2003). The depth of this situation will be more evident in subsequent chapter when 
the historical roots of the Kosovo conflict will be examined. For now, however, it can be 
claimed that due to this perennial tension the possibility of a peaceful coexistence between 
Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo under Serbian rule would be very small, especially after the 
war of 1999.  
In light of this, perhaps Kosovo’s secession was the only solution to overcome the 
stalemate in which Kosovo was after 1999. Nevertheless, it also needs to be taken into 
consideration that while Serbia would accept substantial autonomy for Kosovo, the Kosovo 
Albanians were unwilling to accept anything less than independence (Ahtisaari, 2006b), as it 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Hence, in this respect it is questionable if 
Kosovo’s secession in 2008 was the last resort the Kosovars had, given the fact that they 
refused to try anything else.   
In addition, although there is considerable academic support for remedial secession 
there is still no law regulating such issues. Secession in general is neither legal nor illegal in 
international law, as there are no applicable law either in favour or against it (Crawford, 2006, 
ICJ, 2010a). Only the aforementioned UN resolutions, and in particular the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations of 1970 could imply the right to remedial secession. These resolutions are, 
however, vaguely formulated, and as General Assembly resolutions also have no legal binding 
for the states. 
Furthermore, when the ICJ examined the question of whether Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence was in accordance with international law, the Court explicitly 
added that “issues relating to the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of 
any right of “remedial secession” are beyond the scope of the question posed by the General 




that “a racially or ethnically distinct group within a state, even if it qualifies as a people for 
the purposes of self-determination, does not have the right to unilateral secession simply 
because it wishes to create its own separate State, though this might be the wish of the entire 
group” (ICJ, 2010b §10). He added, however, that “under such exceptional circumstances, the 
right of peoples to self-determination may support a claim to separate statehood provided it 
meets the conditions prescribed by international law, in a specific situation, taking into 
account the historical context” (ICJ, 2010b §11), while he expressed his view that Kosovo 
reflected the type of exceptional circumstances that may transform an entitlement to internal 




In contrast to remedial theories of secession, there are the theories that claim that a group has 
a right to secede even if it has not been mistreated by the state. Various names have been 
attributed to these theories: choice theories (Pavković and Radan, 2007), primary-right 
theories (Buchanan, 1991, 1997, 2004), democratic theories (Beran, 1998) or liberal theories 
(Beran, 1984). The two latter definitions are considered to be confusing, because scholars 
such as Buchanan and Birch have also placed remedial right theories within liberal democratic 
frameworks. This thesis will therefore use the term “primary-right theories,” as it was 
introduced in the writings of Buchanan, since this is the most accepted and recognised term 
by the literature. 
                                                                
18 Still, from the thirty-six countries that offered their submission for this case, only eleven regarded secession 
as established in international law, applicable in various circumstances. Although, this acknowledgement 
constitutes significant progress in the establishment of a concrete, albeit conditional right to secession, it 
remains far from becoming positive international law (Meester, 2012). Thus, claims that there is a right to 





 Although Buchanan is most possibly characterised as a supporter of a remedial right to 
secession, he also referred in his writings to a different possible approach. This approach, 
which he named primary-right theories, views secession to be permissible in a wider range of 
cases and not only as a remedy of last resort. 
He divides these theories into two main categories: ascriptive group theories and 
plebiscitary/associative group theories. The former refers to groups with “ascriptive” 
characteristics, such as nationality or ethnicity. He names these characteristics ascriptive, 
because they are attributed to a person independently of their choice.  Accordingly, this theory 
supports that certain groups whose membership is defined by ascriptive characteristics should 
have the international legal right to secede (unilaterally), simply because they are such groups, 
independently of whether they have suffered any injustices or not (Buchanan, 2004, 1997). 
On the other hand, plebiscitary or associative group theories assert that it is not 
necessary for a group to share a common identity, nationality or any other ascriptive 
characteristics in order to have the right to secede. On the contrary, these theories are based 
on the “voluntary political choice” of a group, whose will is to form their own independent 
political unit. Thus, any group no matter how heterogeneous can qualify for the right to 
secede (Buchanan, 2004, Buchanan, 1997).  
The latter theories have their foundations in the writings of other scholars occupying 
themselves with secession. It appears that the first one to defend a permissive right to 
secession was Harry Beran (1984, 1988, 1998). Built on basic principles of liberalism, such as 
freedom, sovereignty and majority rule, he argued that “secession should be permitted, where 
it is possible, because a separatist group desires secession strongly enough to engage 
successfully in the organised socio-political activities necessary to achieve it.” He defended 




grounds such as oppression or a right to national self-determination, but not on the ground 
that it is deeply desired and pursued by adequate political action, seems to be incompatible 
with the arguments of liberty, sovereignty and majority rule” (Beran, 1984: 28). 
Analysing those fundamental values he considers freedom to be the most important of 
all. He understands the ideal society as a “voluntary scheme” (1984: 24), accepting at the 
same time restrains on participants’ freedom for as long as they are necessary for their 
physical safety and social and economic development. Thus, a liberal society should be 
composed by adults that voluntarily have bound themselves to those restrains emanating from 
the state. Accordingly even the unity of the state should be voluntary, and therefore secession 
would be permissible. 
Originating from the principle of freedom of choice, he claims that a state is sovereign 
for as long as it has the acceptance of its citizens (Beran, 1984). Consequently, if there are 
separatists groups, they should have the right to a referendum in the territory they claim. In 
that way, the majority of people living in the specific area would have the opportunity to 
determine their political society.   
Finally, he sets six conditions according to which secession should not be permitted: 
First of all, if the group that wishes to secede is not sufficiently large to assume the basic 
responsibilities of an independent state. Second, if it is not prepared to permit sub-groups 
within itself to secede although such secession is morally and practically possible. Third, if it 
wishes to exploit or oppress a sub-group within itself that cannot secede in turn because of 
territorial dispersal or other reasons. Fourth, if it occupies an area that it is not on the borders 
of the existing state, but in an area where an enclave would be created. Fifth, if it occupies an 




occupies an area which has a disproportionally high share of the economic resources of the 
existing state (Beran, 1984).  
It is remarkable how restrictive Beran’s approach is once conditions are accounted for. 
Although, he argues so fervently in favour of the freedom of choice, after adding the above 
criteria in his theory he sets serious limitations to the right of secession, ending up as, or even 
more, restraining than other theories.  
 Similar arguments are also expressed by Seymour (2007) and Wellman (2005), who 
both claim that a group should be entitled to secede even if it was not treated unjustly. 
Seymour believes remedial right theories and in specific Buchanan’s criteria of injustices to 
be too conservative, and argues that all nations have a general primary-right to self-
determination, i.e. a general right to be free and equal.  
 Wellman (2005), being more restrained that Seymour, suggests that the political 
abilities of a seceding group are the factor which should determine if it has a right to secession 
or not. He regards nationality and cultural characteristics to be of secondary importance, 
substantial only in cases that they support the implementation of the necessary political 
functions. Additionally, Wellman claims that it is not obligatory for secessions to occur 
within pre-existing internal borders of only one state, but from more states. In order to make 
his argument clear he uses the example of the Kurdish secessionist demands. They involve the 
secession from four different states and the subsequent unification of these territories for the 
creation of the state of Kurdistan. However, recognising the fact that such a permissible right 
to secession would lead to chaos, he sets a restraining condition by adding that secession 





Another scholar in favour of the Associative theories is Copp. He argues that the 
morality behind any secessionist attempt is of paramount importance, since that would define 
whether a group has a right to secede. He develops his theory by taking for granted that the 
criterion of morality is fulfilled. However, a significant drawback of his argument is that 
morality is a vague term, variable to mentality, culture, religion and civilisation.  
Copp claims that a group can possess the right to secede only if it can qualify as a 
“society in a relevant sense” (Copp, 1998: 228). According to him, a society in the relevant 
sense is “a group comparable in size and in social and economic complexity to the population 
of a state; it has a multi-generational history; it is characterised by a relatively self-contained 
network of social relationships and by norms of cooperation and coordination that are salient 
to its members; it is comprehensive of the entire population of permanent residents of a 
relevant territory, with the exception of recent arrivals who may not yet fit into the group’s 
network of social relationships” (Copp, 1998: 227-228). In addition Copp (1998) asserts that 
even if a group has suffered injustices, it cannot have the right to secede, unless it is both a 
political and a territorial society. He clarifies that a society is political if all of its members 
have the firm will to constitute a state, and territorial if it occupies a certain area within which 
it can form a state.  
 Finally, David Gauthier (1994) has also written in support of voluntary political 
association. He compares secession to divorce and political association to marriage. He builds 
his argument on the assumption that right to association stems from the mutual desire of the 
parties to relate with one another and on the condition that none of the parties desires to better 
its place by worsening the one of the fellow part. Applying this to a comparative analysis, he 





i. Kosovo under primary-right theories 
Kosovo fulfils both the ascriptive and the associative characteristics set by Buchanan, since 
the Kosovars share a common nationality and their voluntary political choice was secession.  
Yet, Kosovo fails to meet Beran’s criteria. It falls short of passing the third 
(oppressing a sub-group within it that cannot secede), the fifth (occupying an area which is 
culturally essential to the existing state) and potentially also the second restriction (not being 
prepared to permit sub-groups within it to secede although such secession could be morally 
and practically possible). Kosovo suppresses other sub-groups living on its territory and 
which are unable to secede, for example, Serbs and Roma. Furthermore, Kosovo is culturally 
crucial for the Serbs, who regard it as the cradle of their civilisation. Significant orthodox 
monasteries are located in the region and also the Serbian King Lazar was buried there after 
losing his life during the historical Battle of Kosovo against the Ottoman Empire (Mertus, 
1999, Guzina, 2003). Finally, Kosovo is unwilling to allow secession to Northern Kosovo. 
Should it be supposed that North Mitrovica is sufficiently large to assume the basic 
responsibilities of an independent state and that its secession is practically possible, then 
Kosovo also fails to meet the second term. Thus, the third, the fifth and potentially the second 
restriction Beran sets against his liberal right to secession are flagged. 
However, according to Wellman, Kosovo had the right to secession since it fulfilled 
the criteria set in the beginning, and Serbia’s viability was not undermined.  
Finally, Gauthier’s marriage/divorce comparison is unable to address unilateral 
secessions. For a marriage to end both parties need to sign the necessary documents; there can 
formally be no unilateral resolution of a marriage. On the contrary, the majority of the 
existing separatist movements pursue secession unilaterally and against the will of the parent 




Nation-orientated secession theories 
The main argument of the nation-orientated theories is that nations should have the right to 
self-determination. It is argued that a claim of a nation to political self-expression should 
amount to a defensible right, equal for all nations, and that this claim derives from the mere 
existence of a nation (Moore, 1997: 900). These theories do not necessarily claim that nations 
are allowed to secede or to establish their own state. In contrast, they recognise that there are 
limitations and practical reasons to avoid secession. However, some of them accept the 
possibility of secession and these theories are going to be reviewed in the current section.    
 Contrary to remedial secession theories, nation-orientated theories or national self-
determination theories, do not presuppose that the nation should have its basic human rights 
violated in order to have the right to secede. It has this right just because it is a nation, 
independent of its status and treatment within the state.  
National self-determination theories are also different from the primary theories. The 
latter grant the right to secession to every group which is politically organised and desires 
secession independently of its national composition. Although almost every primary theory 
has its limitations, being a nation is rarely one of the pre-conditions to secession. Even for the 
primary theories that accept the existence of ascriptive characteristics, what is most important 
for the exercise of the right is the common wish to secession and the political organisation 
towards this goal, instead of the fact that a group may share the same nationality.  
 Miller (1997) disagrees with the view that any territorial majority wishing to secede 
should also have the right to do so. He believes that certain criteria must be met in order to 
advance secession, instead of other forms of partial autonomy or other constitutional 




plethora of questions about historic identities, economic justice and minority rights and he 
believes that a sufficient theory of secession must address all of these issues.  
 Miller builds his theory on the principle of nationality and sets two criteria that a 
potential separatist group must initially meet in order to have a case to secede. First of all, he 
suggests that the separatist group should be a nation. He defines as nation a group of people 
who recognise one another as belonging to the same community, who acknowledge special 
obligations to one another, and who aspire to political autonomy, by virtue of characteristics 
that they believe they share. These are typically a common history, attachment to a 
geographical place, and a public culture that differentiates them from their neighbours (Miller, 
1997: 266). Second, the group needs to have a valid claim on the demanded territory, as being 
understood by the history of the territory in question.   
 Miller argues that if these criteria are met, then there are subsequent factors that need 
to be taken into consideration, as only few groups are nationally homogeneous. Thus, the 
establishment of the new state will create a new minority. The future situation of this minority 
should be evaluated before a group obtains justification for secession. Second, he claims that 
secession would be unjust, if it removed from the parent state resources that have been jointly 
created or if it left the parent state with not enough resources to sustain itself. Miller finally 
concludes by stating that both sides should have territory and resources to ground a viable 
community. 
 Weinstock (2000), on the other hand, disagrees with Miller’s approach. He rejects his 
arguments, beginning with that regarding identity. Weinstock characterises as “naïve” the 
practice Miller proposes, namely to “look and see” if the seceding group is indeed a distinct 
nation. Weinstock argues that Miller’s argument does not take into account the dynamics in 




construction of national identity. This observation may be valid, since there are numerous 
cases where national identity has been created through institutions or policies, for instance, 
France, Italy or the USA. However, Weinstock’s view fails to recognise that most of the 
groups desiring independence have kept their distinct nationality, even after years or centuries 
of occupation and common living in the parent state. So perhaps, it is not as easy as he claims 
to change identity.  
Weinstock (2001), being himself in principle against secession as a practice, supports 
a more “procedural” approach. For him the distinction between the moral question of whether 
there is a right to secession and the question of whether and how it ought to be implemented 
institutionally and judicially is of paramount importance. He argues that the right to secession 
should be constitutionalised, because in that way, the state would have the opportunity to pose 
some control on a situation that would otherwise happen in a less manageable manner. He 
asserts that through institutional mechanisms pressure is applied on the motives and 
incentives of the relevant actors. Secessionist attempts can be more costly by imposing 
procedural hurdles. Thus, by reducing centrifugal motives and increasing centripetal ones, a 
settlement could be achieved in a smoother manner.  
Margalit and Raz claim that “the right of self-determination is instrumentally justified 
as the method of implementing the case for self-government, which itself is based on the fact 
that in many circumstances self-government is necessary for the prosperity and dignity of 
encompassing groups” (1990: 460). They use the term self-determination as equal to secession 
and they argue that a group sharing specific characteristics has the right to an independent 
state in order to protect the prosperity and dignity of its members.  
They also add that the encompassing group should constitute the majority in the 




inhabitants as well as those of other countries (Margalit and Raz, 1990). Moreover, the 
decision that a group will take should be supported by the vast majority of its members, 
reflecting deep-rooted, long-lasting beliefs and not mere temporary aspiration. Finally, the 
right should be exercised in order to secure the prosperity and self-respect of the group.  
They conclude by stating that the right of self-determination is relative and 
conditional. On the one hand, those who desire secession should also take into account other 
inhabitants’ interests. On the other hand, the rights of self-respect and prosperity of the group 
are among the most important human rights. Summing up their final argument they assert that 
an encompassing group that constitutes the vast majority of the population in the relevant 
territory should have the right to self-government and secession, provided that the vital 
interests of self-respect and prosperity of directly or indirectly affected citizens are protected 
(Margalit and Raz, 1990). 
 According to secession approaches built on nationality, most separatist movements 
have a justification to secede. Abkhazians and South Ossetians claim to be distinct from 
Georgians, Chechens from Russians, Kurds from Turks, Iraqis, Iranians and Syrians. 
However, their claims have found little support and have also had little success. Thus, the fact 
that a nation desires to establish its own state to pursue its interests in a more effective 
manner, may be a good reason for secession. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that its cause 
will be supported or that the outcome of the secession will be successful.  
 
i. Kosovo under nation-orientated secession theories 
The nation-orientated secession theories recognise a right to secession to every group 
claiming that it is a nation. According to these theories then Kosovo Albanians would have a 




Slavs in general and the Serbs in particular. They identify themselves as belonging to a 
different nation; they speak a different language, profess a different religion, have different 
customs and social values and have a collective consciousness of their distinction. They have 
also been officially recognised as a distinct nationality within the Former Yugoslavia, fact that 
would further strengthen the claim of national differentiation. Therefore, according to nation-
orientated theories and in virtue of this national distinction, Albanians would have the right to 
secede, not only from Serbia, but also from other states where Albanians constitute a 
considerable minority, for example from Montenegro and the former Yugoslavia Republic of 
Macedonia.  
It should be noted that not all of the nation-orientated theories grant the right to 
secession its claimants; on the contrary they recognise the limitations and the implications of 
such a right and propose alternative accommodation of the demands. 
 
Alternative approaches to secession 
Other scholars have adopted alternative approaches to secession, which do not fall into the 
category of the above-mentioned theories.19 
 Freeman (1999) does not distinguish between theories of self-determination and 
theories of secession, but he equates these two terms. He classifies existing theories on the 
subject into six categories: Liberal theories, including both remedial and primary-right 
theories; democratic theories, whose main theorist he considers to be Philpott (1995); 
communitarian theories, with Margalit and Raz (1990) as main representatives; realist 
                                                                
19 There are numerous alternative approaches to secession, which however have limited application to the 
purpose of this thesis. Thus, in this section only the most relevant alternative secession theories are reviewed. 
Some of the scholars that are not included in this research they are Lake and Rotchchild (1998) who try to 
explain why ethnic conflict and desire for secession arises, Wood (1981) and Hechter (1992) try also to explain 
the rise of secessionist movements, Ewin (1995) explores when secession should be permissible, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) justify secessionist attempts on economic terms, and Gordon (2002) proposes an anarcho-




theories, introduced by Shehadi (1993), although the latter’s argument as presented in 
Freeman (1999) has little to do with the international relations approach of realism;20 
cosmopolitan theories, which include parts of aforementioned theories and cosmopolitan 
realism, which connects the latter two categories. He concludes that there cannot be an 
absolute right to self-determination. The main reason for this is that all rights have costs, 
which in the case of self-determination will be diffused to others. Thus, the right to national 
self-determination requires a complex analysis. Moreover, each particular claim to the right 
should be judged on its particular merits and should only be recognised with great caution 
(Freeman, 1999, Raz, 1988). 
 Bartkus’ (2004) research focuses on the motives of secession. She acknowledges that 
all kinds of societies -liberal, former communist, developing- can struggle with internal 
secessionist demands. Bearing this in mind, she suggests that the decision of an entity to 
secede stems from a cost-benefit assessment of its situation. To elaborate further she asserts 
that the timing of the decision to secede can be understood within a framework structured 
around four primary variables: the benefits of continued membership in the existing political 
entity, the costs of such membership, the costs of secession and the benefits of secession. 
Finally, she argues that secessions arise only when the distinct community determines that 
there has been a shift in the balance of these four variables (Bartkus, 2004: 4).  
 Toft (2012), by examining the roots of secession, observes that the literature revolves 
around two main explanations, with the first one to focus on the economic interests for 
secession, and the second one to highlight the political motives. She also adds that a new 
                                                                
20 Shehadi believes that “the international community must clarify its conception of the right to self-
determination; this conception must balance the principle of the territorial integrity of states with the 
aspirations of aggrieved nations; and there should be international institutions with the authority to settle self-





approach has emerged, which emphasises the structure within which these groups operate, 
meaning the geographic and the demographic characteristics of it.  
The economic approach argues that secessionist wars are caused by uneven economic 
development among the groups that populate the country’s territory. Accordingly both rich 
and poor groups have an incentive to demand greater autonomy and secession. Groups with 
greater economic development will come to resent that their wealth is being transferred to 
lesser developed groups, while lesser developed groups will come to fear economic 
domination, or perhaps increasingly resent perceived exploitation, by the advanced groups. 
Disparate development within the state leads to tensions between ethnic groups that populate 
the state (Toft, 2012). 
 In addition, self-determination and secession are political acts. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the nature of the political system in which groups operate has been found to 
influence whether and how groups mobilise for self-determination and secession (Toft, 2012: 
587). The factors that are believed to influence a group to secede are the institutions and the 
leader. The first could provide the appropriate infrastructure, so that political and 
administrative demands are satisfied. Secondly, the leaders can, under certain conditions, 
significantly influence the mobility of a group towards secession.  
 The third approach that Toft mentions is the structural one, referring to the geography 
and the demography within which a group operates. Thus, argument now moves from the 
willingness of a group to secede to its actual capacity to do so. With respect to demographics 
two factors are mostly examined: ethnic diversity and group size. Lastly, the vast majority of 
the groups trying to secede are geographically concentrated. As a result, the organisation and 




 Toft critically examines the previous approaches and outlines their limitations. She 
proposes no alternative to these weaknesses, but she seeks to develop a new perspective to 
secession studies. Her aim is to explain when secessions happen and not when they are 
justified as remedial/primary-right theories do. 
 Pavković and Radan (2007) while not trying to introduce a new theory of secession, 
critically review existing theories and practices. Through a combination of examined 
secession cases and theories, they mention that secessionist attempts succeeded when 
secessionists gained both effective political control of the territory and the recognition of their 
independence from other states and international organisations. 
They accurately refer to a two dimensional approach of study of successful secessions, 
comprising the internal and external aspect of the phenomenon, stressing that the entity needs 
to achieve both in order for the secession to be successful. However, their study is general and 
superficial, lacking of depth and strong underpinnings to support this claim. 
In addition, their statement needs further support and elaboration, as the two 
preconditions they have set are not sufficiently analysed. The fact that the secessionists 
manage to politically control the territory at the time of the secession, does not guarantee that 
the new state will be politically, institutionally and economically viable. Furthermore, the 
international recognition is certainly of critical importance for the outcome of secession. 
However, they fail to address the complexity of the process of international recognition in 
cases of unilateral secession. 
A further limitation of their research is that little effort was made to set a distinction 
between cases of successful unilateral secession and other forms of secession. This is obvious 
by the annex of successful secessions provided at the end of their book, where Bangladesh, as 




dissolution, secession through agreement and decolonisation. Finally, the book is written prior 
to the Kosovo declaration of independence; thus Kosovo is categorised according to its failed 
attempt to secede in 1991. It is evident, therefore, that a renewed effort is essential to 
explaining when a unilateral secession is successful, using as case study the contemporary and 
complex case of Kosovo.   
 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to set the theoretical foundations on which this thesis is 
based. This chapter sought to enhance the understanding of the idea of self-determination, 
explain how it was first introduced in the beginnings of the twentieth century and how it found 
application afterwards, showing its evolution through the years, moving from the concept of 
decolonisation to its application in the post-Cold War era.  
 This chapter also explained the two different applications of self-determination; 
internal self-determination, taking place within the borders of the state and external self-
determination or secession. As the main research question of this thesis concerns secession 
rather than the internal manifestation of the right of self-determination, the chapter continued 
with the examination of how and whether the right to secession is supported by international 
law. The examination concluded that secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, 
regardless of the mounting literature arguing in favour of the existence of a right to remedial 
secession.  
Subsequently, various theories on secession were reviewed, most of them falling into 
following three categories: remedial secession theories, primary theories, and nation-orientated 
theories, while alternative theories have also been examined. In remedial secession theories, 




entity has experienced by the parent state. Thus, an entity has a right to secede in virtue of past 
abuses it suffered.  
In contrast, primary-right theorists assert that an entity does not need to have suffered 
injustices in order to have the right for secession. Primary-right theories argue that if the 
population of a specific territory collectively desires to secede, then it should also have this 
right. Recognising, however, that such a wide implementation of the right of self-
determination and secession would practically lead to chaos, primary-right theorists set some 
restrictions on the implementation of the right.  
Nation-orientated theories presuppose that the seceding entity must be a nation. 
Although, they stress that there are other options for nations to exercise self-determination, 
they maintain that if a national entity wishes to secede, it has this right merely based on its 
nature as a nation.  
Certain aspects of the secession of Kosovo could be explained by all previous 
approaches; however, none of them explains why Kosovo’s secession succeeded. The right to 
remedial secession has been repeatedly presented by states recognising Kosovo after it 
declared independence to justify their choice to accept it as an independent and sovereign 
state. According to those statements Kosovo’s secession had the right to secede due to grave 
human rights violations (escalating to the level of ethnic cleansing) it suffered under the rule 
of Belgrade. Moving to primary-right theories, Kosovo had the right to secede as an entity 
whose population was vastly in favour of secession. Finally, according to nation orientated 
theories, Kosovo Albanians had the right to secede from Serbia by virtue of the fact that they 
are a nation distinct from the Serbs. Thus, although existing theories explain the conditions 
under which Kosovo’s secession would be justified, they fail to explain when or why it would 




Acknowledging the fact that secession literature revolves mainly around the 
justification of secessionist attempts, some theorists sought to provide a new scope to the 
issue. Along with these studies, there are also limited attempts to offer insight about when 
secessions are successful. This section has showed that these efforts remain incomplete and 
need further elaboration. However, they provide the starting point for this thesis to elaborate 
and expand upon the studies seeking to understand when secessions succeed. Recognising the 
two dimensional nature of successful secessions, comprising of the internal and external aspect 
of the phenomenon, this thesis will argue that a secession succeeds when it has managed to 
create a recognised and viable entity, at least to such an extent that its secession is rendered 
irreversible; an argument that was analysed in the previous chapter.  
The following chapters, being the empirical chapters of this thesis will show how 
Kosovo has managed to create a recognised and viable state. It will be demonstrated that this 
was a complicated process that took place at four different levels of analysis, beginning with 
the local level, being the seceding entity, continuing to the state level, the parent state, moving 
on to the region and concluding to how global events affected the outcome of the secession. 
The following chapters will examine the assumption that secession affects and is affected by 
all four levels and for a unilateral secession to succeed favourable conditions must be created 






































INTRODUCTION TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the background of the conflict in Kosovo. It also 
constitutes an introduction to the following empirical chapters, in which the reasons of 
Kosovo’s successful secession will be sought and analysed. Presenting the historical 
background against which Kosovo’s secession took place is important, as Kosovo’s craving 
for independence did not appear suddenly in 1991 when it first attempted to secede. It was a 
long process, the origins of which can be found in the early twentieth century when Kosovo 
was conquered by and included in Serbia. This chapter will briefly present the relations 
between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, beginning with the Balkan wars and ending with 
Milošević’s visit to Kosovo in 1987. It will be demonstrated that Serbian-Albanian relations 
were largely characterised by a dynamic of domination and suppression that constantly shifted 
hands. This chapter seeks to highlight the changes in the dynamics between the ethnic groups 
and also show how these changes prepared the ground for the events that followed in the 
subsequent years, and which will be analysed in the next chapters.  
 
Historical context of the conflict in Kosovo 
The origins of the contemporary conflict on Kosovo can be found in the beginning of the 
twentieth century and the Balkan wars (Ker-Lindsay, 2009b). In the First Balkan War (1912-




Empire. The Albanians, although they declared independence from Ottoman rule, did not join 
the Balkan League in the war against the Ottoman Empire (Dragnich and Todorovich, 1984).  
During the Balkan Wars, Serbia occupied Kosovo, a region populated by diverse 
ethnic groups, with the majority Albanians and the second largest group Serbs. The Albanians 
considered themselves as the rightful inhabitants of the area due to the belief that their nation 
has lived in the area since ancient times (Mertus, 1999). On the other hand, for Serbs Kosovo 
was a fundamental part of their civilization and history. Kosovo was the heart of the Serbian 
kingdom that flourished in the Byzantine times, and is perceived by Serbs to be the cradle of 
Serbian Orthodoxy. A number of monasteries dating back to those times are to be found in 
Kosovo, forming a crucial part of the historical narrative around the glory of Serbs in the 
region. In addition, the historic battle of 1389 against the Ottomans, which took place in 
Kosovo at the field of Blackbirds has become an intrinsic part of the mythology of the Serbian 
nation (Volkan, 2006). Tied in with this is the belief that Serbs sacrificed their lives in this 
battle in order to save Europe from the Ottoman invasion. The defeat of the Serbian army in 
this battle signified the start of the fall of the Serbian Kingdom, leading eventually to its 
conquest by the Ottomans seventy years later. Thus, for Serbs Kosovo seems to be both the 
connection with their glorious past and at the same time the place where the Serbian suffering 
began, it is where they lost their state and were subjugated under five hundred years of 
Ottoman occupation. Therefore, the recapturing of Kosovo in the Balkan wars symbolised for 
Serbs the end of the suffering and the return to independence and freedom. Udovički (2000) 
argues then that the Serb-Albanian conflict seems to stem from the firm conviction of both 
groups that “the land has been theirs for all time” (Udovički, 2000: 317) and Ramet (2001) 




distinct languages and religious traditions lay claim to the same territory with competing 
historical arguments as evidence” (Ramet, 2001: 174).  
After the end of the first Balkan war the new boundaries in the Balkans were decided 
in the London Peace Conference of 1913 and the subsequent treaties of London and Bucharest 
(The Treaty of London, 1913, The Treaty of Bucharest, 1913). In those treaties it was 
decided, that Serbia’s borders were to be extended and comprised the territory up to the 
region of Vardar Macedonia, including thus the area of present-day Kosovo.  
After the inclusion of Kosovo in the Serbian state, the latter undertook several policies 
of both assimilation and exclusion. Examples of policies of assimilation involved the closing 
of Albanian schools combined with the obligatory attendance of Serbian schools and the 
penalisation of the use of the Albanian language (Sörensen, 2009, Prifti, 1999, Dragnich and 
Todorovich, 1984). Strategies of expulsion included a land reform programme laying 
restrictions on Albanians to owning land areas barely sufficient to sustain a family, providing 
at the same time incentives for emigration to Turkey. Those who refused to leave willingly 
were often confronted with dispossession of their land and forced expulsions, while Serbia 
attempted a change of the demographic balance through the settlement of Serbs and other 
Slavs in Kosovo (Benson, 2001, Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003, Shtylla, 1993).  
This relationship of dominance was reversed during the Second World War when a 
large part of Kosovo’s territory unified with Albania under Italian occupation. During the war, 
the Slavic population of the region was systematically expelled or exterminated and 
subsequently replaced by Albanians (Ker-Lindsay, 2009b, Burg, 1983).  
Even so Kosovo was not to remain in Albania after the end of the war. Already in 
1943, the wartime partisan parliament under Tito had decided that the post-war Yugoslavia 




of Serbia (Tepavac, 2000). Other sources claim that the issue of Kosovo was then not 
sufficiently addressed and it was also implied by the Communist Party of Albania that 
Kosovo was to be unified with Albania in a post-war settlement (Pavlakovic and Ramet, 
2004). This, though, would also involve Albania’s annexation to Yugoslavia as its seventh 
republic (Pavlowitch, 2002, Ramet, 2002, Auty, 1969). However, by 1948 relations between 
Tito and Stalin had starkly deteriorated, leading to the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the 
Soviet bloc and the subsequent deterioration of relations with Albania. Thus, a settlement 
where Albania would be incorporated into Yugoslavia was impossible and Kosovo remained 
in Serbia  (Dragnich and Todorovich, 1984, Benson, 2001). 
According to the Yugoslav constitution of 1946, Kosovo was an autonomous region 
(област) in Serbia, elevated to an autonomous province (покрајину) in the 1963 constitution, 
reaching its highest position in the federation with the 1974 constitutional amendment 
(Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946, The Constitution of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1963, Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974). The 1974 Constitution guaranteed enhanced rights 
for the two autonomous provinces; Kosovo and Vojvodina acquired extensive self-
government, fully controlling internal matters such as education, judiciary, taxation and police 
in their respective provinces (ICJ, 2009). Their full and equal participation was provided, as 
well as the right to approve or veto decision concerning their provinces. Thus, they have often 
been referred to as virtual republics (inter alia, Dannreuther, 2001, Mertus, 1999), as they 
were republics “in all but name” (Interview 21, Peci). 
Nevertheless, the Albanians of Yugoslavia had always been a nationality in the federal 
state, never obtaining the status of constituent nation. In Yugoslavia, the peoples or nations 




Hence, for example, the Croats and the Slovenians were nations because their country was 
located within the borders of Yugoslavia. The Albanians on the other hand were a nationality 
as Albania, their nation-state, was outside the boundaries of Yugoslavia. Nationalities also 
included the Bulgarians in Eastern Serbia, the Italians on the Adriatic Coast and the 
Hungarians in Vojvodina (Detrez, 2003).    
Nationalities were not entitled to their own republics, and thus Kosovo never became 
an actual constituent republic of Yugoslavia. The reason why nationalities were not allowed 
to run their own republics was not adequately explained (Ramet, 2002). A possible reason 
could be that nationalities having a nation-state outside the federal boundaries would be 
regarded to be more inclined to the idea to secede and join their fatherland (Detrez, 2003).  
The fact, however, that Albanians were not classed as a nation and Kosovo was not a 
republic also meant that Kosovo did not have the right to secession. Article 1 of the various 
Yugoslav constitutions stated that Yugoslavia is a federal state of peoples or nations (народа) 
who voluntarily associated and created a federation based on the principles of self-
determination “including the right to secession”, “укључујући право на отцепљење” 
(Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946). Although it is unclear 
from the definition whether nations or republics had the right to secession, the fact that only 
nations were entitled to republics probably leads to the conclusion that only republics had the 
right to secession. As it will be discussed later, this view was further strengthened by the 
concluding opinions of the Badinter Commission, which argued that only the constituent 





Despite the enhanced rights Kosovars enjoyed in the former Yugoslavia after 196621 it 
is alleged that Kosovo Albanians have still desired unification with Albania. As a non-Slavic 
population in a predominantly Slavic country they were regarded as “second class citizens” in 
the rest of Yugoslavia (Interview 5, EU Diplomat). They were considered to be more 
“primitive,” peasants or manual workers meant to do the toughest jobs (Udovički, 2000: 319). 
Albanians themselves “never felt part of this artificial construction of the state” and believed 
that “Kosovo was mistakenly a part of Yugoslavia” (Interview 18, Civil Society Activist).  
This sentiment of not belonging in the country was further increased by the low living 
standards Kosovo suffered. Although the province had been allocated special treatment  under  
the Federate Fund for Crediting Economically Underdeveloped Republics and Provinces, 
1965-1990, and was receiving generous  grants  and  low-interest  loans from  the  Federal  
Development  Fund, the levels of development and employment remained extremely low in 
comparison with other regions in Yugoslavia with Kosovo to be the poorest region in the 
country (I.I.C.K., 2000).  
Subsequently, tensions grew between Albanians and Slavs in general and with Serbs 
in particular. The richer republics of Slovenia and Croatia complained that their revenues and 
labour supported the population in the underdeveloped South, while other less developed 
republics such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia claimed that Kosovo received more 
than its fair share of federal funds (Judah, 2000c). Kosovo Serbs in particular accused Kosovo 
Albanians of indolence, maintaining that the younger generations of Albanians seemed to be 
reluctant to occupy themselves with traditional ways of production and agriculture and 
                                                                
21 In the years 1953-1966 Alexander Ranković had been Minister of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia and also head 
of the secret police. During his period in office the ethnic Albanians had been harshly treated, this having as a 
result the migration of significant proportion of their population to Turkey. After Ranković was dismissed in 
1966, a general change of attitude from the federal state towards Albanians followed. Albanians began 
gradually to enjoy more rights, the University of Prishtina was founded, as well as other institutes for Albanian 
language, cultural ties between Albania and Kosovo were permitted and the influx of Albanian books was 




preferred studying instead of working (Guzina, 2003, Poulton, 1993). Kosovo Albanians, on 
the other hand, claimed that Serbs and Montenegrins although comprising a significantly 
lower percentage of the population occupied almost one third of the state run enterprises 
(Mertus, 1999).  
Tensions increased further when the Serbs started to leave Kosovo and relocate to 
other regions of Yugoslavia. Albanians asserted that Serbs were leaving because of the severe 
economic situation in the region. The Serbs, however, talked about an “Albanisation” of 
Kosovo (Arhsien and Howells, 1981: 427) and claimed that they were leaving because of the 
constant harassment and discrimination against them (Malcolm, 1999).  
Eventually the situation escalated, and in 1981 only eleven months after Tito’s death, 
Kosovo experienced one of the most violent demonstrations that had ever occurred in the 
province. The riots were triggered by a seemingly insignificant event in Prishtina University’s 
cafeteria when a student furiously complained about the quality of the food (Binder, 1981). 
Soon the event gained momentum and demonstrations erupted in Prishtina with students 
demanding better conditions in the University’s facilities (Rogel, 2003). The demonstrations, 
having initially little to do with politics, rapidly grew into riots with protesters demanding the 
status of Republic for Kosovo, and a minority of them asking for unification with Albania 
(Malcolm, 1999, Mertus, 1999). The demonstrations were suppressed, but resumed again 
some weeks later, joined by people of all professions, miner workers, teachers, civil servants, 
turning the riots into a mass revolt demanding the status of Republic. The demonstrations 
were brutally crushed, a state of emergency was declared and Kosovo’s borders were sealed 
(I.I.C.K., 2000). 
 The fierceness of the riots and the exaggerated way Serbia responded shed light into 




thought of Kosovo as a weak link in the federation, whose demands could potentially cause 
destabilisation. Second, through this full scale reaction, it was implied that if any other 
nationalist elements emerged elsewhere in the country, they would be likewise suppressed 
(Arhsien and Howells, 1981).   
  The student protests of 1981 were possibly the first sign that Tito’s structure had 
begun to collapse. Tito’s ideal for Yugoslavia dictated that all citizens of the federal state 
were first and foremost Yugoslavs as defined by their citizenship, not by their nation or 
nationality. Thus, any expression of nationalism was rejected in favour of a creation of a 
common Yugoslav identity by virtue that all were citizens of Yugoslavia. The demonstration 
of 1981, however, revealed the long suppressed nationalistic sentiments to such an extent that 
in  hindsight some would claim that the disintegration of Yugoslavia started then in Kosovo 
(inter alia, Interview 12, EU Diplomat, Interviews 10, 18, Civil Society Activists). The 1981 
riots were the first significant event of a turbulent decade that would ultimately end with the 
abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and the consequent open struggle for independence. 
  Other noteworthy events that followed in the subsequent years after 1981 riots were 
the funeral of Alexandar Ranković, the Martinović case, the publication of the SANU 
Memorandum and Milošević’s visit to Kosovo in 1987. Each of these events either 
demonstrated the increase of Serbian nationalism in Kosovo or was used towards this end 
escalating the relations between the two ethnic groups.  
To begin with, Ranković’s funeral turned into a Serbian nationalist demonstration. 
Ranković was the former security chief who ruled Kosovo Albanians in a draconian manner. 
Thousands attended shouting his name, nationalistic slogans as well as slogans against 





Some years later the Martinović case followed. It was a case of an elderly man who 
was rushed into hospital accusing two Albanians of severe sexual abuse. It was a controversial 
incident that took national dimensions, was discussed in parliament and covered in full detail 
by press and media (Kamm, 1986). Although there have been indications that the injury might 
have been self-inflicted, the Martinović case was displayed as a demonstration of the 
oppression and mistreatment of Serbs in Kosovo (Kola, 2003).  
This event gained importance in light of subsequent revelations of the Serbian 
Orthodox church that nuns had been constantly harassed and monasteries had been vandalised 
(Kamm, 1986). Their claims were supported by evidence the church had compiled since 1969 
offering also information about the numbers of Serbs leaving Kosovo, allegedly because of 
Albanian pressure (Judah, 2000c).  
In regards to the latter, the press continued to show cases of Serbs leaving Kosovo also 
providing data supporting the view that this migration was due to mistreatment by Albanians. 
Blagojevic and Petrovic (1992), after conducting a survey in 1985-1986, claimed that the 
most frequently mentioned reason for emigration were “uncertainty, the lack of security and 
freedom, fear and the loss of hope” (1992: IV,1b). In their publication they also cited 
statements such as the following:  
I went out in front of them [Serbs leaving their homes] and said: 'Stop, people, where 
are you going? Don't leave your land, homes, Kosovo-and the answer was always the 
same: 'We can't take the terror anymore, friend; they attack every day, women, 
children, old folks, property, they hit and swear; I'm leaving so that my children can 
live freely' (Farmer from a Serbian village, age 80, cited in Blagojevic and Petrovic, 




Before this survey was published, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts had also 
publicised another document, known as the SANU22 Memorandum, which victimised the 
Serbs not only in Kosovo but in other parts of Yugoslavia as well. The Memorandum 
denounced among others the “physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian 
population in Kosovo and Metohija” and the mistreatment of the Serbian people in other 
republics as well, while it urged Serbia to take action against those practises (Mihailovic and 
Krestic, 1995: 128). The SANU Memorandum provocatively expressed the grievances of the 
Serb population and revealed their resentment that subsequently led to the rise of nationalism. 
The significance of those events is manifold. They represented a situation in Kosovo 
where a Serbian minority was oppressed and terrorised by the Albanian majority, bringing to 
light long suppressed frustration towards Albanians. This exasperation also led to the rise of 
Serbian nationalism in both Kosovo and Serbia, a phenomenon that had already started to 
increase in all Yugoslav republics in the post-Tito Yugoslav years. However, the mistreatment 
of Serbs in Kosovo has been regarded as a Serbian issue surpassing the borders of the 
province. The victimisation of Serbs, adding to the rise of Serbian nationalism provided the 
basis for Slobodan Milošević to enhance his political career (Ker-Lindsay, 2009b).  
In 1987, Ivan Stambolić, president of Serbia, grasping the deteriorating situation and 
the possible effects of it, sent Milošević to Kosovo in an effort to abate tensions. Milošević 
met Communist officials, but also Serb nationalists demanded a meeting. Milošević agreed, 
although this could be regarded as a violation of Yugoslavia’s principal guideline condemning 
all kinds of manifestation of nationalism. During the meeting, the Serbs described incidents of 
everyday harassment taking place against them, until Milošević was informed that the police, 
composed mainly of ethnic Albanians, had violently restrained Serbs gathered outside. 
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Milošević, interrupting the meeting, went outside to see what was happening, and this was 
when he uttered the infamous phrase “you will not be beaten again” (BBC, 1995). The heated 
reaction of the Serbian media afterwards turned Milošević from a communist bureaucrat into 
a hero ready to defend the Serbian rights. 
Milošević’s alignment with the Serbs was a clear breach of Yugoslav brotherhood and 
unity. This upset both Yugoslav leaders and also the police, whose authority had been 
publicly undermined by a politician (Branson and Doder, 1999). Nevertheless, Milošević was 
determined to continue his ascent to power. Later the same year, he orchestrated Stambolić’s 
removal from the presidency and in less than two years he occupied the post himself. 
Milošević’s rise to the presidency of Serbia signified a new era for the Kosovo Albanians. 
Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished one year later, introducing a time of mistreatment and 
oppression of the Albanian population (I.I.C.K., 2000). The next two chapters will present in 
detail Milošević’s policy of oppression in Kosovo, as well as Kosovars reaction to this 
oppression, demonstrating how the way the Kosovars reacted to Milošević’s misrule shaped 
the outcome of their attempts to secede.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a brief overview of the depth of Kosovo’s conflict. 
The aim was to show the longevity of the circle of domination and suppression between Serbs 
and Albanians, beginning with the end of the Balkan wars, when Serbs ruled over Kosovo and 
continuing with the Second World War when the control passed to the Albanians. After the 
inclusion of Kosovo in Yugoslavia it was again the Serbs’ turn to dominate the Albanians 
until 1966 when Ranković was removed from the secret police and the vice presidency of 




themselves oppressed by the Albanian majority in Kosovo. Following Tito’s death, with the 
fading of the idea of Brotherhood and Unity and the rise of nationalism, previous frustrations 
reached the surface by both sides. The students’ demonstrations of 1981 shook Yugoslavia to 
such an extent that many would claim afterwards that the end of Yugoslavia started with 
Kosovo. Throughout the 1980s the Serbian media presented an exaggerated version of events 
in Kosovo, intensifying the Serbian feelings of victimisation, adding further to the already 
emerging nationalism. 
When finally the situation in the whole Yugoslavia erupted in 1991, Kosovo declared 
independence along with the seceding Yugoslav republics. However, its declaration of 
independence was deliberately neglected by the international community and Kosovo 
remained a Serbian internal matter. The next chapter will examine why Kosovo’s first attempt 
to secede failed. It will be followed by Chapter Six exploring the events from 1991 to 1999 
that turned Kosovo from a Serbian internal matter in 1991 to a major international issue that 
triggered the 1999 NATO intervention. Chapter Seven will then evaluate Kosovo’s position 
under the UN-led international administration, established after the end of the NATO air-
offensive to provide interim governance on Kosovo until a settlement on its status has been 
reached. Chapter Seven will evaluate the international administration’s structure, functioning 
and efficiency. It will also examine how events such as the 2004 riots against the Serbs led to 
the Vienna negotiations and the Ahtisaari plan, proposing Kosovo’s supervised independence. 
The last of the empirical chapters, Chapter Eight will assess Kosovo’s course after it 
unilaterally declared independence in 2008. Finally, the thesis will end by reflecting back on 
the events that took place since 1991 and turned Kosovo’s first unsuccessful attempt to secede 
in 1991 to a more successful one in 2008, answering the main question of the thesis: why did 





KOSOVO’S FIRST UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO SECEDE 
 
Introduction  
This chapter explores the reasons why Kosovo’s first attempt to secede in 1991 failed. This 
first attempt stands in sharp contrast to the subsequent unilateral secession of 2008 which led 
to the creation of a still contested, but gradually increasingly consolidated state.  
This chapter argues that the 1991 declaration of independence failed primarily because 
of the lack of international recognition, and seeks to discover the reasons behind this 
deliberate neglect the international community showed to Kosovo’s demands. Although the 
thesis claims that a seceding entity has also to create an internally viable state for its secession 
to be successful, this chapter focuses only on the international dimension of Kosovo’s failure. 
This is because Kosovo, after the 1991 declaration of independence did not have the 
opportunity to demonstrate internal viability. Admittedly, the parallel Kosovar society showed 
a significant level of functionality, however, as it will be shown later, Kosovars were largely 
able to run their parallel system only because the Serbian apparatus allowed them to do so. 
The reason why Kosovo failed to establish a viable state, therefore, is quite straightforward; 
the overwhelming power of Serbia meant that it did not have the chance. On the contrary, the 
question of why Kosovo failed to receive international acceptance at a time when the former 
Yugoslavia was falling apart deserves closer scrutiny. 
In order to address this issue, the chapter first examines how Kosovo’s status as an 
autonomous province of Serbia affected the outcome of its first declaration of independence. 




province and the status of republic, as demonstrated by the Badinter Commission’s opinions. 
The latter provided the blueprint for the international community regarding the acceptance or 
rejection of the demands for statehood raised by some of the former Yugoslav units. 
Furthermore, this chapter will discuss how the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 
turned Kosovo into a Serbian internal matter further impeding its prospects for international 
acceptance. 
Second, this chapter explores how the peaceful situation in Kosovo in contrast to the 
escalating violence in the northern republics undermined the success of its attempt. Due to 
absence of armed conflict Kosovo did not seem to be considered as a destabilising factor, 
turning it to an issue of minor importance for Europe at that time. This section shows how the 
emerging Yugoslav wars absorbed all international interest, hindering, instead of facilitating, 
Kosovo’s independence in 1991. 
Finally, this chapter explores how the dramatic changes in the international system 
had an effect on the outcome of Kosovo’s first declaration of independence. After the end of 
the Cold War Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance for the US; thus when the crisis in the 
Balkans erupted the issue was left to an unprepared Europe to manage. This section explores 
how the lack of adequate mechanisms combined with inexperience and inconsistent decisions 
led to the deliberate neglect of Kosovo’s claims for independence and recognition.  
 
Kosovo declares independence for the first time 
In 1989 Kosovo’s Assembly voted for the revocation of its autonomous status. This was 
resolved under unusual circumstances: federal forces had encircled the parliament, where its 
members under the threat of arms decided the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy (Perritt, 2010, 




 Following the change in Kosovo’s status new onerous laws regulating most aspects of 
everyday life had been introduced in the province. Albanians had been sacked from state 
institutions and enterprises and been replaced by Serbian personnel (Malcolm, 1999), while 
new property laws had been imposed hindering Albanians from buying land or houses 
previously owned by Serbs (Judah, 2000c). Furthermore, Albanian-language education was 
banned; Serbian curricula were introduced in schools, while Prishtina University was turned 
into an exclusively Serbian institution (Kostovicova, 2005, Clark, 2000). What is more, 
Albanian press, television and radio were closed down, as well as most cultural institutions 
(I.I.C.K., 2000, Judah, 2000c). Finally, Albanians were dismissed from the Kosovo security 
forces and replaced by Serbs, thus turning the Kosovo police force into an exclusively Serbian 
unit. The police now, through harassment, arbitrary arrests, the use of violence and even 
murder, subdued Albanians in a physical and psychological state of continuous suppression 
and fear (Ramet, 1996, Cohen, 1994).    
 What the abolition of autonomy also meant is that the province was stripped of all its 
armed forces. Kosovo as an autonomous province had the right to have its own territorial 
defence forces in a similar way as the republics (Interview 21, Peci). In Kosovo, however, the 
territorial defence forces were in a process of disarmament, which had been completed when 
Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished. Kosovo, hence, was overwhelmed by Serbian power, and 
did not have the military capacity to oppose it (Interview 2, Miljanić, Interview 3, Qehaja). 
 Having knowledge of the situation, the Kosovar leaders gathered secretly in Kačanik 
in 1990 and declared the creation of the Republic of Kosovo. This was not yet a declaration of 
independence, but a call for a republic within the still existent Yugoslavia. It was only later in 
1991, after the Slovenian and Croatian secessions were proclaimed, that Kosovar deputies 




addition, a referendum was held whose results clearly showed that the vast majority of the 
Kosovar population was in favour of independence (Abazi, 2008, Guzina, 2003, I.I.C.K., 
2000).  
This referendum and declaration of independence, however, did not receive the same 
international acceptance as the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The 
latter were recognised within a year by the majority of the international community and by 
May 1992 they were accepted into the United Nations, while Kosovo was recognised only by 
Albania (inter alia, Vrieze, 1995, Phillips, 1996, Clark, 2000).  
 
Why Kosovo’s demands were deliberately ignored 
There is a variety of possible reasons explaining Kosovo’s continuous and deliberate ignoring 
by the international community. First, by the time Kosovo declared independence the war in 
the north of Yugoslavia had already begun. This, instead of benefiting Kosovo’s cause, 
proved to be a drawback for its success. The wars in Slovenia and Croatia, with their spill-
over into Bosnia monopolised the interest of the international community.23 A war on the 
European continent in such proximity to the European Community (EC) member states 
created waves of refugees in European capitals and produced fears about the social and 
economic consequences it would create. Hence, the primary purpose of the European powers 
was the stabilisation of the region as soon as possible (Clark, 2000).  
Furthermore, the presence of Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia escalated the 
already deteriorating situation in the northern borders of Yugoslavia through ever-growing 
nationalism. When eventually the war erupted these were amongst the regions where the war 
raged most violently. The stabilisation of the northern front, therefore, seemed to be the key 
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for the stabilisation of the region. Thus, there was a policy of appeasement towards Serbia and 
its leader Slobodan Milošević, trying to get him to the negotiating table with the achievement 
of peace as final goal.  
Milošević, being then the most powerful man in Serbia and the main interlocutor in 
the negotiations, had insisted that Kosovo was a Serbian internal matter (inter alia, Interview 
15, Kursani, Interview 6, UN Official). As such it was regarded as an issue that was 
completely under Serbia’s authority to settle (inter alia, Interviews 5, 7, 12, EU Diplomats). 
Thus, should any state have recognised the independence of Kosovo, it would have been 
considered as a direct interference into Serbian affairs. Such an involvement “would be 
unthinkable at a time when the right of the state was more important than the human rights” 
(Interview 14, EU Diplomat). Besides, with Milošević being the principal Serbian 
representative such an action would possibly disengage him from the peace process, 
minimising the possibility for a solution to be found (Ker-Lindsay, 2009a). Hence, the 
recognition of an independent Kosovo not only would not add anything to the efforts towards 
stabilisation, but on the contrary it was considered quite possible to lead to further 
destabilisation (Phillips, 1996).  
What is more, Kosovo was not considered as an important and urgent factor of 
instability, as it remained peaceful during the first half of the decade. Thus, its recognition 
would possibly pose an additional risk for the regional instability that the international 
community was not prepared to meet. The absence of violence made Kosovars’ demand for 
independence irrelevant for the international community whilst a terrible war was raging in 
other republics (Interview 3, Qehaja). Therefore, “the international community was not really 
prepared to deal with the Kosovo Albanians, at that time they didn’t consider it to be of 




“Christmas warning” in 1992 and its reiteration two months later little effort had been made to 
restrain Serbia’s oppression in Kosovo.24 
Another sign of deliberate neglect by the international community and simultaneously 
one of the reasons why its first declaration of independence failed was the concluding 
opinions of the Badinter Commission. In 1991, the Arbitration Commission of the Conference 
on Yugoslavia, widely known as the Badinter Commission, was established with the aim to 
provide answers on major legal questions raised by the Yugoslav wars. The Badinter 
Commission resolved that Yugoslavia was in a process of dissolution and that its successor 
states would be its six republics, respecting the “existing frontiers at the time of independence 
(uti possidetis juris)” (Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992: 1498). When the Commission was 
asked to provide an opinion regarding whether the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia had the right 
to self-determination as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, the Commission 
repeated the adherence to the uti possidetis principle and the inviolability of first-order 
internal boundaries at the time of independence (Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992, Opinion 
No 2). It added also that minorities inside the republics should be recognised and their rights 
should be respected according to the norms of international law. 
The Badinter Commission did not address the issue of Kosovo, demonstrating its 
apparent insignificance at that time. Nonetheless, it can be derived from the Commission’s 
opinion that Kosovo by not being a republic had no right to be regarded as one of the 
successor states of Yugoslavia (Hilpold, 2009, Ker-Lindsay, 2009a). In addition, by the time 
the Commission was founded Milošević had already abolished the autonomous status of 
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Kosovo, depriving Kosovo of its previously elevated status as a virtual republic. Hence, 
Kosovo could not even remotely be considered to be entitled to secession since it was neither 
a republic so as to be regarded as successor state according to the Badinter Commission nor 
one of the constituent people of Yugoslavia to seek secession according to domestic 
constitutional law.  
Still, Kosovo’s previous peculiar status within the federation made Kosovo’s claim 
different from the claim of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. The Serbs in those regions had never 
had the status Kosovans enjoyed in the federal institutions of Yugoslavia (Caspersen, 2008). 
What is more, the Badinter Commission requested recognition of the minorities’ distinct 
identity within the Republics and respect of their rights, something that Serbia had already 
failed to honour. Hence, the Kosovo problem, although not addressed, was far from being that 
simple and in light of subsequent events far from being resolved.   
 On top of everything else, in 1991 the international system was amidst a 
transformational and transitional phase. The Cold War that regulated the global state of affairs 
for almost half a century was over. The initial feelings of euphoria and relief that the end of 
the Cold War produced were followed by fears for the future (Evera, 1991). Many questions 
concerning European security emerged; it was unclear whether the long peace in Europe 
would outlast the Cold War or whether the united Germany would be a threat once again. It 
was also uncertain whether the former communist states of Eastern Europe would achieve a 
successful transition to democracy, while the Soviet Union was dissolved into fifteen 
successor states. One of the most critical concerns the dissolution of USSR caused for the 
West was the dispersal of its nuclear arsenal to some of its successor states. Suddenly states 
such as Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan that “were in a complete state of political, 




facilities and weaponry (Goodby, 1993: 704). The US focus was thus redirected to ensure that 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, materials and technology would be prevented 
from proliferating further either to non-state actors or other states (Doder, 1993, Goodby, 
1993, Interview 21, Peci). 
With the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance for the US 
(Woodward, 2000, Doder, 1993, Ahrens, 2007). The US therefore turned its attention to 
settling open issues in the Middle East and Russia and left the European Community to deal 
with the crises in the Balkans. The EC responded willingly to this role. Perhaps it was 
considered as an opportunity for the EC to demonstrate its readiness for the imminent 
Maastricht Treaty and its plan to create a more integrated European Union (Guicherd, 1993). 
In view of that, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos declared that Europe “had a 
special responsibility to act in a crisis that threatened European stability” adding also that 
"this is the hour of Europe [...] it is not the hour of the Americans” (Riding, 1991).  
However, despite grandiose statements, the EC proved to be unready to deal with 
problems as complicated as the conflicts in the Balkans. To begin with, the EC, later EU, 
lacked the experience to deal with a crisis of such scale as a coherent entity (Ahrens, 2007). It 
was observed that Europe was largely divided, with each country acting according to its own 
interests as formulated by economic, political, geopolitical reasons (Glaurdić, 2011). Notably, 
in essence Germany and Italy sided with the breakaway republics, while France, the United 
Kingdom, Spain and Greece seemed to be more eager to support the unity of Yugoslavia 
(Steinberg, 1992). 
Europe’s division became more evident with Germany’s early recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia. This was one of the actions that both undermined the EC’s uniform approach and 




argued with regards to the decision not to recognise the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia immediately along with Croatia and Slovenia because of Greek objections,25 
although it largely fulfilled the Badinter Commission’s criteria. What further undermined the 
EC’s coherence was the pro-Serbian inclination of France, the United Kingdom and Greece, 
which obstructed the timely and effective enforcement of measures against it. Another reason 
for the delayed and to some extent futile adoption of measures against Belgrade was that 
European countries were unwilling to alienate Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia. Finally, 
states in proximity or states which were significant recipients of refugees such as Italy, Greece 
and Germany dealt with the crisis accordingly, seeking also to minimise its impact on their 
own countries (Guicherd, 1993). 
Moreover, the EC/EU lacked the necessary mechanisms to handle such crises. 
International concepts of preventive deployment of military force or responsibility to protect 
were not yet developed as to be applied on Yugoslavia (Ahrens, 2007).Various attempts had 
been made to stabilise the situation and create conditions for peace, including series of peace 
conferences, deployment of unarmed missions to report on the human rights situation on the 
ground or to observe compliance with agreed measures. Even then, however, the 
implementation of those actions had often been delayed and by the time they had been 
introduced were no longer relevant (Guicherd, 1993). Thus, all in all, the international 
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initiating a still ongoing name dispute. Greece considers the use of the term Macedonia without any 
geographical or other qualifier as usurpation of Greek history and historical symbols mostly referring to the 
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reaction was only rarely preventive and most of the time it followed, rather than led 
developments on the ground (Ahrens, 2007).  
The issue of Kosovo could have been a successful example of preventive action. Some 
of the negotiators, realising that Kosovo was a part of the crisis directly connected with the 
stability of the region had proposed and insisted on Kosovo being included in the peace 
processes (Interview 23, Non-EU Diplomat). Unfortunately, the EC/EU was unable to deal 
with more than one conflict at the time. A lack of experience and consistency combined with 
personnel and budget fatigue and the desire to settle or conceal the problems as soon as 
possible made the Kosovo issue one too much to deal with (Ahrens, 2007). Hence, with so 
many open matters requiring urgent settlement Kosovo was not a priority for the international 




This chapter investigated the reasons behind Kosovo’s unsuccessful attempt to secede in 
1991. It concluded that its first attempt for independence failed largely because of the lack of 
violence. Due to the absence of armed conflict and potential of spill-over of war, Kosovo was 
not considered to be a major factor of instability. Hence, it was not an issue as urgent to settle 
as it was with the other republics where a violent war was raging. This chapter revealed that 
the Yugoslav wars had absorbed the time and energy of the European powers, having as chief 
priority the stabilisation of the region as soon as possible. Kosovo, by neither being at war, 





Considering also that Milošević had insisted that Kosovo was a Serbian internal 
matter, its international recognition would possibly disengage the Serbian leader from the 
peace process, and therefore, carried a risk. Hence, as Kosovo was both peaceful and was 
regarded as an exclusively Serbian issue, its recognition not only would not have added to the 
European Community’s efforts for stabilisation of the region, but it would have further 
deteriorated the situation by reducing the possibilities for a settlement.  
The international community’s position of considering Kosovo as an internal matter of 
a sovereign state and thus an issue they would be not be in position to settle, was further 
strengthened by the results of the Badinter Commission. The latter had concluded that 
Yugoslavia was a state in dissolution and only the constituent republics were to be recognised 
as successor states. Hence, Kosovo as an autonomous province in Serbia would not be 
qualified for recognition, adding a further reason to Kosovo’s first unsuccessful attempt to 
secede.  
 Moreover, in 1991 major changes were taking place in the international system. With 
the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance and the US focus redirected 
towards its renewed relations with Moscow and the developments in the Middle East. 
Therefore, Europe had been called to deal with the crises in the Balkans. Europe possessed 
neither the experience nor adequate conflict management mechanisms and was overwhelmed 
by the complexity and magnitude of the Balkan wars. In addition, it was divided, with each 
member supporting actions that promoted individual interests. The European Community, 
being unable to deal with all issues at once, set the establishment of peace and stability in the 
region as the leading goal for action. Thus, again Kosovo by not being engaged in armed 





 Finally, the argument that Kosovar demands were ignored because of the absence of 
armed conflict is further strengthened in light of subsequent events. When the Kosovo 
Liberation Army emerged early in 1996, their actions provoked Serbian retaliation escalating 
the level of violence, which in turn the international community finally noticed. Hence, as an 
interviewee characteristically mentioned “it had to take the lives of people to become a 
successful case” (Interview 18, Civil Society Activist) demonstrating the predominant role 
violence played in Kosovo’s quest for independence.  
Thus, Kosovo’s first attempt to secede failed because of reasons being found at four 
different levels: at the local level, being Kosovo, at the state level, Serbia, at the regional 
level, thus, the Balkans and at the global level. Locally Kosovo was at peace, thus, due to lack 
of violence was not considered to be a factor of instability. At the state level, Milošević was 
one of the most powerful leaders of the former Yugoslav states and a key to regional stability. 
The international community prioritised an agreement with him over supporting Kosovo’s 
independence and risking disengaging Serbia from the peace processes for the termination of 
the Yugoslav wars. Then at the regional level the Yugoslav wars had begun. Therefore, again 
the priority was to establish peace in the parts of Yugoslavia that were at war instead of 
endangering opening a new front in Kosovo. Finally, at the global level the end of the Cold 
War and the loss of Yugoslavia’s strategic interest for the US, called for Europe to deal with 
the Yugoslav wars. The EC/EU, unready and inexperienced, was unable to include the 
settlement of the issue of Kosovo on the agenda. The next chapter will reveal how changes at 
all four levels turned Kosovo from a Serbian internal matter to an international issue of such 
importance that triggered an unauthorised NATO military intervention against Serbia, 






THE YEARS 1991-1999 
 
Introduction 
In 1991, when Kosovo declared independence for the first time it was treated as an issue of 
minor importance and an internal Serbian matter. In contrast, by 1999 Kosovo had gained 
such importance that triggered the military intervention from NATO without the consent of 
the UN Security Council. Although the purpose of the NATO intervention was not the 
creation of an independent Kosovo, it played a catalytic role towards this end. This chapter, 
using a process tracing methodology, will analyse the events from 1991 to 1999 that changed 
the dynamic between Kosovo and Serbia and turned Kosovo from a purely internal matter 
into a global issue that mobilised the Western alliance to conduct a 78 days air-offensive 
against a sovereign state. 
This chapter will examine a number of factors that may have had an effect on 
Kosovo’s second, and far more successful, attempt to secede. To begin with, this section will 
look into Rugova’s non-violent approach and how it influenced following events. Although 
Rugova’s strategy failed to achieve independence, it certainly produced a number of positive 
outcomes, legitimising Kosovo’s claims and making known the human rights violations that 
Serbia was committing in Kosovo. Even Rugova’s failure to bring Kosovo’s demands to the 
Dayton negotiation table is regarded in hindsight as positive for Kosovo’s future secession, as 
Kosovo could barely have achieved independence at Dayton. In addition, Kosovo’s exclusion 
from the Dayton accords led to the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria 
Çlirimtare e Kosovës, UÇK), a radical movement that pursued independence by violent 




leading eventually to NATO’s air campaign and the consequent de facto detachment from 
Serbia. 
Another aspect that will be examined is how Milošević’s actions had an effect on the 
turn of events. In the early 1990s Milošević was the main representative of the Serbian side 
and was seen by the international community as the pioneer of the Dayton peace agreement. 
By the second half of the decade, however, he was perceived as an untrustworthy partner. 
This change was largely due to the revelation of the extent of the atrocities Serbian forces had 
committed during the Yugoslav wars and the strongly suspected involvement of Milošević in 
those actions. Frustration and distrust against Milošević was also exacerbated by his erratic 
and dismissive behaviour towards international representatives. This distrust, combined with 
the previous experiences from the Yugoslav wars and the exaggerated retaliation of the 
Serbian forces against KLA attacks in Kosovo both reminded the international community of 
their shortcomings in Bosnia and also provided them with the moral high ground to intervene 
actively in Kosovo. Hence, this chapter will reveal how Milošević’s leadership, ironically, 
positively affected the outcome of Kosovo’s attempt to secede.  
Lastly, this chapter will examine the significance of the Rambouillet negotiations and 
the impact of NATO’s military intervention on the secession of Kosovo. The failure of the 
Rambouillet accords led to the NATO bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
including Kosovo. The NATO intervention, followed by the establishment of the UN 
administration in Kosovo, was the first step towards the creation of an independent Kosovo. 
This chapter will not analyse in length the background or the legitimacy of NATO’s 
involvement, as there is already a significant amount of detailed literature on those issues.26 
Instead, this chapter will focus on the aftermath of NATO’s bombing and how it affected 
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Kosovo’s successful secession. This chapter will also examine certain provisions of the 
Rambouillet accords, analysing their effect on Kosovo’s successful secession. 
 
Rugova’s non-violent resistance 
Since the abolition of the autonomous status of the province, the Kosovo Albanians 
established a parallel society within the Serbian state. The leader of the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Kosovo was the President Ibrahim Rugova and his party, the Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK, Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës). Rugova imposed a strategy of non-violent 
resistance against the Serbian oppression, convincing the Kosovo Albanians that this would 
successfully lead to the fulfilment of their demands and the independence of Kosovo.  
However, Rugova’s peaceful approach failed to produce the expected results. Kosovo 
demands were deliberately ignored by the international community, while Kosovo 
representatives were often invited only as observers to the various peace negotiations 
procedures aiming to settle the Yugoslav wars (Evangelista, 2015).  
Even so, in hindsight it is observed that Rugova’s peaceful approach had a significant 
impact on the processes that led to Kosovo’s successful secession. The adherence to non-
violent resistance against the human rights violations committed by Serbia and its ruler 
Milošević in Kosovo legitimised Kosovo’s demands for independence. When eventually the 
international community noticed Kosovo claims in the second half of the decade, the Kosovo 
Albanians were presented by the international media as helpless victims that needed 
protection from their oppressors. Mobilising and using the support of public opinion, NATO 
found the moral justification to conduct an air campaign against a sovereign state without the 
consent of the UN Security Council. Finally, when Kosovo declared independence for the 




only viable solution for Kosovo. It was claimed that due to the grave human rights violations 
Kosovo Albanians have suffered under Serbian rule in the past, a return to Belgrade’s rule 
would be impossible. Thus, although Rugova’s non-violent approach failed to present 
immediate successful results, it created the conditions for the legitimisation of Kosovo’s 
cause and thus was an important step towards Kosovo’s successful secession in 2008.    
 Rugova’s strategy for Kosovo was a threefold one. As Edita Tahiri, the LDK Foreign 
Minister at the time, said in an interview “first, we wanted to ensure cultural survival and 
prevent ethnic cleansing. Second, we wanted to create a parallel system and build an 
independent democratic state. Third, we wanted to win international support for 
independence” (Tahiri, cited in Stephan, 2006: 72). 
In order to ensure cultural survival and prevent ethnic cleansing Rugova knew that any 
violent revolt should be prevented (Malcolm, 1999). Seeing the events in other parts of 
Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia, Rugova expected that the Serbs would engage in mass 
expulsion or extermination of the Albanian population when a pretext was given 
(Dannreuther, 2001). Hence, any action that could provoke Serbian retaliation was to be 
avoided. Allegedly, “whenever a violent episode involving Serbian police occurred, members 
of the Kosovar Youth Parliament and the Council for the Defence of Human Rights would go 
to the scene to document the incident and explain to fellow Albanians the rationale behind 
maintaining non-violent discipline” (Stephan, 2006: 73). This commitment to non-violence 
brought the plaudits of the international community. Rugova succeeded in placing Kosovo on 
the international agenda and being recognised as the leader of Kosovo’s Albanians (Interview 
18, Civil Society Activist).  
However, the international community endorsing a peaceful approach was one matter 




popular internationally he wasn’t taken as seriously [as other leaders] who were more 
successful in lobbying for their goals” and thus “the Albanian cause was not as strongly 
understood or supported” (Interview 7, EU Diplomat). Hence, the international community, 
although sympathetic, had repeatedly affirmed that further secessionism would not be 
encouraged and thus adhered to its position that an independent Kosovo would not be 
supported (Caplan, 1998, Cottey, 2009).  
 Rugova’s government was successful in its establishment of a parallel society. Kosovo 
Albanians rejected every association with Serbian institutions, boycotted Serbian elections 
(Vrieze, 1995), and certainly avoided in every way fulfilling their mandatory military service 
in the Yugoslav and subsequently Serbian army27 (Interview 18, Civil Society Activist). In 
order to fill the gap of services this boycott had produced, the LDK government created 
parallel structures extending to most aspects of everyday life, including education, health care, 
transportation, and the market and banking system (Mertus, 2009, I.I.C.K., 2000). This 
parallel structure, running under the oppression of the Serbian apparatus, was fairly well-
organised and well-functioning. The effectiveness of the parallel society in a wide range of 
competencies demonstrated a significant level of administrative capacities, showing in a way 
that Kosovo had the capability to create a viable state.  
Arguably the greatest success of the parallel state was the education system 
(Kostovicova, 1999). When, in 1990, the Serbian administration banned teaching in Albanian 
and demanded that schools introduce the Serbian curriculum, most of the Albanian teachers 
were removed and replaced by Serbs. Similarly, the University of Prishtina became fully 
Serbian and tutors were instructed to lecture in Serbian (Bellamy, 2000a). The Albanians 
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rejected and opposed those measures by creating a parallel system of education in which the 
dismissed teachers delivered classes, right up to university courses, in private houses 
(Interview 4, Kosovar Press Editor).  
Another aspect that the parallel society covered was the health care system. Allegedly 
in the early 1990s there were repeatedly incidents of poisoning in the schools through the 
ventilation system (Interview 18, Civil Society Activist). Although it still remains uncertain 
whether the poisoning occurred or not, the mass hysteria that was created filled Albanians 
with suspicion towards Serbian health care facilities (Mertus, 1999). As a result, the Mother 
Teresa Society was founded, designed to provide humanitarian assistance and at least basic 
health care services for Albanians who were reluctant to visit the Serb-dominated hospitals 
(I.I.C.K., 2000, Clark, 2000). Nonetheless, neither the Mother Teresa Society nor other clinics 
established at private houses were able to deal with complicated incidents where more 
sophisticated equipment was required. Thus, inevitably Albanians had to use state hospitals in 
those cases, largely explaining why Albanian doctors who kept their jobs in Serbian facilities 
were not rejected by wider society (Judah, 2000c).  
Furthermore, some cultural organisations such as the Kosovar Academy of Arts and 
Sciences or the Institute of Albanology kept operating for some time even without funding. 
Similarly, the Institute of History and the Institute of Language and Literature continued to 
function and to publish, though less often than they used to. Some sports events were also 
organised, and finally after the closing of Radio-Television Prishtina and the daily newspaper 
Rilindja, Kosovars turned the farmers’ magazine Bujku and the youth magazine Zëri i Rinisë 




Finally, after the mass dismissal from state institutions, unemployed Albanians sought 
alternative forms of income, mainly starting their own private businesses. Along with 
restaurants, shops and tourist agencies,  
 
the fired Albanian workers, ex-civil servants and former policemen registered several 
hundred taxis, vans, lorries and minibuses (twice as many began operating without 
registration) taking over city and intercity lines. Their initiative made transport so 
cheap and efficient that the main state companies faced bankruptcy and after six 
months, Belgrade banned alternative transport and taxis (Maliqi cited in I.I.C.K., 
2000: 47). 
 
Thus, the parallel society displayed a considerable level of efficiency in several areas, 
including education, health care, transportation and culture, with those being services often 
provided by state institutions. Thus, although Kosovo’s attempt to create an independent state 
was unsuccessful because of the lack of international recognition, the successful parallel 
structure showed that Kosovo effectively had state capabilities and the potential to establish a 
functioning state in the future.    
All these parallel structures and private initiatives required considerable financial 
backing. In order to raise funds to cover those needs, the LDK imposed taxes on all employed 
Kosovar citizens and the diaspora. Although the amount expected to be offered varied 
according to type of occupation, the rate was generally set at 3% of the income (Babuna, 
2000). Non-compliance was very low, with the majority of Kosovars contributing according 
to their capacities, and the diaspora often donating more than the minimum required (I.I.C.K., 




Despite the success of the parallel system, it still operated under the supervision and 
with the tolerance of the Serbian state, which allowed the parallel structure to continue 
without committing to actions crushing it. However, reports publicised by international 
organisations illustrated the grim situation that Kosovo was in, mentioning several incidents 
of violence against Albanians, describing also a regime of impunity for the perpetrators of 
such actions (HRW, 1994). Arbitrary raids into houses by Serbian police in the middle of the 
night with the pretext of searching for weapons were also reported as a frequent phenomenon. 
Those raids, accompanied by the destruction of property, apart from terrorising, were also 
humiliating with use of excessive violence against any member of the household regardless of 
age or gender often in front of the family (Amnesty International, 1994). 
Even under these circumstances the Kosovo Albanians adhered to non-violent 
resistance, and out of fear and necessity two completely segregated, parallel societies were 
created (Ramet, 1996). In the times of the former Yugoslavia the population reportedly lived 
in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods and memories of good neighbouring relations between 
the two ethnic groups are often mentioned today. However in the early 1990s the population 
was divided according to ethnicity. In rural areas ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods 
were created, while in larger urban areas, where physical separation was more difficult, 
division took other forms. For instance the same street would not be used by both Albanians 
and Serbs or there were specific markets, cafés and bars for each ethnic group (Interview 10, 
NGO Activist, Interview 18, Civil Society Activist).  
Thus, the situation in Kosovo was a bizarre one in the early years of the 1990s. On the 
one hand, the Kosovo Albanians were allowed, amidst human rights violations, harassment, 
suppression or the constant threat of those, to continue their parallel society. On the other 




this non-violent approach would lead to independence (Bekaj, 2010). The next section will 
show that Rugova’s non-violent method failed to secure a place at the negotiating table at 
Dayton, where the peace talks for the termination of the Yugoslav wars took place. It will also 
demonstrate that only after the KLA emerged and level of violence in Kosovo escalated the 
international community noticed and took actions for the settlement of the issue of Kosovo 
(Evangelista, 2015). However, these years of peaceful resistance had a significant impact on 
the procedures that led eventually to Kosovo’s successful secession.  
While Milošević was given significant international respect in the early 1990s, with 
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the revelation of war crimes committed in Bosnia, he not only lost his legitimacy, but the 
Kosovars were portrayed as innocent victims (Interview 6, UN Official). The stark contrast 
the media presented between a ruthless Milošević and the suppressed civilian population in 
Kosovo provoked the outcry of international public opinion, sidelining in favour of the 
protection of Kosovo Albanians by all means, including a military intervention if necessary.   
Thus, the continuous and systematic human rights violations in Kosovo provided the 
necessary pretext for the international community to intervene, as it will be discussed later in 
more detail. These human rights violations constituted a focal point of NATO’s rhetoric 
aiming to promote and justify its military intervention in 1999 (Clinton, 1999). Similarly, the 
human rights violations also provided a justification for the recognition of Kosovo as an 
independent state. Under the emerging norm of remedial secession, some of the recognising 
states have supported that Kosovo had the right to secede because of the grave human rights 
violations the Kosovar people had suffered (ICJ, 2010a §82). It was also argued that because 
of the extent and the severity of those violations, no other solution was available short of 




approach of peaceful resistance failed to lead to Kosovo’s secession, it was a beneficial factor 
for Kosovo’s independence, with the human rights abuses and Albanians’ stoic reaction to 
have legitimised Kosovo’s cause, providing the moral justification for Kosovo’s future 
secession. 
Finally, the human rights violations and the commitment to the creation and 
preservation of the parallel society strengthened the bonds between the members of the 
Albanian society. The Albanians had always been an introverted, almost impermeable society, 
with very strong family ties. All important matters were discussed and solved within the 
extended family, in the presence of the elders of the community (Sörensen, 2009, Dragnich 
and Todorovich, 1984). In the 1990s the segregation and the human rights violations 
strengthened those relationships even further, increasing their solidarity and commitment to a 
common cause, regardless, as it will be shown later, whether this was peaceful resistance or 
armed conflict. This bond of solidarity sustained their parallel system for almost a decade and 
later played a crucial role both for the conduct of guerrilla warfare on the ground and for the 
diaspora’s successful international lobbing, with all these factors combined contributing to 
Kosovo’s eventual successful secession.  
The next section will analyse the reasons behind Kosovars’ turn from Rugova’s 
peaceful resistance to KLA’s violent approach. It will discuss how Rugova’s exclusion at 
Dayton affected this change, leading the Kosovars to the realisation that their non-violent 
approach would not lead them to independence. The next section will present how and why 
the KLA was created and expanded and also how the KLA’s emergence led to a change of 






The KLA emerges 
The emergence of the KLA and the turn of the Kosovo Albanians to a violent approach to 
pursue their demands for independence was a significant factor for Kosovo’s successful 
secession. The escalation of violence in Kosovo shortly after the end of the Yugoslav wars 
threatened to destabilise the fragile peace in the region. The international community, having 
the experience of the Yugoslav wars and the memories of its shortcomings in Bosnia still 
fresh, as will be discussed in detail in the next section, decided to intervene more actively this 
time. This section shows that the primary contribution of the KLA in Kosovo’s successful 
secession is that through the emergence and escalation of violence, the international 
community finally noticed and addressed the Kosovo issue, intervening in its favour.  
During the years of the Yugoslav wars there have been repeated declarations and 
actions from the international community affirming that further secessionism in the Balkans 
would not be supported, and that Kosovo needed to be settled as an internal matter of Serbia. 
According to the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference of Yugoslavia, 
Kosovo was not entitled to independent statehood, and in the London Conference in 1992 the 
Kosovar delegation was treated as observers (Rogel, 2003). Similarly, three years later in 
Dayton, where the main objective of the negotiations was to terminate the war in Bosnia, 
Kosovo was off the agenda (inter alia, Perritt, 2010, Dannreuther, 2001, Bellamy, 2002).  
 Given the constant rejections Kosovo had received since 1991, its exclusion from the 
Dayton accords should have been expected. Surprisingly however, the Kosovars were 
convinced by Rugova’s four-year rhetoric that the international community would eventually 
take their concerns into account and sustained unfounded hopes that their problems would 




once again disregarded their claims shocked the Kosovo Albanians and led them to the 
realisation that peaceful resistance led nowhere (Guzina, 2003, O'Neill, 2002). 
 Thus, after Dayton, Rugova’s non-violent approach was marginalised in favour of a 
more radical one (Wheeler, 2000b). The KLA emerged, an armed, guerrilla group, which 
initially pledged unification with Albania (Interview 4, Kosovar Press Editor, Interview 15, 
Kursani). The origins of the KLA can be traced back to the beginnings of the 1990s, when the 
Popular Movement for Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës, LPK) was established and 
created the KLA as its army. The KLA, however, was initially a small, unorganised group, 
whose tactics were largely unpopular, as they provoked brutal acts of reprisal by the Serbian 
police against civilian population. At a time when the Kosovars, first, believed that the 
peaceful way of resistance was the key to independence, and second, were satisfied that they 
could live in peace when seeing the terror in Bosnia, KLA’s violent actions received limited 
support (Interview 19, EULEX Official). 
However, everything changed with Dayton and the international community’s 
subsequent actions. The UN lifted the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the latter was formally recognised, including Kosovo (Kubo, 2010, I.I.C.K., 2000). At 
this point, any intention to exercise pressure on Serbia regarding Kosovo seemed to have 
evaporated. This was the turning point for Kosovars as they realised that “if there is not a 
fight sort of, then Kosovo would be forgotten” (Interview 11, Malazogu).  
Thus, the military movement started to be more organised both inside and outside the 
borders of Kosovo. Once again, the role of the diaspora proved invaluable. Kosovo Albanians 
who promoted armed struggle and worked in the West, especially in Switzerland and 
Germany, had founded as early as in 1993 the “Homeland Calling Fund” aiming to raise 




as the majority of the diaspora supported Rugova’s fund for the maintenance of the parallel 
society. After 1996, however, the support largely shifted from Rugova’s fund to the KLA’s 
one. Nevertheless, raising funds although necessary was not sufficient, as an army also needs 
weaponry and recruits.  
The problem of armaments was solved in 1997 when the economic and political 
institutions of neighbouring Albania virtually collapsed, leading the country into chaotic 
turmoil. Hundreds of thousands Albanians had invested in fraudulent pyramid banking 
schemes that became eventually unsustainable.28 Their inevitable collapse led to extensive 
riots where approximately two thousand people were killed. The government was overthrown 
and the country descended into anarchy, with the army and police deserting their posts (Jarvis, 
2000, Judah, 2000a). Army warehouses were looted and the black market was flooded with 
hundreds of thousands of arms and ammunition that the KLA hurried to purchase, effectively 
solving the problem of the lack of weaponry (Judah, 2000b, I.I.C.K., 2000, Kubo, 2010). 
What is noteworthy, however, is that several actors operating in Kosovo reject the 
relationship between the collapse of the Albanian state structures and the development of the 
KLA, claiming that the acquisition of weapons had never actually been a significant obstacle. 
The predominant argument presented is that plenty of arms had been bought from officials of 
the Yugoslav army itself (Interview 4, Kosova Press Editor, Interview 6, UN Official). In 
several instances smuggling and illegal trading were hailed as the most successful type of 
communication and cooperation between Serbs and Albanians. When considering this in 
relation to the wide availability of weaponry in the former Yugoslavia and taking into account 
the low standards of living during and after the Yugoslav wars, this perspective appears 
                                                                
28 “In a typical pyramid scheme, a fund or company attracts investors by offering them very high returns; these 
returns are paid to the first investors out of the funds received from those who invest later [...] To attract new 
investors, a scheme may raise interest rates, but the larger interest payments soon force it to raise rates again. 
Eventually, the high rates begin to arouse suspicion or the scheme finds itself unable to make interest 




plausible. Another argument is that “Albania had never been under full control of its army 
units anyway” implying that trade between the Albanian army and the KLA has always been 
feasible (Interview 11, Malazogu). Finally, it was maintained that most of the weapons 
operating in Albania were “operationally useless, with the quality of the chemical 
composition of the gun powder in bullets to be very low, causing a gun to jam after the firing 
a couple of bullets” (Interview 6, UN Official). Thus, although the accessibility of the 
Albanian stockpile may have been a contributing factor to the further equipment of the KLA, 
it is possible that it was not as central a factor as the existing literature suggests.  
Nonetheless, the fact that the KLA acquired weapons when they decided to pursue the 
violent approach demonstrates significant organisational capacities. The KLA also established 
military training camps in Kosovo and Albania, where thousands of recruits received at least a 
basic military training and the KLA leaders even recruited former Yugoslav army officers to 
conduct the training in some cases (Perritt, 2008, Mulaj, 2008). The ability to build an 
efficient guerrilla, quasi-regular army as the KLA within such a short period of time, shows 
management skills that could be later transformed into state running competencies in an 
independent Kosovo. 
However, what proved to be more challenging than the acquisition of weapons was the 
recruitment of soldiers. Although, by 1997, the Kosovo Albanians were willing to change 
their support to more aggressive means, until 1997 the KLA numbered only a few hundred 
members (Kubo, 2010, Hedges, 1999, Bekaj, 2010). The Serbian state reacted ruthlessly to 
any suspicion of resistance or insurgency, thus, people were terrified and reluctant to risk their 
and their families’ lives by joining the KLA. 
The turning point was the massacre of the Jashari family in 1998 (Interview, 23, Non-




resistance towards Serbia. Adem Jashari had been one of the leading members of the KLA 
(Hedges, 1999) and known to have been guilty of the murder of a Serbian policeman (Judah, 
2000b). Their village Prekaz was for years impermeable against Serbian forces, who had 
attempted by 1998 at least twice to arrest the Jasharis. Every time though, their operations had 
failed after meeting fierce resistance (Bekaj, 2010). 
This time, though, Serbia was determined to use full force to break their defiance. 
Early in 1998 Robert Gelbard, Bill Clinton's special envoy to the Balkans, had described the 
KLA as a terrorist group stating also confidently “I know a terrorist when I see one and these 
men are terrorists” (BBC, 1998). Milošević, probably misinterpreting the statement, perceived 
it as a green light to proceed to operations against anyone suspected of involvement. In March 
1998 a full scale operation began with the Serbian army attacking the region of Drenica, 
considered as the “hotbed of Albanian terrorism” (HRW, 1998). The operation focused on an 
attack against the compounds of the Jashari family, which ended with the death of at least 
fifty-six members of the extended family29 including eighteen women and ten children aged 
sixteen or younger (Bekaj, 2010, HRW, 1998).  
The massacre of the Jashari family, rather than demoralising the Albanians, had the 
exact opposite results. The Jasharis were turned into martyrs, while their mass killing showed 
the Albanians that their families could not be protected as long as Serbian oppression 
continued (Perritt, 2008). Thus, this event triggered an unprecedented degree of unity, 
determination and solidarity among the population and thousands of Albanians rushed to join 
the KLA (Interview 23, Non-EU Diplomat). In a short while, the KLA had multiplied its 
ranks with volunteers coming not only from Kosovo but also from the diaspora (Bekaj, 2010). 
Estimating the exact number of KLA soldiers is difficult because the KLA comprised both 
                                                                
29 The exact number varies among sources because the bodies were buried in a mass tomb by the police some 




regular soldiers and civilians, who had weapons and some sort of training, but which were 
meant only to defend their own houses and villages. Furthermore, in all probability KLA 
leaders exaggerated the actual numbers of their forces in their public statements, leading to a 
very broad estimation of fifteen to thirty thousand men (Perritt, 2008). What remains clear, 
however, is that the KLA had turned from a guerrilla movement with few hundred recruits, 
into a quasi- regular army numbering thousands in its ranks.  
Still, KLA leaders knew that their military capacities were not strong enough to defy 
the professional and well-equipped Serbian army. Therefore, the principal aim of their 
strategy was to attract the attention of international public opinion and make the international 
community notice (Interview 3, Qehaja). In order to achieve this, they maintained guerrilla 
tactics intending to provoke Serbian retaliation. Serbia indeed responded by committing 
heinous crimes that were subsequently publicised to the international media (Interview 11, 
Malazogu). The atrocities committed by the Serbian forces produced an outcry of 
international public opinion, who only witnessed the Serbian retaliation and not the KLA 
provocation. Thus, through a combination of the escalation of violence and skilful 
manipulation of the international media, in less than two years the KLA had attracted such a 
level of international attention that would eventually lead to the NATO military intervention.  
Thus, the tragedy of the Jashari family had triggered the interest of the international 
community for Kosovo. However, the turning point that led to active international 
intervention was the Račak massacre, where Serbian forces had allegedly executed forty-five 
Albanian civilians. Serbia still denies the massacre and subsequent forensic reports indicate 
that the bodies had possibly not been executed but might have been killed in an armed 
confrontation between the Serbian army and the KLA the day before and later been placed in 




massacre was real or not, international public opinion willingly accepted the assertion of the 
head of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission30 (KVM), William Walker, who instantly 
proclaimed that the Serbian security forces were “directly responsible for the massacre of 
forty-five civilians” (Udovički, 2000: 332). The Račak massacre offered the pretext for the 
international community to get more involved and justify military intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.  
Hence, the fierce and indiscriminate retaliation of the Serbian state was one of the 
reasons why the KLA had been so successful. Milošević had overreacted in his responses, 
provoking an international outcry. In addition, after the Yugoslav wars and the atrocities in 
Bosnia, international representatives largely mistrusted him. The atrocities in Kosovo were a 
constant reminder of the failures of the international community in Bosnia, as will be 
examined in more detail in the next section. Furthermore, the KLA leaders had built a very 
effective public image, appearing courteous and reliable, when in contrast Milošević 
disregarded public opinion and also became disrespectful towards international envoys 
(Interview 12, EU Diplomat, Interview 23 Non-EU Diplomat). Thus, acknowledging that 
Milošević’s misrule and misbehaviour played a decisive role in the process of Kosovo’s 
independence, the next section will examine in depth how Milošević’s actions led to 





                                                                
30In a previous attempt to stabilise the situation in Kosovo, under the threat of use of force, Richard Holbrooke 
achieved an agreement with Slobodan Milošević in October 1998 that included the deployment of an OSCE 
verification mission. The mission would be composed of 2,000 unarmed verifiers and would have as main task 
to verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, calling for a cease-fire, 




Milošević and the Yugoslav wars 
In hindsight, Milošević’s heavy-handed rule in Kosovo was a contributing factor to Kosovo’s 
successful secession. Ever since the late 1980s, Milošević had taken actions that could be 
used against Serbia later. When Milošević abolished the autonomous status of Kosovo, he 
violated a fundamental element of internal self-determination as expressed in international 
law. Furthermore, the breach of such a settlement between central state and a self-governed 
territory is a violation that could potentially justify separation according to the principle of 
remedial secession. Although remedial secession as an approach was not widely accepted in 
the 1990s, it gradually gained importance, and by 2008 when Kosovo declared independence 
for the second time, it was used as one of the arguments in favour of Kosovo’s recognition 
(Bolton and Visoka, 2010).  
 The arguments of remedial secession are further strengthened through the grave 
human rights violations Kosovo Albanians had suffered during the 1990s. The scale of 
violations in Kosovo under Milošević’s rule provided the evidence to support independence 
as the only solution. The combination of the sudden abolition of autonomy and the 
subjugation that followed provided Kosovars with the argument that this created a precedent 
that may happen again (Interview 15, Kursani). In addition, although the years of the Former 
Yugoslavia are often recalled with nostalgia by Kosovo Albanians, through the actions of 
Milošević the widespread perception was created that the Serbian system as a whole was 
“anti-Albanian” and thus it made no difference who would be in the leadership in Serbia, 
leaving thus no other solution apart from complete independence from Belgrade (Interview 
11, Malazogu). Milošević’s actions then, by coercing the Kosovo Albanians and completely 
dividing society, had destroyed the possibility for peaceful co-existence among the different 




Even during the 1990s, the human rights violations Milošević’s regime was 
committing had been used as a policy-making tool by Rugova. When the Kosovars had the 
opportunity to overthrow Milošević in the elections of 1992 by supporting his opponent 
Panić, they decided that the most beneficial option for their cause would be “to continue with 
Milošević” (Agami, cited in I.I.C.K., 2000: 49). Panić had promised the restoration of 
Kosovo’s autonomy, including the re-employment of the sacked personnel and the re-opening 
of Albanian press and schools. However, should the Kosovars have accepted Panić’s 
proposal, they would lose the predominant justification of their demands for independence, as 
their claims were largely based on the abuse of their basic human rights by the Serbian 
regime. Therefore, “it would have been a disaster for them if a peace-monger like Panić had 
restored human rights, since that would have left them with nothing but a bare political 
agenda to change borders” (Vickers, cited in Udovički, 2000: 324). Rugova’s government 
then instead of ameliorating the living conditions in Kosovo, preferred to continue with the 
bearing of all violations to achieve the internationalisation of Kosovo’s issue. The best way to 
achieve this was to retain the existing status quo and eventually use Milošević’s misrule to 
promote their goals.  
 In addition, it is possible that Rugova calculated that the Kosovar cause was more 
likely to be achieved through the prevalence of Milošević and the implementation of his 
doctrine “all Serbs in one state.” It is possible that the Albanians expected that Milošević 
would win the war and incorporate the Serb inhabited Croatian region of Krajina and Eastern 
Slavonia, as well as the Serbian territories of Bosnia. This would practically lead to a general 
rearrangement of the borders of the former Yugoslavia according to ethnicity. Thus, Rugova 




international community would have no reason to oppose a similar arrangement for Kosovo 
as well (Judah, 1999).  
It is unknown whether this was indeed Rugova’s estimation, as by the mid-1990s the 
balance has shifted and Milošević was losing the war. Serbia was financially devastated by 
the long international financial sanctions and its population was demoralised by the war and 
the continued poverty (Sell, 2002).  
In the meantime, the Bosnian Serb forces, led by Radovan Karadžić and Ratko 
Mladić, proceeded to actions of intimidation against international personnel operating in 
Bosnia. In May 1995 Mladić’s forces took hostage approximately three hundred fifty UN 
peacekeepers as an answer to the NATO airstrike31 of some ammunition warehouses. The UN 
personnel were chained and placed in front of ammunition depots and were used as a human 
shield to prevent any other potential air attacks (Ramet, 2002). The hostages were released 
two weeks later after extensive negotiations. However, the capture of the UN personnel 
showed how inadequately equipped the UN mission was to protect even their own personnel, 
let alone to provide any substantial security to the local population. Regrettably, those 
shortcomings were more evidently revealed two months later when the Bosnian Serb army 
attacked the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica.     
In July 1995 Bosnian Serb forces marched towards the Bosnian-held enclaves of Žepa 
and Srebrenica. Both had been declared safe areas, protected by UN forces and hosted 
approximately fifty thousand Bosnian Muslim refugees. When Mladić attacked, the Bosnians 
were unable to defend themselves, as they had handed over their weaponry when Srebrenica 
was proclaimed a safe area. Although, the Bosnians requested their weaponry back after the 
                                                                
31 Between 1993 and 1995 NATO engaged to a number of air strikes against Bosnian Serb facilities.  Although, 
the attacks had an important military and diplomatic impact, they were mainly retaliatory with limited tactical 
and strategic elements. Hence their objective was to lead the Bosnian Serbs to a change of attitude instead of 




Serb offensive began, the request was denied under the assurance that the UN forces would 
protect them. However, as the siege intensified the UN personnel refused to use any military 
equipment they possessed trying to avoid the escalation of the situation. The requests of the 
UN commander in Srebrenica for deployment of close air support were repeatedly denied by 
the UN commanders in Sarajevo and Zagreb. Finally, after five days of siege Srebrenica fell 
with the UN not firing “a single shot directly at the advancing Serb forces” (A/54/549, 1999: 
304). What followed was a clear act of genocide, the worst Europe has seen since the end of 
the Second World War. An estimate of five to eight thousand men and boys were executed, 
others had been killed while fleeing, while women, children and elderly had been put into 
buses and transferred to Muslim territory32 (Klep and Winslow, 1999, Honig and Both, 1996). 
Both events were humiliations that the international community was not disposed to 
forget. The UN hostage crisis, covered by international media, demonstrated publicly the 
limitations and inefficiency of the international community on the ground. In the case of 
Srebrenica the magnitude of the massacre and the atrocities committed were not only a 
humiliation, but a constant source of guilt for the international envoys for years to come. In 
that sense, Kosovo was the beneficiary of the experiences of the Yugoslav wars as the 
international community was not prepared to risk again its reputation as a mediator and 
guarantor of peace, stability and security. In addition many of the international representatives 
genuinely felt guilty and responsible for failing to provide safety for the people in Srebrenica 
(Interview, 23, Non-EU Envoy). Thus, when the KVM reported the escalating situation in 
Kosovo, the international community, determined not to let a second Srebrenica occur, 
decided to intervene promptly (Caplan, 1998).  
                                                                




In addition, after the end of the Yugoslav wars Milošević was not accused of war 
crimes along with Karadžić and Mladić by the ICTY (ICTY, 1995). On the contrary, he was 
praised by the international leaders and media as the man who made peace possible (LeBor, 
2003). At the same time, however the international representatives had been aware of 
Milošević’s ability to control the Serbian army and paramilitary organisations, as they also 
knew about the material and financial support Belgrade provided to the Bosnian Serbs. Thus, 
the international representatives were “slightly ashamed they had done a deal with him in 
Bosnia” (Interview 27, Senior UN Official) and this feeling intensified when the extent of the 
atrocities in Bosnia was slowly revealed through testimonies of witnesses, trials in the ICTY, 
and through research of governmental and non-governmental organisations operating in 
Bosnia. 
The international community, therefore, sought a pretext that would enable them to get 
back at Milošević and the pretext was given through the escalation of the situation in Kosovo 
and the severe retaliation of Serbian forces against the KLA actions (Interview 6, UN Official, 
Interview 25, EU Diplomat). Serbian military and paramilitary forces, with the excuse of 
fighting against KLA, indiscriminately attacked civilians, including women, children and 
elderly. Thus, through the vicious circle of attacks and counter-attacks between the KLA and 
the Serbian forces, the fourth war in the Balkans was starting. This time, the international 
community was determined, on the one hand, not to repeat the same deficiencies as in the 
Yugoslav wars, and on the other hand to act swiftly to stabilise Kosovo as soon as possible, as 
there were fears that a full-scale conflict in Kosovo could destabilise the still fragile situation 
in the Balkans as a whole.  
Moreover, Milošević’s attitude after the Dayton agreement marginalised Serbia on 




and his catalytic role for the achievement of peace in Bosnia. Thus, he expected the 
revocation of the international sanctions that had brought Serbia’s economy to the verge of 
collapse (Sell, 2002). Indeed, after Dayton, the UN arms embargo and trade sanctions were 
lifted. However, the US introduced unilaterally the “outer wall” sanctions prohibiting the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from accessing major international organisations, including 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank until “substantial progress 
towards the solution of the Kosovo issue” was demonstrated (Hasani, 1998: 4). Milošević 
seemed to feel betrayed by the international community and proceeded to irrational actions. 
He not only ignored the international community’s requests for normalisation of Kosovo but 
also adopted additional suppressive measures against Kosovo Albanians (Interview 12, EU 
Diplomat). 
Apart from the issue of Kosovo, however, Milošević was turning into a dictator 
crushing democratic rule in Serbia (Interview 26, Dimitrijević). Fraud in the local elections of 
1996 was widely known, while opposition parties boycotted the 1997 parliamentary and 
presidential elections citing an absence of fair and transparent electoral conditions (CNN, 
1997, IFES, 1997). From 1996 onwards massive demonstrations were taking place for months 
in which citizens demanded his resignation (Interview 27, Senior UN Official). All this 
indicated to the international community that the Milošević regime was out of control and 
needed to be constrained, as it could otherwise endanger stability in the region once again 
(Interview 26, Dimitrijević).  
 A further reason that contributed to Serbia’s international marginalisation was that 
Milošević was eventually regarded as an untrustworthy partner. Although Milošević 
repeatedly denied any responsibility and connection with the atrocities in Bosnia, 




strengthened by witnessing direct negotiations between Milošević and Karadžić and Mladić 
(Sell, 2002, Holbrooke, 1998). Moreover, Milošević blatantly lied to international envoys 
resulting in distrust, diminishing the credibility of his claims (Interview 23, Non-EU 
Diplomat). What further added to the untrustworthy image of Milošević was that through the 
years of interaction international representatives had realised that Milošević was a “political 
opportunist” (Interview 28, Former Yugoslav Ambassador). They watched how he betrayed 
those closest to him, beginning with his friend and mentor Ivan Stambolić,33 how he ascended 
to power using nationalistic propaganda, while strongly denying being a nationalist in the 
presence of foreigners (LeBor, 2003). International representatives also noticed how easily 
Milošević gave away Krajina to Tudjman and how he gave up some of the most crucial 
demands of Bosnian Serbs at Dayton when he genuinely wanted the war to be over and the 
sanctions against Serbia to be lifted (Bildt, 1998). All this combined to turn Milošević into an 
unreliable partner resulting in the political and diplomatic marginalisation of Serbia.  
Serbia’s marginalisation was also increased through the sharp contrast between 
Milošević’s dismissive behaviour and the successful lobbying of Kosovo Albanians. While 
Milošević was regarded as a ruthless dictator and was projected as such in the media, Kosovo 
Albanians managed to win the support of public opinion. The media, along with the 
endorsement of the West, turned the KLA from a terrorist organisation into legitimate 
freedom fighters and the Kosovo Albanians into victims that needed urgent protection.  
Milošević’s misrule, thus, in combination with the recent memories of the Yugoslav 
wars, played a catalytic role for Kosovo’s successful secession almost ten years later. The 
unprecedented atrocities that Serbian forces have committed in Bosnia and the exaggerated 
actions of suppression against Kosovo Albanians provided the international community the 
                                                                
33Ivan Stambolić, President of the Republic of Serbia 1986-1987, had to resign when his protégé Dragiša 
Pavlović was accused by Milošević of impeding ideological unity and of being against Tito and Yugoslavia during 




necessary reasons to intervene more actively. Hence, under the threat of military intervention 
the two parties, Serbs and Kosovars, agreed to meet in Rambouillet. Yet, Rambouillet failed 
to produce an agreement and NATO intervened. The significance of the Rambouillet accords 
and the role of NATO’s intervention in the outcome of Kosovo’s secession of 2008 will be 
analysed in the next section. 
 
Rambouillet fails and NATO intervenes  
The Rambouillet accords are significant for Kosovo’s successful secession for various 
reasons. First, their failure triggered the military intervention of NATO, a milestone for 
Kosovo’s secession as it practically removed Serbian authority and jurisdiction in Kosovo and 
turned the latter into a UN protectorate, providing one of the major arguments in favour of 
Kosovo’s secession. Second, the Rambouillet accords constituted the foundation of 
subsequent resolutions regarding the final status of Kosovo. The connection between the 
Rambouillet accords and the final status of Kosovo will be analysed in detail in the following 
chapter. This section, however, will provide an overview of the course of the Rambouillet 
negotiations and what their failure meant for the future of Kosovo.  
 Previous attempts to restore order in Kosovo had been made by the Contact Group34 
since the autumn of 1998. Under the threat of use of force Richard Holbrooke, the US Special 
Envoy, achieved an agreement with Milošević on the principles of previous Security Council 
resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) according to which all actions of violence and 
terrorism would cease immediately. Serbia committed to withdraw special police units and 
refrain from actions affecting the civilian population, accepted an OSCE verification mission 
and agreed to allow access by humanitarian organisations to Kosovo (S/1998/953, 
                                                                
34 The Contact Group had been previously founded to address the war in Bosnia and was comprised by 
representatives of the US, UK, France, Germany and Russia, while later representatives of Italy were included. 




S/RES/1160, S/RES/1199, 1998). More specifically Serbia agreed to the deployment of over 
two thousand OSCE verifiers and the return of refugees, and also consented to the 
establishment of a NATO air verification mission over Kosovo to confirm compliance with 
the provisions of S/RES/1199 (Holbrooke, 1999, NATO-FRY, 1998).  
 Indeed, on 27th October 1998, the NATO Secretary-General announced that the level 
of violence had been significantly reduced and that the cease fire held, with the exception of 
some sporadic incidents. An immediate improvement in the humanitarian situation was 
observed, while international relief organisations resumed operations in Kosovo and 
thousands of displaced persons returned. The NATO Secretary-General also reported that 
over four thousand members of the Yugoslav Special Police had been withdrawn, most police 
and military units that were not normally placed in Kosovo had also been removed and check 
points had been dismantled. Thus, substantial steps had been made, and this progress created 
the opportunity to move the political process forward towards the achievement of a political 
solution (NATO SG, 1998).  
 The agreement, however, was short-lived as the KLA took advantage of the removal 
of the Serbian forces and renewed its military operations. Later, leading members of the KLA 
would characterise the ceasefire as “life-saving” for the KLA, as it gave them time to re-
organise after the heavy losses they had suffered from the Serbian retaliation and it allowed 
them to recapture territories seized by the Serbian army (Interviews with Haradinaj and Çeku, 
cited in Kubo, 2010). Serbia, facing the renewed KLA offensive, responded with returning 
heavy equipped military units to Kosovo, proceeding also to acts of reprisal. 
Although it is commonly accepted that the revelation of the Račak massacre in 
January 1999 led to the Rambouillet negotiations in February of the same year, this is only 




mediation after the failure of the Holbrooke agreement (Thaci, 2000, Weller, 2009). 
Nonetheless, it can still be argued that the Račak massacre accelerated the already-existing 
plan for further negotiations.   
 Under the threat of use of force, representatives of Serbia and Kosovo Albanians 
agreed to meet in France in Rambouillet to negotiate an Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-Governance in Kosovo. The Serbian government chose to create a delegation composing 
of members not only of Serb nationality, but also representatives from Montenegro and ethnic 
minorities of Kosovo -including Goranis, Turks, Muslims, Romanies and Egyptians- in an 
attempt to demonstrate that their position was endorsed by the people of Kosovo and FRY as 
a whole, in contrast to the Kosovo Albanian delegation that was dominated by Albanian 
“terrorists” (Milošević, 1999). The Kosovo delegation included representatives of the elected 
government of the LDK, led by Rugova, members from the opposition party United 
Democratic Movement (LBD, Lëvizja e Bashkuar Demokratike,), which was believed to be 
closer to the KLA, and members representing the KLA itself, led by Hashim Thaçi. As the 
Kosovo elected government constituted a minority of the delegation, Hashim Thaçi of the 
KLA was appointed chief of the delegation (Weller, 1999).  
 The course of the negotiations remains to this day a matter of controversy.  On the one 
hand, there are prominent voices that maintain that the Rambouillet process was far from a 
negotiation, claiming that it was a diktat, and only a nominal process necessary to legitimise 
intervention after its expected failure.35 This approach focuses both on the fact that the 
Contact Group had set the so called non-negotiable-principles,36 and also that the final draft 
                                                                
35 Some literature on Rambouillet arguing in favour of this approach Herring (2000), Mccgwire (2000), Chomsky 
(1999), Schwarz (1999), Jones (2002). 
36 Key points of the Non-Negotiable-Principles included that after an interim period of three years a mechanism 
would be established to settle the final status of Kosovo, the territorial integrity of FRY and neighbouring 




included provisions that no sovereign state would accept, referring mostly to the extensive 
NATO presence37 in FRY (Booth, 2000). In addition, it is maintained that the Serb and the 
Russian delegations were not informed about those crucial points of the draft until only some 
hours before the planned signing of the agreement (Marković, 2005, Lynch, 1999).  
 On the other hand, prominent scholars and participants in the negotiations argue that 
international representatives were making every effort to meet the Serbian demands and 
persuade the Serbian delegation to sign (Weller, 2009). They report that the Serbian 
delegation was reluctant to be constructive and cooperative in a substantial manner, while 
they repeatedly demonstrated inappropriate behaviour (Interview 23, Non- EU Diplomat, 
Weller, 2009). They also provide counter-arguments to the claims regarding the 
marginalisation of the Russian and Serbian representatives38 (Bellamy, 2001).  
Another matter of controversy is the stance Russia maintained during the negotiations. 
Participants in the talks assert that Russian envoys were aware that an agreement at 
Rambouillet was the last opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the conflict (Petritsch, 
2008). Therefore, Russia wanted the negotiations to succeed and played an important and 
constructive role towards this end (Petritsch, 2008, Interview 23, Non-EU Diplomat). In 
contrast, Weller (1999), a participant in the Rambouillet conference himself, argues that 
Russia acted as an advocate of Serbia and tried to frustrate the very concept of a settlement 
which might appear to have been imposed upon the FRY and which would be enforced by 
NATO. He adds, nevertheless, that this attitude was praised by the other members of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Kosovo would be conducted, amnesty and release of political prisoners and international involvement in full 
co-operation with the parties (Contact Group Negotiator's Proposal, 1999).  
37 The provisions regarding NATO authority, rights and freedoms are outlined in Chapter 7 and the Appendix B 
of the Rambouillet document. More specifically, in Chapter 7, Art. I, §2(b) the document provides for the 
authorisation of NATO to take all actions required to ensure the implementation of the agreement, including 
also the right of use of force, while paragraphs 6,7 and 8 of the Appendix B present the freedoms NATO was 
supposed to enjoy in the whole FRY, along with the complete immunity of NATO personnel (Rambouillet 
Accords, 1999). 




Contact Group, as they expected that Russia would be in position to persuade Milošević to 
sign (Weller, 2009).  
 Examining the course of negotiations and the final draft of the Rambouillet 
conference, this thesis accepts that the Serbian delegation did not engage in a constructive 
way in the negotiations as there was no actual incentive to do so, apart from the constant 
threat of use of force.39 The documents produced showed that the Albanian delegation was 
offered incentives in order to sign the agreement, however, no such practice was to be 
observed for the Serbian side (Mccgwire, 2000). For instance, the principal requirements of 
the Serbian delegation were that there should be no provisions for future independence of 
Kosovo and that there should be no NATO military force in Kosovo. On the contrary the 
Kosovo delegation argued that in light of the previous shortcomings of UN and OSCE both in 
Kosovo and in Bosnia, only a NATO force would be effective for the implementation of the 
agreement and demanded also a provision for the settlement of the future status of Kosovo. In 
order to satisfy the Kosovar side, throughout the negotiations the involvement of NATO 
appeared to be a fundamental part of the agreement that the FRY should comply with, 
                                                                
39 The threat of use of force proved insufficient to secure Serbian unconditional compliance perhaps for two 
reasons: First, it seemed that Milošević was initially not convinced about the credibility of the threat (Bellamy, 
2000b). He probably expected that the NATO would not maintain the necessary coherence to conduct the air-
campaign believing that potentially Greece, Italy or Germany would veto such decision (LeBor, 2003). 
Furthermore, Milošević supposed that Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council would block NATO’s operations, 
misjudging the willingness and the ability of the latter to proceed to a military action without the consent of 
the UN Security Council (Wolff, 2003). Second, after Milošević was convinced that the air campaign would 
begin in case of not signing the Rambouillet agreement, he still would not comply for a number of reasons 
(Holbrooke, 1999). To begin with, it seems that Milošević expected that NATO’s operation would last only for a 
short period of time. Thus, he was confident that Serbia military infrastructure could survive some days of air-
bombing and after the end of the operations he could renegotiate a settlement for Kosovo in more favourable 
terms than the ones offered in Rambouillet. In the mean time, he probably expected that through the NATO 
external threat he would regain his lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Serbs. For months Serbian citizens 
demonstrated against him demanding his resignation. By the time the air-offensive began, however, these 
protests immediately stopped and the crowds turned against NATO and the US (Interview 27, Senior UN 
Official). Thus, it is possible that Milošević had (mis)calculated that a brief NATO military offensive could have 
been beneficial for him, as he would both be able to keep Kosovo with a more advantageous agreement and he 
would have regained his legitimacy as the leader who defended the Serbian territorial integrity against an 




although the presence of NATO was not explicitly mentioned in the non-negotiable-principles 
(Contact Group Negotiator's Proposal, 1999). Furthermore, in order to meet the requirements 
of the Kosovo delegation, an amendment was made to the final section of the agreement 
referring to the settlement of the final status according to “the will of the people”40 (Weller, 
1999). Finally, when the Kosovars threatened that they would not sign the document, 
Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, spent a considerable time in meetings with the 
Albanian delegation trying to persuade them to do so (Weller, 2009).  
The two principal demands of Kosovo Albanians were met, meaning that the most 
crucial demands of the Serbian side were rejected and space was left to negotiate only issues 
of secondary importance. The Serbian delegation seemed to be entrapped between two 
options that would most possibly lead to Kosovo’s independence, either through the 
acceptance of the agreement and the determination of the final status three years later based 
among others on the will of the people, or as it eventually happened through the rejection of 
the agreement and an imminent NATO intervention (Herring, 2000). Thus, although the 
Kosovo Albanians made considerable concessions regarding the internal functioning of 
Kosovo, minority rights, powers of minorities’ within the assembly, the and extent of self-
governance of ethnic communities, Serbia at this point was unwilling to negotiate anything 
that implied an independent Kosovo.   
Evidently Russia could not exert enough influence either on the Contact Group so as 
to amend the proposals in that way that the Serbian side would accept, or as to convince the 
Serbian government to accept one of the proposed drafts (Bellamy, 2001). Although Russia 
                                                                
40 The provision for the future settlement of the final status of Kosovo is to be found in Chapter 8, Article 1(3), 
where it is stated that “three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall 
be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, 
opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the 
Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and 




had worked with the US and the EU as a member of the UN Security Council and the Contact 
Group and had endorsed previous Resolutions 1160 and 1199, it began to perceive its 
increasing marginalisation in the decision-making procedures (Harzl, 2008, Antonenko, 
1999). At Rambouillet, Moscow realised that the West was resolved to ignore Russia’s 
objections and deploy a large-scale military force on FRY territory and use force to restore 
peace in Kosovo, if Milošević refused to comply (Averre, 2009). Russia fundamentally 
opposed to this idea, and constantly reaffirmed the need for a political solution to the conflict 
(Wolff, 2003). Moscow, however, firmly supporting a non-military solution contributed to 
Serbia’s intransigent stance, instead of persuading Milošević to show flexibility (Petritsch, 
2008, Levitin, 2000).    
Nevertheless, neither the Serbian nor the Albanian delegation had the authority to sign 
the agreement in Rambouillet. Thus, the parties requested two weeks consultation time at 
home and it was agreed to meet again three weeks later in Paris. Upon arrival in Paris, the 
Serbian delegation proposed a new agreement completely different than the concluding draft 
of Rambouillet. This draft, shorter, much vaguer and less elaborated than the Rambouillet 
Accords, deprived Kosovo of any substantial self-governance, while the latter was referred 
throughout the document as Kosmet,41 a term that was widely known that Kosovo Albanians 
regarded as derogatory. Large sections were removed or significantly altered and the whole 
section of NATO presence was absent (Agreement for Self-Government in Kosmet, 1999). 
                                                                
41 Kosmet is the shortened version of Kosovo-Metohija, the name the Serbs attribute to Kosovo and under 
which Kosovo was first incorporated in Yugoslavia as an autonomous region within Serbia. Metohija, referring 
to the western part of the present day Kosovo means “monastic estates” and it is a term largely resented by 
Kosovo Albanians as it indirectly refers to the medieval Serbian Kingdom and also implies ownership by the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and consequently subordination to Serbia. The name officially changed to Kosovo 
with the constitutional amendment of 1968 when Kosovo’s status elevated from Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo and Metohija to Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (Amendments VII-XIX, 1963 SFRY 
Constitution, 1968). Thus, the reference to Kosovo as Kosmet during the Rambouillet negotiation was a 
provocation, implying the return of Kosovo to a previous status, with significantly less rights and competencies 




The draft, being considerably different from the non-negotiable principles the Contact Group 
had set was considered to be a provocation. Thus, with no substantial discussion on the 
submitted draft, the Kosovo Albanian delegation proceeded to the signing of the agreement, 
being witnessed by the Contact Group members, except for the Russian representative. At the 
same time the Serbian delegation signed in the presence of the Russian envoy the document 
they had proposed (Agreement for Self-Government in Kosmet, 1999). 
The Rambouillet negotiations both in terms of the document produced and as a 
process were of critical importance for the future success of Kosovo’s secession. First, the 
Rambouillet Accords became the cornerstone on which subsequent documents such as 
Security Council Resolution 1244 were based, including also the provision regulating the 
final status of Kosovo (S/RES/1244, 1999). The next chapter will analyse in detail the effect 
on Kosovo’s secession of the provision in Chapter 8, Art.1(3) of Rambouillet document and 
the wording about a mechanism to determine the final status of Kosovo “on the basis of the 
will of the people” three years after the enforcement of the agreement. 
Second, the failure to reach an agreement with Belgrade resulted in eleven weeks of 
NATO bombing of the whole territory of FRY, including Kosovo. With NATO bypassing the 
Security Council, a weak and marginalised Russia could not prevent the bombing. There is a 
vast literature on the NATO campaign regarding its legitimacy, legality, whether it was 
indeed a humanitarian operation or it served further interests of political, geopolitical, 
strategic and economic nature, as well as whether this air invasion was actually successful in 
fulfilling its objectives.42 Nonetheless, this thesis focuses only on the effect of the NATO 
campaign on Kosovo’s successful secession of 2008.  
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What the NATO intervention achieved regarding Kosovo’s secession in 2008 was the 
abolition of Serbian authority in Kosovo and the subsequent position of Kosovo under UN 
administration. The period of the UN administration will be discussed in the next chapter. 
However, what is important to highlight here is that this detachment from Serbia was only 
made possible after NATO’s military intervention. Although the end of the NATO bombing 
legally left Kosovo as a part of the FRY, the withdrawal of Serbian forces and the 
establishment of  NATO troops as guarantors that Serbia would not proceed to any military 
action to reoccupy Kosovo, in combination with the UN administration until a final status is 
reached, set in motion the dynamic that eventually led to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence in 2008 (Cottey, 2009).  
However, the NATO intervention had a further side-effect. At the start of the NATO 
bombing the situation on the ground escalated to terrifying levels. Serbian military forces 
expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians, who either managed to reach 
neighbouring countries or were internally displaced across Kosovo. Considering the severity 
of the Balkan winter, the latter meant that the most vulnerable members of the civilian 
population, children and elderly would not survive cold and famine. In addition, Serbian 
heavily armed forces executed Albanians indiscriminately and en mass. Although the 
numbers vary from four to ten thousand killed or missing, the situation in Kosovo had 
certainly turned into a significant humanitarian catastrophe (Webber, 2009, Herring, 2000). 
Hence, even though NATO cannot be held responsible for causing these atrocities, it can be 
held accountable for producing the cover of war for the ethnic cleansers and for inflaming the 
latter’s desire for revenge against defenceless civilians, who, unlike NATO’s warplanes, were 




Nevertheless, the level of the atrocities, however sad, had a positive effect on the 
future outcome of Kosovo’s secession. Often it is argued that after the crackdown of 1999 the 
situation was “beyond the point of reconciliation” (Interview 14, EU Diplomat). This view is 
further strengthened by the atrocities that followed after the bombing ended and NATO troops 
entered Kosovo. At this point it was the Albanians’ turn to retaliate and the same horror 
followed, with this time the Albanians as the perpetrators and the Serbs the victims (Interview 
20, Maksimović). Therefore, NATO’s intervention made both a direct and an indirect 
contribution to Kosovo’s successful secession. Directly it forced Serbia to hand over 
Kosovo’s administration to the UN, and indirectly, through the escalation of violence during 
and after the bombing, it strengthened the argument that there was no other viable and 
sustainable solution other than Kosovo becoming independent.  
Lastly, the Rambouillet process and the NATO intervention signalled a major shift in 
power dynamic in the Serbian-Kosovar relations. Through the support of the US and major 
Western countries, the rights of a sovereign state were marginalised in favour of separatist 
demands. Although, Serbia was supported by Russia, at the end of the 1990s Russia was an 
economically weak and politically marginalised country. Rambouillet showed that at that time 
Moscow had no influence either on the Contact Group members or even on Serbia. This 
asymmetric power difference between the supporters of each side facilitated a unilateral 
NATO military intervention that would have never been possible with a mighty Russia to 
counter-balance the negotiations. This power dynamic established in 1999, continued 
throughout the 2000s, and led eventually to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 







This chapter examined the years from 1991-1999 seeking to discover what turned Kosovo 
from an internal Serbian matter into an international issue that demanded the rapid and active 
intervention of the international community. The chapter started with the study of the 
different phases of Kosovo’s resistance beginning with Rugova’s non-violent approach and 
continued with the KLA’s armed insurgency. The role the Dayton agreement played in this 
change of strategy was revealed, while the chapter continued with an evaluation of how 
Milošević’s rule and the experiences of the Yugoslav wars led to the internationalisation of 
Kosovo’s issue. Finally, this chapter demonstrated the catalytic impact of the Rambouillet 
process and the subsequent military intervention on the outcome of Kosovo’s secession in 
2008. The section closed with NATO’s air offensive as this was the decisive event that 
changed Kosovo’s status within Serbia effectively abolishing the latter’s jurisdiction on 
Kosovo.   
 Various and interrelated reasons led to the internationalisation of the Kosovo issue, 
constituting the first step towards its successful secession in 2008. Beginning with Rugova’s 
non-violent resistance against Serbian oppression it is acknowledged that although it did not 
achieve a place at Dayton’s negotiation table, it won the respect and the sympathies of the 
international community. Although, this was not enough at the time to bring Kosovo to 
independent statehood, the human rights abuses Albanian society endured throughout the 
1990s provided them later with strong arguments in favour of Kosovo’s secession. First, the 
combination of the constant suppression they suffered and their stoic reaction created the 
perception of the Albanians being innocent victims in the hands of a ruthless leader, a view 
that was increasingly strengthened as the atrocities the Serbian forces had committed in the 




remedial secession approach, this mistreatment provided the Kosovars the right to secede due 
to the severity of the human rights violations Serbia had committed. Second, the sudden 
abolition of their autonomy and the harassment that followed, created a precedent that 
according to Kosovo Albanians could be repeated at any time. Consequently both arguments 
significantly contributed to the approach that there was no other actual solution short of 
Kosovo’s independence, as because of what they suffered they could not return under 
Belgrade’s rule and any other political settlement could be as easily annulled as Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1989. 
 In hindsight, Kosovo’s exclusion from the Dayton accords positively contributed to 
the process of Kosovo’s secession. In all probability, Kosovo would not have achieved 
independence at Dayton (Interview 21, Peci). However, the fact that their demands were once 
again ignored led to the realisation that peaceful resistance not only would not result in the 
achievement of their cause but also that without violence the Kosovo issue would eventually 
be forgotten. Thus, the emergence of KLA and the use of force were legitimised as last resort 
since previous peaceful means had failed, attracting international attention and leading to 
NATO’s air offensive in 1999. 
 It is often claimed that the KLA brought Kosovo to independence and there is 
certainly some truth in this claim. The KLA contributed to Kosovo’s successful secession 
largely by provoking with their actions massive Serbian retaliation. The KLA, even though 
fairly well-organised in the end, remained less capable than the well equipped Serbian 
professional forces. However, Milošević’s misrule and the excessive way he reacted to KLA 
attacks, publicised through a well-orchestrated media campaign, provoked an outcry in 




The deteriorating situation on the ground alarmed the international community that 
pursued actions to stabilise the situation in the region. Having the previous experience of the 
Yugoslav wars and still remembering the inefficiencies in Bosnia, the West was determined to 
react promptly this time, both to prevent a second Srebrenica from occurring and also to 
defend its reputation as a capable conflict resolution mediator and peacekeeper. As Milošević 
was still the Serbian leader, a man the international representatives distrusted and held 
accountable for the atrocities in Bosnia, the escalation in Kosovo provided the pretext to 
punish Serbia for previous crimes and rectify past international short-comings. Thus, although 
the Yugoslav wars had overshadowed Kosovo’s importance in the beginning of the decade, 
by the end of the 1990s this experience accelerated the actions of the international 
community, offering also the excuse for a humanitarian intervention.  
Furthermore, as it became clear during the Rambouillet negotiations that there was an 
imbalance between the capacities of the international backers of each side. The Kosovo 
Albanian cause was championed by NATO led by the US at a time when the hegemony of the 
latter in international affairs was undeniable. Serbia’s primary supporter was Russia; a weak 
Russia, however, not in a position to exert real pressure. Thus, by the absence of a 
counterweight in the peace processes, NATO was able to pose a credible threat of use of force 
and to carry it out when necessary. As a consequence of the NATO intervention, Kosovo was 
separated de facto from Serbia. Although, officially after the bombing Kosovo remained a 
part of FRY, in reality all Serbian authority was effectively removed. Serbian military forces 
withdrew, and Kosovo was placed under international administration.  
 Finally, the Rambouillet document also regulated how the final status would be 
reached and how Kosovo would function as a self-governed entity. More specifically it called 




status of Kosovo. Although the agreement was never signed this provision along with others 
were incorporated into subsequent resolutions of the UNSC seeking to settle the issue of 
Kosovo.  
 Summing up, this chapter revealed that changes taking place across four different 
levels, -local, state, regional, global-, turned Kosovo from a Serbian internal matter to a major 
international issue that triggered NATO’s unilateral military intervention. At the local level, 
the Kosovars abandoned Rugova’s peaceful resistance and turned to KLA’s violent approach. 
This resulted in the international community noticing and prioritising the settlement of the 
Kosovo issue. At the same time at the state level, Milošević had lost his credibility and 
legitimacy. The international community held him accountable for the crimes committed by 
Serbs during the Yugoslav wars and sought a pretext to punish him and Serbia for past 
abuses. At the regional level, first, the Yugoslav wars had been over. Thus, the international 
community had the time, energy and resources to deal with the issue of Kosovo. Second, the 
experience of the Yugoslav wars, the humiliation of the numerous international short-comings 
and the guilt of Srebrenica, persuaded the international community to act as soon as possible 
to prevent a second Srebrenica from occurring. Finally, at the global level, the Cold War was 
not only over, but the US enjoyed and demonstrated its absolute supremacy after almost half a 
century of competition with USSR/ Russia. Thus, in 1999 a weak Russia was unable to 
defend the interests of Serbia. This one sided power distribution between US and Russia was 
transferred to the protégés of each country, Kosovo and Serbia respectively, changing the 








KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
Introduction 
The NATO offensive ended with the signing of the Kumanovo agreement, foreseeing and 
demanding the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. Through the subsequent Security 
Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was placed under the UN interim administration (United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo- UNMIK) until an agreement for its final status had been reached.  
 This chapter will examine how the international administration itself, and how major 
events that occurred during its time affected Kosovo’s successful secession. In order to do 
this, this chapter will present UNMIK’s structure and duties and will evaluate its efficiency. 
In addition this chapter will discuss constitutive documents of the mission, such as Resolution 
1244 and Regulation 1999/1 and will reveal how the formulation of those documents affected 
Kosovo’s secession. More specifically, the direct reference of Resolution 1244 to the 
Rambouillet accords was perceived by the Kosovars as guaranteeing independence in three 
years through a referendum. Chapter seven will show how this perception, in combination 
with impatience for the settlement of the final status and frustration against UNMIK, led to 
the 2004 riots, which accelerated the process of Kosovo’s secession by swiftly leading to the 
Vienna negotiations and the Ahtisaari plan.  
Examining the course of the negotiations, the chapter sheds light on why they failed 
and what their impact was on Kosovo’s unilateral secession shortly after their conclusion. 
Finally, the chapter closes with a general overview of the years of international administration 
(1999-2008) evaluating how key events and policies occurring during this time affected 




Resolution 1244, international administration and “standards before status” 
Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted on 10 June 1999 placed Kosovo under an UN-led 
international administration (UNMIK). Its main purpose was to provide interim 
administration in Kosovo and develop provisional democratic self-governing institutions, 
reaffirming at the same time the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(S/RES/1244, 1999). This section analyses the structure of the international administration, its 
mandate and actions, examining also how it was perceived by the local population. It shows 
the deficiencies of the international administration and reveals that its policies were often 
detached from the local realities undermining their effectiveness and legitimacy. However, the 
section also argues that international presence was beneficial for Kosovo’s future, providing 
with the foundations to create a functioning state afterwards.  
 The responsibilities of the international administration were divided into three 
domains. First, Resolution 1244 prescribed that it would perform civilian administrative 
functions and would regulate the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government 
in Kosovo. Second, the international presence would facilitate a political process for the 
determination of Kosovo’s final status and the transition from the interim institutions to the 
permanent ones established after the final status had been reached. Third, the international 
administration would support reconstruction in Kosovo, offer humanitarian relief, protect 
human rights and ensure the return of all refugees, while promoting rule of law (S/RES/1244, 
1999 §11). Moreover, a NATO-led force (KFOR) would oversee the withdrawal of FRY 
forces and would be responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in Kosovo (NATO, 
1999).  
In order to carry out its mandate, the international mission in Kosovo was organized 




Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pillar II, Civil 
Administration, under the UN, Pillar III, Democratization and Institution Building, led by the 
OSCE, and Pillar IV, Reconstruction and Economic Development, managed by the EU 
(UNMIK, 1999). However, the Regulation No. 1999/1 provided that UNMIK would exercise 
all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of the judiciary 
(UNMIK/REG/1999/1, Section 1 §1). Thus, UNMIK’s job was to coordinate the cooperation 
of all four pillars, a rather difficult task since each one of the pillars had their own 
management structures and centre of authority. On top of that UNMIK had governance 
authority with all powers conferred on the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG).  
The wide range of tasks entrusted to UNMIK complicated the organisation of the 
mission and considerably delayed deployment on the ground. Even after deployment, the 
relations between the respective pillars were largely characterised by competition and lack of 
practical co-operation. Seeking to materialise their own objectives, the organisations had 
different priorities and divergent approaches regarding the utilisation of financial resources, 
impeding the function of international administration as a coherent centre of authority 
(Yannis, 2001). 
 This delay in deployment and the lack of co-ordination allowed local centres of power 
to be established in the respective areas of control of each community and fill the power 
vacuum that was created after the withdrawal of Serbian forces. In Albanian populated areas 
the KLA took over former state assets, such as industries and electricity and petrol stations, as 
well as private properties that used to be owned by Serbs (Perritt, 2010). Self-appointed local 
rulers in both communities created zones of influence, imposing a system of taxation on the 




only to flourish but also to be institutionalised through this usurpation of power and control of 
economic resources by the self-appointed authorities (Yannis, 2001). These systems of control 
were unauthorised by the international administration and were considered to be founded on 
illegal methods. Nonetheless, their establishment showed that the Kosovar society assumed 
administrative responsibilities swiftly and effectively. Thus, although unwelcome by UNMIK, 
which desired to build Western type democratic institutions, the speed and effectiveness with 
which these unofficial structures were established indicated considerable administrative 
capabilities, necessary for the future creation of a viable state.  
 Furthermore, UNMIK’s delay and the lack of experience in establishing state 
administration led to a rule of law vacuum during the first months after the end of the NATO 
intervention. Regulation 1999/1, on the one hand, provided that the laws applicable in the 
territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 would continue to apply as long as they did not 
conflict with internationally recognised human rights standards, the fulfilment of the mandate 
of UNMIK and any regulations issued by UNMIK (UNMIK/REG/1999/1, Sections 2,3). On 
the other hand, the vagueness of the former provision, combined with the slow establishment 
of UNMIK and the uncertain final status of Kosovo enhanced the rule of law vacuum 
(Interview 11, Malazogu). 
This was again covered by local actors, mainly affiliated with the KLA who provided 
basic security and law-enforcement services (Perritt, 2010). However, the KLA also took 
advantage of the prevailing lack of accountability and engaged in horrific actions against 
Serbs and other ethnic communities, as well as against Albanians, almost annihilating 
Rugova’s army43 (Interview 4, Kosovar Press Editor, Interview 12, EU Diplomat). Serbs 
living in Prishtina during the first year of international administration describe the city to be 
                                                                
43 Rugova’s government alarmed by the KLA’s rise created in 1998 the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo 




in a state of terror, with daily evictions, harassment and arbitrary executions (Interview 20, 
Maksimović, HRW, 1999). It should also be noted that these actions, being an undeniable 
ethnic cleansing process, were allowed by the international administration not only out of 
incompetence, but also out of choice. The international administration implicitly endorsed 
these actions as it was believed that the creation of an ethnically homogenous Kosovo would 
strengthen its future stability and viability (King and Mason, 2006, Interview 5, EU 
Diplomat).  
 Eventually the UNMIK-led international administration was set up and also managed 
to impose itself as a source of authority, successfully leading to a considerable degree of order 
and stability. Institutions were gradually formed and constantly developed, Prishtina was 
slowly reconstructed and infrastructure was improving.  Police capacities were significantly 
improved and ethnically motivated violence was radically reduced (King and Mason, 2006). 
From 2002 onwards, the local Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were 
assuming responsibilities in several areas, including education, health service, culture and 
telecommunications, always, however, under the supervision of UNMIK (Sörensen, 2009). 
Thus, under UNMIK’s administration, Kosovo had made some first steps in the state building 
process, forming some institutions and slowly acquiring the knowledge on how to run them.  
Nonetheless, UNMIK was unsuccessful in establishing itself as honest and trustworthy 
administrative body due to its undemocratic structure and the impunity its personnel enjoyed 
(Lemay-Hébert, 2013, Visoka, 2012). UNMIK concentrated all powers over the territory of 
Kosovo -executive, legislative, judicial- overriding one of the basic principles of democracy, 
the separation of powers. All powers were exercised by the SRSG, who also had the right to 
“appoint any person to perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the 




UNMIK enjoyed, in particular the authority of the person of the SRSG, was virtually 
unlimited, with reports of the UN-appointed Ombudsman in Kosovo personally accusing the 
SRSC of abuse of power and impediment of the rule of law (Mertus, 2001, Ombudsperson 
Institution in Kosovo, 2002). Amplifying this perception of impunity, the international 
personnel were exempted from domestic law. International personnel were free from 
accountability as they were exempted from the jurisdiction of the local courts (Mulaj, 2011b) 
and the Ombudsman was not authorised to investigate their actions (Ombudsperson 
Institution in Kosovo, 2002). 
 Furthermore, the public policies the international mission pursued showed limited 
understanding of the reality on the ground, which inhibited UNMIK’s effective 
administration. Often lacking sound understanding of local history, tradition and mentality the 
international officials designed policies estranged from the everyday life and culture of 
Kosovo’s citizens (Mulaj, 2011b). In the process of the development of the legal, economic 
and political system international advisers often promoted their own country’s regulations 
with only minor alterations to adjust them to Kosovo’s needs (Perritt, 2010). In addition, the 
international administration seemed to have unrealistic expectations regarding the 
implementation of laws in a territory that lacked formal state-running experience and 
“institutional memory” (Interview 19, EULEX Senior Personnel, Interview 15, Kursani). UN 
Officials admitted that UNMIK sought to introduce policies alien to the local realities and 
acknowledged that they still expected a level of implementation that had not materialised even 
in their own countries (Interviews 6, 17 UN Officials). 
UNMIK’s detachment from the reality on the ground, in combination with the 
extended powers the SRSG concentrated in his hands and the impunity the international 




the eyes of the local population. For many Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo was again under 
foreign rule, while UNMIK administration was even compared with Serbian oppression 
(Goldstone, 2002, Perritt, 2010). Albin Kurti, political activist and later leader of the 
Vetëvendosje!, claimed that “UNMIK and Serbia are two sides of the same coin and one 
aspect of domination cannot be distinguished from the other” (Kurti, cited in Lemay-Hébert, 
2013: 93). 
 Frustration with UNMIK was also fuelled by the awkward position of the mission. 
UNMIK was in Kosovo with a mandate of interim administration until the settlement of its 
final status, while one of UNMIK’s responsibilities was to facilitate a political process that 
would lead to the determination of its future status (S/RES/1244, 1999, 11(e)). UNMIK’s 
position was further complicated by the condition that the above mandate had to be combined 
with the respect towards the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This 
provision had as a result that whatever action was undertaken to transfer jurisdiction to local 
institutions were considered by Serbia as a violation of Resolution 1244. Thus, through 
Russia’s involvement, almost every step towards the establishment of a self-governing 
territory became subject of discussion in the UN Security Council, leading most of the times 
to a deadlock (Interview 11, Malazogu). 
 Moreover, UNMIK evidently procrastinated on the transferring of powers to local 
actors and avoided discussions related to the settlement of the final status. As the institution-
building process was gradually progressing and the conditions on the ground were improving, 
international actors seemed to be satisfied with the way the situation in Kosovo was evolving 
(Perritt, 2010). In addition, the option of Kosovo to return to a reformed, democratic Serbia 




from the point of view of UNMIK, this institution building process could continue for a 
considerable time in the future, avoiding the thorny issue of final status (Perritt, 2010). 
Nonetheless, the Kosovo Albanians believed that UNMIK’s role was to facilitate the 
process for the settlement of their future status, as mentioned in Resolution 1244. Resolution 
1244 stated that the international administration would support the process for the settlement 
of the final status “taking into account the Rambouillet accords” (S/RES/1244, 1999: 11(e)). 
The Rambouillet accords, however, foresaw the settlement of a final status within three years 
after the agreement’s entry into force, and that the status would be based among others on the 
will of the people. Thus, although the Rambouillet agreement had not been signed by Serbia, 
the explicit reference on this provision convinced the Kosovars that the implementation date 
of the resolution 1244 equalled the entry into force of Rambouillet, at least on this matter. 
Therefore, the Kosovars expected that a final status would be reached within three 
years, hence by 2002 (Interview 15, Kursani). In addition, although the Rambouillet did not 
define who the “people” would be according to whose will the final status would be agreed, 
the Kosovars took for granted that this referred exclusively to the will of the people of 
Kosovo. The Rambouillet document referred to a mechanism for the determination of the 
final status of Kosovo, based also on the “opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts 
regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake 
a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider 
proposals by any Party for additional measures” (Chapter 8, Article 1(3), Rambouillet 
Accords, 1999). These further conditions, though, were neglected and the view that a final 
status would be reached within three years, on the basis of the will of the Kosovan people, 




Furthermore, Kosovars being adamant that they had seceded from Serbia in 1999 
expected that the state administration would eventually be handed over to the local 
institutions. Indeed, a mechanism of dual governance was established in which powers would 
be transferred from international to local agents, and thus the PISG assumed responsibilities 
on certain issues (Knoll, 2006). The PISG actions, however, remained subjected to the 
international administration’s supervision, while key powers, including budget control, 
minorities issues, defence, security, policing and external affairs remained in the hands of the 
UN and the SRSG (Goldstone, 2002, King and Mason, 2006, Sörensen, 2009). With the 
international administration controlling major domains of governance, the Kosovar elites were 
unwilling to address the responsibilities assigned to them, as they seemed to be tasks of minor 
importance (King and Mason, 2006). Moreover, the two sides -international mission and local 
actors- often pursued conflicting interests, creating tensions between international officials 
and local elites (Mulaj, 2011b, Sörensen, 2009). All this combined with the evident reluctance 
of the international community to deal promptly with the settlement of the final status, made 
the Kosovo Albanians perceive the international administration as an obstacle on the road to 
their own state (Perritt, 2010). 
Perhaps in an attempt both to motivate Kosovo Albanians to co-operate in various 
fields concerning the internal fun functioning of Kosovo and to allow more time to the 
international community to handle the future status of Kosovo, the SRSG proposed in 
December 2003 the “Standards for Kosovo.” The Standards for Kosovo outlined eight areas 
in which Kosovo had to reach certain benchmarks that would determine its progress towards 
European standards. The standards aimed to create a multi-ethnic, democratic society that 
would be governed by tolerance, freedom of movement and equal access to justice for all 




functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable returns of 
refugees and the rights of communities, economy, property rights, constructive Belgrade-
Prishtina dialogue, reform of the Kosovo Protection Force (UNMIK/PISG, 2003).  
The Standards for Kosovo were received with mistrust by the Kosovo population with 
the majority seeing them as an excuse for the international community to continue its rule 
over Kosovo (Mulaj, 2011b). These benchmarks were regarded to be subjective and their 
fulfilment was thought be more a matter of interpretation than actual achievement of 
measurable goals (Interview 15, Kursani). Hence, these standards rather than motivating the 
Kosovars to rebuild the society and work towards the achievement of higher standards of 
living, only added to their frustration towards UNMIK.  
However, UNMIK was playing an important role in favour of Kosovo’s successful 
secession in two ways. First, the international missions on the ground, with their institution-
building mandate, actually promoted state-building. Thus, although UNMIK was in Kosovo 
with a neutral position on Kosovo’s final status, by developing state mechanisms the 
international administration effectively set the foundations for the future efficient function and 
viability of Kosovo as an independent state. Second, the mere fact that Kosovo was under UN 
administration instead of Serbian rule provided later strong arguments in promotion of 
Kosovo’s international recognition. It was argued that the return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s 
control would not be a viable option as Kosovo was de facto separated from Serbia and, with 
UN assistance, self-administered since 1999. As Belgrade exerted no control over the 
majority of Kosovo’s territory and population, Kosovo was de facto a state and consequently 
by declaring its independence the Kosovo authorities merely officially announced a pre-




achieved statehood by practicing, along with UNMIK, de facto sovereignty over the 
population and territory of Kosovo. 
The international administration, hence, played a catalytic role for the future internal 
viability of Kosovo and also provided arguments for its international recognition. In 2004, 
however, the Kosovars, obsessed with the achievement of full independence, did not seem to 
appreciate the benefits of the international presence. By comparing UNMIK with Belgrade 
and feeling that the international community had turned Kosovo into a colony, the frustration 
of the local population was growing. Finally, Kosovo erupted in March 2004 when three 
Albanian children drowned in the Ibar River in northern Kosovo. This unfortunate event led 
to a pogrom against Serbs and other non-Albanian communities, the worst wave of violence 
the region had experienced since the end of the war. 
 
Riots 2004 
On March 17th 2004 news spread rapidly of three Albanian children drowned the previous day 
in the Ibar River, allegedly after being chased by Serbs with their dogs. Although no evidence 
was found supporting these accusations, soon angry Albanian mobs started attacking Serbian 
neighbourhoods, threatening and expelling residents from their houses, burning the buildings 
after the residents’ departure. By that afternoon, the riots had spread through the whole of 
Kosovo and continued to rage for three days, when they stopped as suddenly as they had 
begun. The 2004 riots were the worst wave of violence Kosovo had seen since the end of the 
war, largely caused by frustration with UNMIK and impatience with the settlement of the 
final status. The rapid escalation and the intensity of violence was a brusque reminder to the 




in the region was in danger. Thus, this section looks into the riots and shows how they led to 
the Vienna negotiations, accelerating the process of Kosovo’s independence.  
The riots lasted three days and according to the UN report a total of nineteen people 
died, of whom eleven were Albanians and eight Serbs, while hundreds were injured. In those 
three days four thousand people, mostly Serbs, became displaced. The account of property 
damage was also tragic, with more than seven hundred houses belonging to minorities being 
damaged or burned down. Similarly, public buildings such as schools and hospitals were 
damaged, as well as several orthodox churches and monasteries, including centuries old 
UNESCO protected cultural sites (S/2004/348, 2004).  
  Apart from attacks against the non-Albanian population, angry crowds also turned 
against UNMIK. The frustration with the UN exploded and rioters started vandalising UN 
property and setting fire to UN cars (Interview 18, Civil Society Activist). Rocks and Molotov 
cocktails were thrown towards every symbol of UN administration, slogans against UNMIK 
were chanted and UN flags were burned (King and Mason, 2006, Perritt, 2010). Despite the 
continuously escalating situation the majority of KFOR commanders chose not to intervene 
(Interviews 9, 10 and 18, Civil Society Activists). Thus, essentially the riots continued to rage 
unrestricted (Interview 18, Civil Society Activist).  
 Whether the riots had been spontaneous or previously organised remains a matter of 
controversy and speculation. The UN report firmly argued that “the onslaught led by Kosovo 
Albanian extremists against the Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities of Kosovo was an 
organized, widespread, and targeted campaign” (S/2004/348, 2004: 1). On the other hand, 
eyewitnesses maintain that “it is indisputable that they were spontaneous, at least to a 
considerable extent” (Perritt, 2010: 79). Other witnesses assert that at first the demonstrations 




and tries to manipulate for their own interest” (Interview 15, Kursani). In addition, it was 
acknowledged that the media had played an important role in fuelling the rage of the rioters. 
Television shows followed the events live, reporting how many Albanians were dead or 
injured, urging also the rioters “to kick Serbs out, because even in a liberated Kosovo they 
were still making problems” (Interview 15, Kursani). 
 Regardless of whether the riots were previously organised or not, it is widely accepted 
that one of the reasons why they escalated to that level was the longstanding frustration of 
Kosovo Albanians with the impasse the process of the settlement of their final status had 
reached. Kosovars believed that they had fought for independence throughout the 1990s, first 
through their peaceful resistance and afterwards their armed insurgency (Interview 18, Civil 
Society Activist). They were convinced that NATO intervention, the subsequent withdrawal 
of all Serbian forces and annulment of Serbian authority, equalled their independence 
(Interview 14, EU Diplomat). Nonetheless, they were prepared to wait for three years, as 
resolution 1244 foresaw, so that the final status of Kosovo would be determined according to 
the provisions of the Rambouillet Accords. However, more than three years had passed and 
their status was still uncertain. In addition, they also seemed to notice the international 
community’s reluctance to deal with the matter quickly. Therefore, it seems that they realised 
once again that patience and peace would not lead to the fulfilment of their cause.  
Finally, their frustration was further increased by the low standards of living in 
Kosovo. Although the international administration had spent millions on Kosovo’s 
reconstruction by 2004, Kosovo Albanians seemed to believe that their economic 
development was held back because of their undetermined final status. They were convinced 
that as soon as they were independent, Kosovo would attract more investments, 




Press Editor). Thus, UNMIK was perceived both as a barrier on the road towards the 
establishment of their own state and as an obstacle to their economic welfare. In the end, 
frustration added up and erupted in the violence of March 2004. 
The impact of the riots on the course for the settlement of the final status of Kosovo 
was enormous. The events served as a “wake up call” for the international community, which, 
as a result, realised that the existing situation was unsustainable (Interview 11, Malazogu). 
The process for finding a solution was accelerated, leaving aside the fulfilment of the 
Standards for Kosovo as a prerequisite for the initiation of the talks for the status (Interview 5, 
EU Diplomat). Thus, although the EU opined in its 2005 enlargement strategy paper that 
“Kosovo’s institutions still lack the political maturity necessary to build a truly democratic, 
secure and multi-ethnic society” (European Commission, 2005: 8), it was decided after the 
UN Secretary General’s endorsement that status talks would begin later the same year (Ker-
Lindsay, 2009b). Thus, as King and Mason (2006) very accurately observed “violence had 
once again advanced the independence agenda as nothing else in the previous five years had” 
(King and Mason, 2006: 191). 
 
Vienna talks and the Ahtisaari plan 
The March events showed that the stability in the region remained fragile. Regional stability, 
though, had been the primary concern and leading cause of the international community’s and 
in particular the EU’s, actions for more than a decade. On the one hand, the EU could not 
afford to have a source of instability in such close proximity to its borders. On the other hand, 
failure to ensure peace and stability after long efforts and millions of Euro spent would reflect 




West and the EU, not willing to have one more failure on their record, decided to act swiftly 
and the procedure for finding of a permanent solution started.  
 Consequently, the UN Secretary General appointed Kai Eide as Special Envoy to 
review the situation in Kosovo and draft a report on the situation on the ground. According to 
his report a decision would be made regarding the process for the settlement of the final status 
of Kosovo (S/2005/635, 2005).   
Eide’s report illustrated a bleak image of Kosovo. He referred to the grave economic 
situation and the increased cases of illegal economic activities, the absence of rule of law and 
the malfunction of the judicial system, as well as to the troubling relations between the 
Albanian majority and the minorities. Nevertheless, Eide concluded that  
 
There will [...] not be any good moment for addressing the future status of Kosovo. 
Determining Kosovo’s future status remains -and will continue to be- a highly 
sensitive political issue with serious regional and wider international implications. 
Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to 
commence this process (S/2005/635, 2005 §62). 
 
The Council accepted Eide’s proposal for the initiation of the process for settlement of the 
final status and shortly afterwards Martti Ahrisaari was appointed UN Envoy for Kosovo. 
Although Belgrade insisted that the March events were a clear demonstration of Kosovo’s 
inadequacy for statehood, the Serbian authorities agreed to engage in dialogue with Prishtina 




The negotiations started in Vienna in early 2006 and lasted for fourteen months.44 The 
negotiations, being a one-sided process, showed from the very beginning that the West was 
determined to support an independent Kosovo, excluding the possibility of any other 
alternative solution (Ker-Lindsay, 2009c). Participants in the negotiations confirm that the 
Kosovo Albanian delegation was assured about the outcome of the negotiations, while 
Belgrade was put under constant pressure to compromise (Interview 27, Senior UN Official). 
The UN Envoy himself, instead of retaining the role of impartial mediator, clarified in the first 
meeting with the Serbian delegation that Kosovo’s independence was inevitable, while later 
he openly stated that:  
 
The democratic leadership in Serbia today cannot be held accountable for the actions 
of Slobodan Milošević, but the leaders in Belgrade have to face the heritage and 
responsibility, because this historical heritage cannot be ignored, but rather must be 
taken into account in the process of finding a solution for the future status of Kosovo 
(Ahtisaari, 2006a). 
 
With Ahtisaari explicitly holding Serbia accountable for past abuses and believing that the 
only appropriate remedy would be Kosovo’s independence, every proposal the Serbian side 
submitted for extensive autonomy was ignored. Ahtisaari’s stance was also endorsed by the 
members of the Contact Group, apart from Russia, who repeatedly affirmed that Kosovo 
would never return to Belgrade’s rule (Perritt, 2010).  
 Kosovo Albanians having been assured of the fulfilment of their demands were 
willing to make significant concessions on matters concerning the status of minorities in 
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the secession of Kosovo two years later. For detailed review of the negotiations: Perritt (2010), Ker-Lindsay 




Kosovo (Rohan, 2007). The Albanian delegation agreed to protect minority rights and provide 
among others extensive liberties and competences to the communities, guaranteed 
representation of minorities in the assembly and in the various state institutions, freedom in 
education, broadcast media and press and committed to bound to these terms by drafting a 
constitution including those measures (S/2007/168.Add1, 2007). The constitution and laws 
aimed to guarantee a peaceful co-existence on equal basis among the communities and set the 
foundations for the inter-ethnic stability and future viability of Kosovo.  
Serbia, in contrast, being once again under pressure to submit to a diktat, refused to 
compromise and co-operate. As had happened in Rambouillet, Kosovo Albanians’ demands 
were met, leaving space for Belgrade to negotiate only on issues of secondary importance. 
Hence, with its fundamental demands conclusively rejected, there was no incentive for Serbia 
to be constructive in a process that would ultimately lead to the official loss of Kosovo.  
Throughout the process, Russia remained a firm ally of Serbia, mainly for two 
reasons. First, Russia was concerned with the possible effect of Kosovo as a precedent to 
similar secessionist cases. Being itself confronted with secessionist demands on parts of its 
territory, Russia was reluctant to support Kosovo to achieve independence without the 
consent of Belgrade. Second, Kosovo was a constant reminder of Russia’s humiliation during 
the Rambouillet process and its inability to prevent the NATO air-offence against Serbia. By 
2006, however, Russia under Putin was in a course of re-emerging in the centre of 
international politics and its uncompromising stance was supposed to be a demonstration of 
this (Antonenko, 2007).  
Nonetheless, Russia failed to exert the necessary influence on the Contact Group for 
the finding of a mutual accepted plan. The rest of the Contact Group members remained 




Kosovo that would offer extended freedoms to the minority communities. In addition, there 
seemed to be the widespread opinion within political and diplomatic circles that Russia’s 
stance was a bluff. According to close friends of Ahtisaari, the Russian veto came as a 
surprise to him who “right to the end believed that the Russians would go along with the 
Security Council resolution” (Interview 27, Senior UN Official). Indeed, Russia during these 
months of negotiations had shown periodically some signs of relaxing its stance, urging 
Serbia to be more co-operative (Ker-Lindsay, 2009b). However, expecting that Russia would 
compromise was at least overoptimistic, if not misinformed, especially at a time when the 
Bush administration was promoting the expansion of the missile defence shield in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, a plan that was assertively and repeatedly condemned by Russia as a 
threat to its security (BBC, 2007).  
Despite the certainty that Belgrade would reject any plan that would allow Kosovo to 
secede, Ahtisaari presented his proposal for the future status of Kosovo. The document started 
with the recommendation that “Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the 
international community,” arguing that this was the only viable option for Kosovo 
(S/2007/168, 2007). As expected, Serbia refused to sign the plan and after the failure of the 
negotiations, a Troika was established to continue the talks, comprising representatives of the 
US, Russia and EU. This renewed round of negotiations had 10th December 2007 as its 
deadline.  
In this renewed round of negotiations, the Troika committed to “leave no stone 
unturned in trying to find a solution to the Kosovo status question” (DW, 2007). Along these 
lines, the Troika suggested a solution of partition of Northern Kosovo. Northern Kosovo 
would pass to Serbian control, in exchange for agreeing to the independence of Kosovo 




Then the EU representative, Wolfgang Ischinger, proposed a solution based on the 
West-East Germany experience (Lehne, 2009).  The two Germanys, through a series of 
bilateral agreements, were able to coexist in international organisations, cooperate and engage 
constructively with each other, while not recognising each other (Childs, 1977). Thus, 
Ischinger suggested Serbia and Kosovo to regulate their economic and political relations, 
while temporarily putting aside the dispute over Kosovo’s status (Weller, 2008a). The plan 
was also rejected by Belgrade, as this model of co-operation implied that Kosovo would be 
able to pursue international recognition and independent statehood. Thus, it would create a 
win-win situation for Kosovo, enabling it to enter the UN and be internationally recognised, 
while Serbia would continue to oppose its secession.   
Despite rejecting the Troika’s proposals, in this round of negotiations Belgrade was 
actively engaged in the process, producing concrete ideas for widest autonomy solutions. The 
Serbian delegation presented a settlement based on the Hong-Kong model, with several 
possible variations, seeking control only over foreign and defence policy, border control and 
the protection of Serbian heritage (Bataković, 2014). Belgrade was also willing to allow 
Kosovo to participate in international organisations and use symbols usually reserved for 
sovereign states (Ker-Lindsay, 2009b, Weller, 2008a). Serbia was disposed to offer Kosovo 
practically everything except for a UN seat and their own armed forces (Bataković, 2009). 
Nonetheless, after the announcement of the Ahtisaari plan, the Kosovo Albanians had no 
incentive for further negotiations (Weller, 2008a).  
Thus, although the meetings with the Troika and the Serbian and Kosovar delegations 
continued, they were far from productive. Any possibility of progress, however, was virtually 
eliminated after US and European officials publicly stated that their countries would 




2007). Fully confident of the support they enjoyed, the Kosovar delegation refused to 
negotiate further (Bataković, 2009). Consequently, having reached a stalemate, the Troika 
terminated its operations earlier than the deadline of 10th December. In their final report, the 
US, Russian and EU representatives announced that no mutual solution could be found as 
neither party was willing to yield on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo 
(S/2007/723, 2007).  
Assessing the Vienna negotiations and the Troika talks, it can be observed that they 
followed a quite different route from the one the UN Envoy Kai Eide had proposed when he 
called for the process of a settlement of the final status to begin. Eide had stressed the 
complexity of the situation acknowledging that the territory in question was still part of a 
sovereign state. He had called for caution in the negotiations and emphasised that “artificial 
deadlines should [...] not be set.” He underlined the need for joint participation of all parties 
and the necessity of a process with a “clear and common picture of the agenda and the 
implications” (S/2005/635, 2005: 70).  
The Vienna negotiations, in contrast, were rushed, with artificial deadlines, neither 
following nor concluding a common agenda agreed by all parties. The negotiations were 
expected to finish by the end of 2006 (Woehrel, 2006), setting an unprecedentedly short 
deadline for such negotiations. The matter was believed to be irresolvable from the start, i.e., 
even if the negotiations continued there would be no mutually accepted outcome. Claims by 
renowned scholars show the hastiness of certain international actors to conclude the 
negotiations. Weller (2008a) acknowledged that Belgrade proposed a set of solutions during 





that might have appeared sufficiently reasonable to international negotiators to warrant 
further exploration, had it been made in the context of the Ahtisaari negotiations. 
Under those circumstances Kosovo would have come under very heavy pressure to 
defend its insistence on independence. However, after 15 months of Ahtisaari talks, 
there was little inclination to start again from scratch [...] (Weller, 2008a: 1227). 
 
Recalling, however, other cases of contested territories where negotiations continue 
for years in search of a mutually accepted solution, it can be observed that fifteen months of 
negotiations is an extremely limited time for reaching a comprehensive agreement. Yet, in the 
case of Kosovo, fifteen months of negotiations were considered to be already too long. Even 
when Belgrade proposed potentially viable solutions in the Troika negotiations, its proposals 
were again dismissed as being put forward too late, which raises questions about the actual 
reasons why the negotiations had been conducted in the first place.  
In hindsight it can be argued that the primary purpose of the negotiations was not the 
pursuit of a mutually accepted solution, but rather the justification that all means for the 
achievement of a mutually accepted solution were employed and failed. Kosovo’s 
independence was a pre-determined necessity. However, to conduct negotiations was 
necessary in order to claim afterwards that all means to reach a consensual solution were 
exhausted, providing the final argument for major Western powers to recognise the 
independence of Kosovo (Interview 16, Senior UN Official).  
Finally, the negotiations largely aimed to settle and secure the status of the Serbs in 
Kosovo. One of the predominant reasons why the West so actively promoted Kosovo’s 
secession was to enhance stability in the region. Stability, though, would be impossible in an 




they had to pay for independence (Rohan, 2007), agreed to provide extended liberties and 
protection of minority rights, so that a 2004 pogrom would not be repeated (Interview 11, 
Malazogu). To what extent the agreed measures have actually been implemented will be 
discussed in the next chapter, along with an evaluation of the supervised independence 
process Ahtisaari had proposed.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter looked into the years following the NATO intervention until the end of the 
Troika talks in late 2007. During those years Kosovo was under international administration 
led by UNMIK. The chapter demonstrated the importance of the international administration 
itself for the future successful secession of Kosovo and also identified major events that 
accelerated this process, referring mainly to the March riots of 2004 and the subsequent 
Vienna negotiations.  
 It revealed that also in the years 1999-2008 changes at four levels affected the 
outcome of Kosovo’s secession. Kosovo’s position under international administration had an 
impact both at the local and at the state level. At the local level, the international 
administration promoted the development of institutions, necessary for the internal viability of 
a future independent Kosovo. At the state level, the UN-led administration suspended and 
eventually permanently annulled Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo, creating a de facto 
seceded entity.  
Another event that took place at the local level and affected Kosovo’s secession was 
the riots of 2004. The magnitude of violence created fears that a possible repetition of such an 
enormous wave of protests not only would be destructive for the international administration 




procedures were accelerated for the finding of a permanent settlement that would guarantee 
peace and stability in the region.  
This led to global-level negotiations including participants from local, state and global 
levels. Here, the sole possible outcome from the beginning was the secession of Kosovo as 
the only solution that would produce a permanent settlement sufficient to ensure stability on 
the regional level. The very conduct of negotiations provided the argument that all means 
possible to settle the conflict had been exhausted and therefore there was no other viable 
solution short of the secession and the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state.  
Finally, the negotiations showed again how global dynamics affected the outcome of 
Kosovo’s secession at the local level. Serbia was supported by Russia, which although a re-
emerging global power was unable to exert enough influence on the Contact Group. The 
Contact Group members, on the other hand, could unilaterally accept the Ahtisaari plan, 
foreseeing the supervised independence of Kosovo, and as will be discussed in the following 
chapter, proceed to the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state resulting into the fait 














KOSOVO DECLARES INDEPENDENCE 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present and evaluate Kosovo’s progress towards international 
recognition and internal viability after it unilaterally declared independence on 17 February 
2008. In order to do this, this chapter first sets the international background against which 
Kosovo began its course as a newly created state.  
It therefore begins with an evaluation of the first international reactions following the 
unilateral declaration of independence. Serbia immediately declared Kosovo’s declaration 
illegal and pledged to employ any non-violent means possible in order to prevent a fait 
accompli (Bataković, 2014). Russia, China and five EU member states -Spain, Greece, 
Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania- considered Kosovo’s unilateral act a breach of international 
law and called for a solution based on mutually accepted agreement (UN SC SC/9252, 2008). 
The US and the majority of the EU countries, however, accepted Kosovo’s independence and 
quickly recognised it as a sovereign independent state. 
The chapter continues with an examination of whether Kosovo is a unique case or a 
dangerous precedent for international relations. The international community was and remains 
divided on whether Kosovo’s unilateral secession constituted a breach of international law 
and a precedent for similar cases. States which perceive Kosovo’s unilateral action as illegal 
and dangerous refuse to recognise it, inhibiting Kosovo’s progress to uncontested statehood. 
Taking also into account that several states waited for the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) before announcing their position on the issue of Kosovo, it 




Assembly. The respective section will reveal whether it affected Kosovo’s successful 
secession.  
 The chapter continues with the evaluation of Kosovo’s progress in its international and 
internal affairs. Kosovo is currently recognised by 109 UN member states (May 2015), a 
number of recognitions far greater than that which other cases of contested secession have 
achieved. Kosovo’s participation in international and regional organisations is also growing, 
while it has made the first steps towards European integration with the signing of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) (European Commission, 2015b). Relations 
with Serbia are gradually improving through an EU-facilitated dialogue, the first phase of 
which was successfully concluded with the reaching of common ground and the signing of a 
historic agreement (EEAS, 2013). Regarding its internal viability Kosovo has made 
significant steps forward. Its institutions are still weak, but constantly developing, and the 
state gradually becomes more and more consolidated (Interview 23, Non-EU Diplomat). 
Kosovo has made major steps forward in terms of infrastructure, communications, 
transportations and policing, creating the foundations for a stable and viable state.   
This chapter shows that Kosovo’s second secession reached this level of success 
because of the significant support the West provided. After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence the West engaged in policies promoting Kosovo’s international recognition 
around the world, resulting into Kosovo’s widespread formal acceptance (inter alia, Interview 
7, EU Diplomat, Interview 14, EU Diplomat, Interview 15, Kursani). Finally, the West 
promoted and ensured Kosovo’s internal viability through the allocation of generous funds 
aiming to accelerate the state-building process in Kosovo and enhance the efficiency of 





Kosovo declares independence: first reactions 
The Serbian parliament immediately condemned the unilateral declaration of independence of 
Kosovo and rejected as unacceptable any fait accompli that violated international law. The 
Serbian parliament reaffirmed its adherence to Resolution 1244 as the only document defining 
the status of Kosovo, until a mutually accepted solution had been reached. As a sign of protest 
Belgrade temporarily recalled its ambassadors from all the states that recognised Kosovo’s 
independence (Bataković, 2014). 
 Serbia, excluding the option to use force or enforce economic sanctions against 
Kosovo, decided to follow the diplomatic route and seek an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice (A/63/PV.22, 2008). Bringing the matter to the United Nations 
General Assembly, Serbia’s delegation persuaded the latter to submit a relevant enquiry to the 
ICJ (UNGA/10764, 2008). Consequently, the ICJ received in October 2008 the request to 
provide an advisory opinion on the question “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?” (ICJ, 2010a: 8). The ICJ agreed to examine the question and delivered an advisory 
opinion two years later in 2010. How the ICJ opined and what the implications were of this 
decision for Kosovo’s successful secession will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 Russia similarly condemned the unilateral declaration of independence. Calling for an 
emergency Security Council meeting after Kosovo announced its independence, the Russian 
representative declared that this act was illegal and a blatant breach of the norms and 
principles of international law that would eventually undermine peace and security in the 
Balkans. Stressing that this act would constitute a dangerous precedent and could have 
destructive consequences for international relations in general, the Russian representative 




for a lawful solution based on agreements between Belgrade and Prishtina (UN SC SC/9252, 
2008).  
 Likewise, the Chinese representative opposed Kosovo’s unilateral action and 
expressed concerns about a potential revitalisation of conflict in the region. Considering thus 
the negative implications that a unilateral action may have for peace and stability he asked for 
continuation of fruitful and honest negotiations between the parties. Also, similar to the 
Russian representative, the Chinese envoy stated that this act would constitute a serious 
challenge to the fundamental principles of international law, therefore urging once more the 
parties to continue their pursuit of a mutually acceptable solution through political and 
diplomatic means (UN SC SC/9252, 2008).  
In contrast, the US recognised Kosovo with enthusiastic words and congratulated its 
leaders and citizens for this decision. The US deemed this decision to be an important step 
towards Kosovo’s democratic and national development, while it also welcomed Kosovo’s 
commitment to the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposals (Bush, 2008). Furthermore, the 
US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, clarified that the recognition of Kosovo is based on 
a specific combination of factors, including the context of Yugoslavia's breakup, the previous 
crimes against civilians and actions of ethnic cleansing, as well as the extended period of UN 
administration. Rice emphasised that because of the previous combination of factors Kosovo 
constitutes a special case and cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the 
world (Rice, 2008). 
 The British representative to the Security Council also stressed that Kosovo is a sui 
generis case, deriving from the break-up of former Yugoslavia, affirming that its secession 
created no precedent. He supported that it was Resolution 1244 that had committed the 




power of Belgrade over Kosovo- and not the declaration of 2008. He also claimed that 
through Resolution 1244 it was officially recognised that the respect for human rights in 
Kosovo and the stability of the region could only be secured if Serbia did not exercise control 
over Kosovo. The latter, he argued, was a condition that rendered Kosovo’s secession 
inevitable. Thus, the British representative reaffirmed that the only way forward that would 
adequately ensure the overriding priority of peace and security in the region was the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, emphasising the importance of respect for minority 
rights as a parameter that would determine Kosovo’s future (UN SC SC/9252, 2008).  
 Similar were the stance and arguments from the rest of the Contact Group countries. 
France reiterated the uniqueness of Kosovo’s situation, being the last chapter of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, a position that was also repeated by the German Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (UN SC SC/9252, 2008, Die Zeit, 2008). France and Italy both declared that 
after the exhaustion of all means the only option that would ensure stability in the region was 
the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan and the eventual integration of both Serbia and 
Kosovo in the European mechanisms (Sarkozy, 2008, UN SC SC/9252, 2008).  
 The majority of EU member states, twenty seven at that time, recognised Kosovo’s 
independence, repeating similar arguments to the above. The context of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, the human rights violations that occurred during the 1990s, the exhaustion of all 
other means, the unsustainability of the current status and the imperative need of stability in 
the region were the predominant arguments employed (inter alia Interviews 7,13,14, EU 
Diplomats).  
Nevertheless five EU member states refused to recognise Kosovo’s statehood. Cyprus, 
Greece, Slovakia, Spain, and Romania opposed Kosovo’s unilateral secession as a violation 




(Vallely, 2008). Although the arguments these countries officially expressed revolved around 
the adherence to the international law, the position of those states is also a result of latent 
domestic issues these countries confront and which could potentially take a problematic turn 
with Kosovo’s precedent. The same can also be argued for China and Russia, facing the 
secessionist demands of Tibet and Chechnya respectively (Interview 6, UN Official, Interview 
7 EU Diplomat, Interview 21, Peci). In the case of Cyprus and Greece, their unwillingness to 
recognise the unilateral secession of Kosovo is understandable when considering the still 
unresolved issue of the TRNC. Similarly Spain is concerned with separatist demands 
expressed by the Basque and Catalan communities and prefers to avoid any kind of 
endorsement of unilateral acts that could potentially harm its territorial integrity. Finally, 
Romania and Slovakia also deal with internal minority issues that could potentially deteriorate 
through an official endorsement of a unilateral secessionist act (Interview 5, EU Diplomat, 
Interview 12, EU Diplomat, Interview 25, EU Diplomat).   
  Even though the EU failed to officially adopt a coherent approach regarding the 
recognition of Kosovo, its member states were able to agree on collective actions. The EU 
was able to decide on the deployment of a mission in Kosovo that would assist the UN in the 
field of rule of law and maintain at the same time respect for Resolution 1244 (Gow, 2010). 
The European Rule of Law mission (EULEX) was established shortly after the unilateral 
secession of Kosovo, whose actions and mandate will be discussed later in more detail.  
 The reaction of the international community to Kosovo’s unilateral secession shows 
that both recognising and non-recognising countries were concerned with the potential future 
implications of Kosovo as a precedent. Recognising countries hastily affirmed that they 
regarded Kosovo as a sui generis case and presented arguments supporting the uniqueness of 




to some extent with their own secessionist movements the confirmation that Kosovo could not 
be used as an example for other cases was repeatedly heard. Non-recognising countries chose 
the safe option to oppose Kosovo’s unilateral act as a violation of international law. Worried 
that the Kosovo incident would open Pandora’s Box and lead to a fatal undermining of the 
principle of the respect of territorial integrity, these countries abstained from endorsing such 
an act. As expected, this divergence in approaches also sparked a feverish academic debate on 
whether Kosovo constitutes a precedent or not.  
 
Academic reflections on Kosovo as a precedent  
This section examines some of the arguments on the matter of whether Kosovo’s unilateral 
secession constitutes a precedent or not. It demonstrates the different views on the potential 
implications of Kosovo as a precedent in international relations. It also highlights the division 
Kosovo’s widespread recognition created in both international relations’ practice and 
literature. Policy-makers and scholars have been divided on the issue, with many supporting 
the idea that despite assurances of uniqueness, inevitably Kosovo would encourage other 
secessionist movements to declare independence. Other academics, however, have argued that 
Kosovo indeed presented a unique combination of elements that convincingly justifies its 
unique treatment.  
  In more detail, scholars who claimed that Kosovo will inevitably be used as an 
example, argue that there are several similar cases of secessionist demands around the world. 
Some of those cases have succeeded in creating de facto states, such as South Ossetia, the 
TRNC, and Nagorno-Karabakh, but have received limited or no international recognition. Ker-
Lindsay (2011, 2013) refers to other cases that share similarities with Kosovo, but have failed 




under Saddam Hussein, and Vojvodina, which shared the same status as Kosovo in the Former 
Yugoslavia.  
 Caspersen (2013, 2008) and Cheterian (2012) examined the effects of Kosovo’s 
secession on the frozen conflicts in Caucasus and argue that Kosovo’s recognition introduces a 
new dynamism in the region. Implying that Kosovo’s case is far more successful than the 
cases in the examined region, Caspersen argues that the Kosovo example can lead to an 
increase of the rigidness of the position of all conflicting parties, potentially leading to a 
violent escalation. However, Caspersen also identifies a potentially positive aspect of 
Kosovo’s precedent. Taking into consideration that Kosovo was placed under supervised 
independence, allegedly conditional upon the strengthening of democratic rule, multilateralism 
and respect of minorities and human rights, Caspersen maintained that this could perhaps 
constitute an incentive for de facto states to turn more democratic and abandon authoritarian 
rule. Kosovo, therefore, may produce a negative precedent for international relations, but it 
could also induce positive changes to the internal governance of entities demanding secession.   
 Another interesting argument was proposed by Vrbetic (2013) who likewise believes 
that Kosovo would be a source of inspiration for other secessionist movements and supports 
that Kosovo constitutes a bad model of conflict management. In the case of Kosovo a Security 
Council resolution that repeatedly affirmed the territorial integrity of a state was placed aside 
when negotiating the final status of the territory in question. Such a precedent could only 
undermine the trustworthiness of other interim agreements that foresee the establishment of 
provisional international administration turning states more reluctant to agree to such terms of 
conflict settlement.  
 On the other hand, Fabry (2012) admits that Kosovo encouraged aspirations of various 




them, referring to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. Moreover, he also acknowledges that 
this would have probably not occurred if Kosovo’s unilateral secession and recognition had 
not taken place before. Nonetheless, the limited number of recognitions those two entities have 
achieved indicates that these cases have not marked the abandonment of the post-
decolonisation and post-Cold War norm of non-recognition of unilateral secessions. 
 Furthermore, Jia (2009) argued that Kosovo can be used as an example for similar 
demands only if the aspiring secessionist movement fulfils all conditions present in Kosovo. 
Hence, the population of the seceding entity should fully support secession and have a history 
of suffering past human right abuses, while the secessionist entity should be a former member 
of a disintegrated state, in which it had distinct administrative boundaries and enjoyed equal 
representation in the federal bodies. In addition the seceding entity should have a history of 
international administration and at the time of the secession it should have developing 
democratic structures (Malazogu, 2007).  
 Additionally, Watson (2008) maintained that Kosovo was the last phase of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. As such, by definition Kosovo is a unique case, because it was 
the last of the administrative units of Yugoslavia that demanded independence. Moreover, 
Roseberry (2013) asserted that what makes Kosovo a unique case is that recognising countries 
clearly stated that the people of Kosovo have the right to independence also because the past 
abuses they suffered under Serbian rule reached the level of ethnic cleansing or genocide. 
Roseberry claims that by setting the threshold as high as genocide, the recognising countries 
removed this right from other entities that suffered discrimination, but not ethnic cleansing or 
genocide. Finally, Borgen (2008) highlighted the fact that Kosovo was under international 
administration for almost ten years. Thus, Kosovo was, first, already de facto independent 




solution. Second, the presence of international administration on a territory wishing to secede 
constitutes an unusual element that the majority of secessionist entities do not possess,45 
rendering thus Kosovo’s case unique.      
 
i. Reflecting on the literature 
When examining the arguments provided by all sides, each has valid perspectives. To begin 
with the evaluation of the claims presented in favour of the opinion that Kosovo will constitute 
a precedent, this thesis accepts that there are several cases around the world that share 
similarities with Kosovo. For instance, South Ossetia and Abkhazia both demand 
independence from Georgia since the USSR collapsed. South Ossetia was an autonomous 
region and Abkhazia an autonomous province in Georgia during the time of the USSR (Toal, 
2008). Georgia was a constituent republic of USSR, having thus similar status with Serbia in 
Yugoslavia. Thus, following the uti possidetis principle after the dissolution of the initial 
structures, i.e., the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Georgia and Serbia, had the right as 
constituent entities to establish their own states, as successor states of the former Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, respectively (Ratner, 1996, Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992). This right was 
not extended to the autonomous provinces within the republics. Therefore, by recognising 
Kosovo and violating the uti possidetis principle the way might open for other entities that 
enjoyed autonomy to demand their independence. Similar arguments can be presented also for 
Chechnya and Ingushetia that formed together an autonomous province in the Russian 
Republic at the time of the USSR, and which also have a history of repression and ethnic 
cleansing by Russia, as Kosovo by Serbia (Sakwa, 2003). Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous 
                                                                
45 East Timor was also under UN administration (UNTAES) and achieved independence from Indonesia through 




region of Azerbaijan in the former Soviet Union, is another example that shares similarities 
with Kosovo (Caspersen, 2013, Cheterian, 2012).  
Furthermore, the TRNC is a de facto state created through a military invasion 
conducted to protect the rights and the physical safety of the Turkish Cypriots (Tocci, 2003, 
Yakinthou, 2012). In this respect, it shares similarities with Kosovo in the sense that a state -
Turkey- or a coalition of states -NATO- conducted a war on humanitarian grounds against a 
sovereign state, Cyprus and Serbia respectively, and resulted in the separation of a part of the 
parent state’s territory and the creation of a de facto state. Thus, if Kosovo is accepted in the 
international system on the basis of the human rights violations it suffered and/or the previous 
status it enjoyed in the former structure, then there are also other entities that fulfil those 
standards and might be eligible for recognition.  
On the other hand, despite the similarities these cases share with Kosovo, they also 
present some important differences. For example, while Kosovo initially pursued a peaceful 
way for the accommodation of its demands, Chechnya hardly engaged to any attempts for a 
negotiated accommodation. In addition, Kosovo made significant steps towards the 
establishment of a functioning state, whereas during its period of de facto independence, the 
Chechen government failed to build any viable institutions of an independent state (Charney, 
2001).  
In the case of TRNC, the latter was not a pre-existing territorial entity within the 
Republic of Cyprus, in contrast to Kosovo, which was an autonomous province in Serbia. In 
addition it is questionable whether the military intervention and the creation of a state was the 
only viable solution possible (Tocci, 2003), as was argued in the case of Kosovo.  
Finally, Kosovo enjoyed a peculiar autonomous status with enhanced rights in the 




USSR. It had representation and a vote in the federal bodies of Yugoslavia, as well as its own 
constitution, assembly and territorial defence forces as the other republics (ICJ, 2009). That is 
why it is often call a “virtual republic” or a republic “in all but name” (Mertus, 1999, 
Dannreuther, 2001).  
Even in the case of Vojvodina, which was put forward as a case sharing similar status 
with Kosovo as virtual republic in Yugoslavia, but never achieved independence, Vojvodina 
did not declare independence or explicitly expressed such demands. Its ethnic composition is 
also different to Kosovo. In Kosovo 95% of the population is ethnic Albanian, whereas 
Vojvodina is an ethnically heterogeneous region, with Serbs to constitute more than 60% 
(Stojsin, 2015, Judah, 2010). It is, therefore, debatable whether Vojvodina’s secession would 
be desirable for the majority of the population.  
Moving on to the argument that Kosovo is a sui generis case, this is founded primarily 
on the assumption that Kosovo combined certain elements that turned it into a unique case. 
These elements turned into criteria for other cases demanding statehood that the latter had to 
meet in full in order to receive the same treatment as Kosovo. It was argued however that the 
conditions found in the case of Kosovo, including the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia 
and the peculiar status Kosovo enjoyed in the federal institutions, make its duplication almost 
impossible, thus, rendering Kosovo a unique case (Rice, 2008, UN SC SC/9252, 2008). 
The problematic aspect of this argument is that the criteria set by Kosovo derive from 
the case itself. There were no previous conditions that Kosovo had to fulfil in order to achieve 
recognition by other states. To the contrary, after Kosovo unilaterally declared its 
independence, the recognising countries tailored criteria that fit the case and justified its 
uniqueness. Similarly then, by advocating Kosovo’s uniqueness according to conditions set a 




opened the way for other “unique cases” to emerge according to circumstances (Ker-Lindsay, 
2013).  
Furthermore, counter-arguments can be provided for many of the presented arguments. 
For instance, the claim that Kosovo was the last part of the disintegration of Yugoslavia can be 
contested when considering the uti possidetis principle regarding at the time of its collapse. 
Recalling the Badinter Commission’s opinions regarding Yugoslavia’s successor states, 
Kosovo was not examined along with the Yugoslav republics and was not qualified to be 
among the successor states, as upon Yugoslavia’s disintegration Kosovo was a Serbian 
province and beforehand it had never reached the status of a republic (Conference on 
Yugoslavia, 1992). The recognition, thus, of Kosovo as being a chapter of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia may not only not be an argument of uniqueness, but in contrast, it may trigger 
other entities to declare independence from the current structures they belong to, referring 
mainly to the possibility of Republika Srbska realising its threats for separation from the 
Federation of Bosnia. Bosnia’s decision for non-recognition of Kosovo in light of the potential 
disastrous effects such an action could have for the federation shows the latent precedential 
effects of Kosovo’s secession for still-unsettled former Yugoslav issues (Interview 30, Non-
EU Diplomat).  
Finally, the argument that Kosovo Albanians had been victims of genocide is founded 
on an inaccuracy.  Although Kosovo Albanians undeniably suffered human rights violations 
and constant harassment throughout the 1990s, with the level of violence to escalate during the 
NATO air-offensive to ethnic cleansing, the UN-Supervised Supreme Court in Prishtina ruled 
that genocide had not occurred by Serbian forces (BBC, 2001). Ethnic cleansing, on the other 




observed in wars and claims of past of ethnic cleansing can be found in the majority of 
separatist conflicts (Mann, 2005). 
All in all, convincing arguments and counter-arguments have been presented by all 
sides. Nonetheless, this thesis will take no firm position on this debate. It will follow the 
middle route, accepting, on the one hand, that up to now Kosovo has not been used 
successfully as example for similar separatist cases. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded 
that the case of Kosovo could potentially have precedential effects in the long term. This thesis 
maintains this position through observation of other cases in the world that share similarities 
with Kosovo. Some of those cases, such as Nagorno Karabakh, while having created de facto 
states (and in some cases fairly successful de facto states), were not able to effectively use the 
case of Kosovo as a precedent to further promote their goals. Even South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, which are supported and recognised by Russia, have managed to achieve official 
recognition by only four states. This single-digit number comes in stark contrast to the one 
hundred and nine recognitions Kosovo already has (May 2015). Hence, for the moment 
Kosovo seems to have maintained the status of a unique case.  
Nonetheless, this status has been possible only because of the one-sided balance of 
power in the international system in 1999 at the time when Serbia’s authority over Kosovo 
was annulled. However, this unipolarity that followed the collapse of the USSR has 
diminished. Although the US remains the most influential country in the world, other powers 
have emerged. What this means for the argument of this thesis is that more Kosovos may 
occur in the future, if coalitions of influential powers are created. Whether this is a credible 
scenario or not remains to be seen. For now this thesis accepts that other powers, such as 




unique case. However, the precedential effects Kosovo may have in the future should not be 
dismissed.   
 
ICJ’s decision on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
The ICJ finally announced its long-awaited opinion in July 2010.  However, the ruling did 
not live up to the expectations of the parties involved. The judges opted for a very narrow 
interpretation of the question, deciding that: 
 
the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate 
general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional 
Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any 
applicable rule of international law (ICJ, 2010a: 122).    
 
At first glance, the ICJ ruling seems to endorse the Kosovar position as it explicitly states that 
the declaration did not breach international law. Accordingly, Kosovo’s government and 
citizens received the ruling with enthusiasm, while its president, Fatmir Sejdiu, urged all non-
recognising countries to recognise Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state (McElroy, 
2010). In contrast, Serbian president, Boris Tadic, reiterated Serbia’s position that they would 
“never recognise the unilaterally-declared independence of Kosovo” and called for resumption 
of talks over the status of Kosovo (Lowen, 2010).  
 On a closer look, though, the Court by exactly and narrowly answering the question 
received, produced an opinion that neither condemned nor endorsed Kosovo’s independence 
(Vrbetic, 2013). The Court opined that “general international law contains no applicable 




secession is not prohibited under international law (Crawford, 2006) and that international law 
does not regulate the dissolution of states from within (Bothe, 2010), the Court merely 
reiterated that since there is no applicable law, then there is also no violation of it. 
In addition, the Court clarified that the question was specifically on whether or not the 
declaration of independence was in accordance with international law. Thus, the issue of 
whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood was beyond the scope of the question. The 
Court also added that the question did not concern the validity or any legal effects of the 
recognition of Kosovo by those states that had already recognised it (ICJ, 2010a §51). Finally, 
the Court decided that debates on the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence 
of any right of “remedial secession” were also beyond the scope of the question and therefore 
the Court would not address those either (ICJ, 2010a §83).  
 The Court then literally concluded that it is not illegal for an entity to declare 
independence. The decision entailed neither political interpretation, nor validation of Kosovo’s 
statehood. As such, the ICJ’s ruling ultimately did not offer any major contribution to either 
the specific issue of Kosovo, or to the general understanding of secession and state creation 
(Hannum, 2011, Gallucci, 2010). Similarly, it provided no particular guidance to the countries 
waiting for its decision, and its impact on Kosovo’s future and on other similar unresolved 
conflicts around the world was not as influential as was initially expected (Jamar and Vignes, 
2010). The supporters of Kosovo, the US and leading European countries continued to 
advocate for Kosovo’s recognition, while Russia, China and the five non-recognising EU 







Kosovo’s international relations  
Up to the submission of this thesis, thus in seven years of independence, Kosovo has 
progressed significantly in its international and internal affairs. Internationally, through the 
constant efforts of the supporting countries combined with work of the Kosovar elites and civil 
society organisations, Kosovo has managed to be recognised by 109 UN member states as an 
independent and sovereign state (May 2015). The supporting countries strongly promoted 
Kosovo’s statehood worldwide, persistently lobbying in favour of its recognition and its 
participation in international and regional organisations (inter alia, Interviews 5, 7, 14, EU 
Diplomats). This way, apart from the significant number of recognitions Kosovo has achieved, 
it has also been admitted as a member in a number of international organisations, among 
others the World Bank (World Bank, 2009), the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009), the 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC, 2013) and the Council of Europe Venice Commission 
(Council of Europe, 2014), as well as in many sports organisations, including the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC, 2014). Interestingly, the International Olympic Committee 
declared in its statement announcing Kosovo’s admission that Kosovo fulfilled the 
requirements for participation as outlined in the Olympic Charter, including the condition of 
being a “country” defined as “an independent State recognised by the international 
community” (IOC, 2014). Thus, the West’s support and the increasing numbers of recognising 
states and international organisations that accept Kosovo’s admission “have strengthened 
Kosovo’s position, casting little doubt on its survival as an entity independent of Serbia” 







i. Relations with non-recognising states  
Despite not recognising Kosovo’s independence, China, Russia, Slovakia, Romania and 
Greece maintain liaison offices in Prishtina. Admittedly, the Russian liaison office, although 
demonstrating a level of engagement in Kosovo, is established in Prishtina mostly as a 
mechanism to observe the situation on the ground (Ker-Lindsay, 2015). The liaison offices of 
the other countries, however, operate as embassies, maintaining close relations with local 
elites and politicians. Moreover, Greece, Slovakia and Romania, acknowledging the need for 
regional stability and prosperity support Kosovo’s regional integration and further European 
perspective, while Greece went a step further agreeing to the establishment of an Economic 
and Commercial Affairs Office of Kosovo46 in Athens (Hellenic Republic MFA, 2015). All 
three countries have eventually recognised Kosovo’s passport as a legal and valid form of 
identification (Kosovo MFA, 2012, Selimi, 2015, Kosovo MFA, 2014). Finally, all three 
countries with their capacity as members of the EU support Kosovo’s institution-building 
process through EULEX (EULEX, 2015b), while Romania and Greece are among the thirty 
one troop contributing countries of KFOR (KFOR, 2014).  
Thus Kosovo, although not fully recognised, is far from excluded by its neighbourhood 
and the prospects for the future are rather optimistic. In April 2015 the European Commission 
adopted the proposal for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) for Kosovo, 
constituting an important step towards Kosovo’s European integration. The next important and 
mandatory step will be the verification of the proposal by the EU Council and the European 
Parliament before it can be signed and enter into force in early 2016  (European Commission, 
2015b). Once in effect, the SAA will be the first contractual relation between the EU and 
Kosovo, which will allow Kosovo to enjoy and benefit from the EU’s policies for the Western 
                                                                




Balkans, as it will provide a framework for political dialogue, including co-operation in 
various sectors, such as justice, trade, education, employment, energy and environment 
(European Commission, 2015b). 
Furthermore, Kosovo has made important steps towards the signing of the visa 
liberalisation agreement with the EU, a process initiated in 2012. The 2014 EU report 
regarding Kosovo’s progress on the requirements of the visa liberalisation roadmap has 
identified numerous improved areas. In particular, significant progress was noted in the fields 
of readmission, border management, migration and asylum, while there was also some 
improvement in the fields of reintegration and freedom of movement (European Commission, 
2014b). Despite considerable improvements in the above areas, Kosovo greatly lacks in the 
fields of document security and rule of law and thus the agreement on visa liberalisation will 
possibly be delayed until effective measures are met to combat high-profile corruption and 
organised crime (Avramopoulos, 2015). Nevertheless, the visa liberalisation is an ongoing 
process that, upon its completion, will be an important step towards Kosovo’s European 
integration.  
 
ii. Relations with Serbia 
One of the most important steps towards Kosovo’s international acceptance is the ongoing 
dialogue with Serbia, aiming for normalisation of relations. Serbia, with EU accession as its 
principal goal, is aware that a prerequisite for its admission to the Union is the settlement of 
the issue of Kosovo, as indicated in Chapter 35 of the accession procedure.47 Given also the 
importance and the complexity of this matter, this Chapter is to be opened first and progress is 
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thirty five chapters of the acquis (European Commission, 2015a). The thirty-fifth chapter, having the general 





required throughout and in parallel with the progress in the other chapters (European 
Commission, 2014c). Thus, the settlement of the issue of Kosovo is of primary and urgent 
importance for Serbia’s European course. In light of this, an EU-facilitated, high-level 
dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina commenced in October 2012, resulting in April 
2013 in a landmark agreement between the two parties (EEAS, 2013).  
Even though the high-level dialogue and the signed agreement48 do not constitute 
formal recognition by Serbia, the agreement includes various provisions that regulate their 
relationship as being interstate. More specifically, Article 14 specifies that “neither side will 
block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path” 
(Brussels Agreement, 2013), while measures decided in the frame of technical agreements 
foresee progress in the field of freedom of movement, regional representation, integrated 
boundary management (IBM) and the appointment of liaison officers (Republic of Serbia, 
2015).  
Notably, progress has been observed in all of the aforementioned areas. In the field of 
freedom of movement, residents with Serbian and/or Kosovo identity cards are allowed to 
enter and exit both Serbia and Kosovo (European Commission, 2014c). Serbia, thus, 
recognises Kosovo-issued documents as valid forms of identification. In the area of boundary 
management, six interim joint crossing points were established, while the exact location and 
layout of the permanent ones have been agreed (European Commission, 2014c). Furthermore, 
Serbia’s role in facilitating Kosovo’s participation in the South-East Europe Cooperation 
Process (SEECP) was especially constructive, as it was in the case of Kosovo’s request for 
participation in the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) (European Commission, 2014c, 
Republic of Serbia, 2015). Finally, the system of liaison officers is in place and several 
                                                                





official visits have been organised, which the Serbian government reports were unfolded 
“without a single problem and in excellent cooperation” (Republic of Serbia, 2015: 19).  
The Brussels Agreement has also led to significant changes on the ground. For the 
first time elections were held in the whole of Kosovo, including Northern Kosovo. In 
addition, the units of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) in Northern Kosovo have 
begun to dismantle and integrate into the Kosovo (Bjeloš et al., 2014). This way, the Kosovo 
government gradually expands its control in the entire territory of Kosovo, meeting the 
minimum requirement for state viability this thesis has set, i.e. the ability of the government 
to exert control over population and territory.    
Hence, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo is increasingly taking the form of 
neighbouring states, even though Serbia still refuses to recognise Kosovo as an independent 
state. This increasing quasi-interstate interaction can be regarded as a form of de facto 
recognition, demonstrating at the same time that Serbian government officials have 
acknowledged the irreversibility of Kosovo’s secession and the need to settle this issue and 
move forward to EU accession (Interview 26, Dimitrijević, Interview 27, Senior UN Official, 
Interview 34, Civil Society Activist).  
The Brussels Agreement was the first result of the EU-facilitated dialogue for the 
settlement of the Kosovo issue. The discussions have resumed in February 2015 and progress 
is expected to be seen with the implementation of the agreement, as well as with the 
finalisation of remaining issues (Mogherini, 2015). Although the time of the conclusion of 
negotiations and their outcome is uncertain, the imperativeness of positive results for Serbia’s 






Kosovo’s domestic policy 
Along with progress in matters of external recognition, Kosovo has also made significant 
steps forward on issues of internal state function following the Ahtisaari proposals. After the 
launching of the Ahtisaari plan, the Kosovo authorities and the international community on 
the ground committed themselves to its implementation. Ahtisaari recommended an 
independence procedure supervised by the international community until Kosovo has reached 
satisfactory standards in several areas49 of internal regulation. For the fulfilment of the 
benchmarks set by Ahtisaari, Kosovo’s government adopted several laws in the fields of 
human rights, public administration, local governance, justice, and elections. In addition, the 
government adopted a constitution corresponding with the international community’s 
standards (Assembly of Kosovo, 2015), 
 
i. Constitution  
Kosovo’s constitution is a remarkably democratic document, in line with the Ahtisaari 
requirements. The Constitution declared Kosovo to be a “multi-ethnic society consisting of 
Albanian and other Communities” (Constitution of Kosovo, 2008, Art.3.1) and comprises 
provisions that guarantee the rights of those communities, as well as their representation in 
                                                                
49 The provisions of the Ahtisaari proposal included  the protection of human rights, and rights of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious communities in particular, return of refugees and missing persons, regulation of issues 
of territorial self-governance, so that municipalities would constitute the basic form of self-governance in 
Kosovo, autonomy and protection of religious denomination, with enhanced protection measures for the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, establishment of a fiscal surveillance system of public accounts under the aegis of 
the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, the development of Kosovo Security Force to 
a multi-ethnic and professional force, the conduct of free and fair general and municipal elections and drafting 
of a constitution in cooperation with the international community. The Ahtisaari plan also provided for the 
establishment of an International Steering Group comprising key international stakeholders and the 
appointment of an International Civilian Representative who would bear responsibility for the supervision and 
interpretation of the settlement. Furthermore, the proposal foresee the establishment of a European mission 
to assist Kosovo authorities in the field of rule of law and also the formation of a NATO International Military 
Presence to support the implementation of the plan and also to assist with the training of the Kosovo Security 




the legislative, judicial and administrative institutions of Kosovo (Constitution of Kosovo, 
2008).  
In more detail, the Constitution guarantees that out of the one hundred and twenty 
seats in the Assembly, twenty are reserved for the minority communities. Half of those seats 
are reserved specifically for the Kosovo Serb community (Art.62.2). Non-majority 
communities are also guaranteed to hold two Deputy Presidents (Art.67.4), as well as Minister 
and Deputy Ministers positions (Art.96.3, Art.96.4.). Furthermore, at least three judges of the 
Supreme Court (Art.103.3) and at least two judges of any other court shall be from minority 
communities (Art.103.6). There shall also be guaranteed representation of minority 
communities in the Central Election Committee (Art.139.4.), and although no specific 
percentage of representation is mentioned, the Constitution of Kosovo requires that the 
composition of the police shall reflect the ethnic diversity of the population (Art.128.2). 
Finally, the constitution foresees that for any amendment a two-thirds majority vote is 
required by all deputies of the Assembly including two thirds of the minorities (Art.144.2), 
implicitly offering the minorities the right to veto future amendments.   
Moreover, the constitution protects the rights of the ethnic, religious and cultural 
communities of Kosovo. Beginning with reaffirming basic human rights, such as the right to 
their own language, traditions and religion, Article 59 also includes the right to receive public 
education in their own language, establish and manage private educational institutions, as well 
as to use their language in their relations with the municipal authorities in areas where they 
represent a sufficient share of the population. In addition, guaranteed access is provided to 
public broadcast media, with the right to use their own language and freedom to create their 
own independent media. Freedom of movement within and throughout Kosovo is ensured, as 




of local, regional and international non-governmental organisations and freedom to establish 
associations for culture, art, science and education fostering and development of their identity 
(Constitution of Kosovo, 2008, Art.59). Finally, the Constitution of Kosovo pledges to 
promote and facilitate the return of refugees and assist them with the recovery of their 
property (Constitution of Kosovo, 2008, Art.156).  
However, the implementation of laws remains limited, especially the laws referring to 
human and minority rights (Interview 20, Maksimović). Serbs still lack solid and tangible 
assurances of physical security (Bataković, 2014). This insecurity, and more importantly the 
perception of insecurity have locked Serbs in enclaves allowing them only restricted freedom 
of movement. Consequently, the possibility for those who abandoned their residence during 
the 2004 riots to return remains also limited (Interview 10, Civil Society Activist). Impunity 
against perpetrators of ethnically-motivated violence only enhances the feelings of insecurity 
and widens the distance between the two communities. Serbs have also limited access to 
justice, with their lawsuits or appeals often being ignored (Interviews 9,10, Civil Society 
Activists). In addition, Serbs have poor access to public services, which is exacerbated 
because of the language barrier. Although the law foresees the translation of public 
documents to all official languages of the state, the translation is often inadequate, making the 
text incomprehensible (Interview 20, Maksimović). In addition, although non-majority 
communities of Kosovo are allowed to use their own language when dealing with the public 
sector, usually this is a luxury not provided. Serbs also have limited opportunities for 
employment, being mainly restricted to the Serbian-run structures (Interview 13, EU 
Diplomat). Furthermore, technical and infrastructural problems are widespread, with power, 




Serbs remain marginalised in their enclaves, having limited access to higher education or 
opportunities for economic and professional development.  
 
ii. State institutions 
Apart from adoption of new laws, Kosovo has developed its institutions and infrastructure. 
State institutions are in place and fairly functional, while Kosovo had made significant 
progress in road and telecommunications infrastructure.  In addition, the Kosovo Police has 
evolved into a remarkably effective force. It sufficiently established order and rendered 
Kosovo a safe place (ICG, 2010). Moreover, Kosovo has, since the early days of its 
independence, been a pluralistic political scene with numerous political parties, vibrant media 
and engaged civil society (Tansey, 2009). The last elections of 2014 were transparent and 
well-organised. Moreover, for the first time the four northern Serb dominated municipalities 
of North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zvečan and Zubin Potok participated in the elections, 
terminating the longstanding boycott (European Commission, 2014a). 
The role of the international community was enormous for this positive development. 
The EU, through the establishment of EULEX has a more active role in Kosovo since its 
declaration of independence. EULEX, being the largest EU civilian mission to date, provides 
expertise for the strengthening of Kosovo’s rule of law institutions, seeking to improve and 
lustrate the judicial system and render it free from political interference (EULEX, 2015a). 
EULEX significantly contributes to the fight against corruption and organised crime by 
investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating sensitive cases such as cases of high-profile 
bribery, drug and human trafficking cases and war crimes (EULEX, 2015b).  This way 
EULEX assists Kosovo to reach the necessary EU rule of law standards promoting its 




EULEX had played a major role in the police reform and the establishment and orderly 
function of border police and customs (EULEX, 2015a).  
Apart from EULEX, several international institutions and organisation are operating 
on the ground assisting Kosovo in its state building process. UNMIK, although not 
governance authority any more, remains in place as the Resolution 1244 is still valid. 
Although being significantly reduced, UNMIK continues to promote security and stability in 
Kosovo and encourage inter-ethnic peace and reconciliation through the launching of various 
cultural programmes aiming to create bridges of communication between Kosovo Serbs and 
Albanians (Interview 17, UN Official). The OSCE plays a leading role in all matters related to 
human and community rights, institutions and democracy-building, as well as good 
governance, gender equality, civic participation and electoral support (OSCE, 2015). 
Furthermore, through Stand-By Arrangements first signed in 2012 and being renewed in 
2015, the International Monetary Fund controls Kosovo’s fiscal policies and macro-economic 
strategies transferring knowledge and expertise to Kosovo’s economic institutions (IMF, 
2013, IMF, 2015). Along with those organisations, a plethora of other UN specialised 
agencies and inter-governmental organisations are operating in Kosovo, such as International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and USAID, supporting the state building process, strengthening the institutions, 
promoting security and stability in Kosovo (Kosovo MFA, 2015).   
 With international support, Kosovo has established a functioning state structure that is 
increasingly developing. Its institutions are still weak but continuously strengthened, the 
political system is also weak, but functional, and the press and civil society enjoy freedom of 
expression and operation. Everyday life of Kosovo Albanians resembles life in a fully 




is fairly safe with violent crime at low levels (ICG, 2010). In terms of services and 
infrastructure the situation is efficient and constantly improving. Prishtina airport is modern 
and well-organised; transportation throughout Kosovo is well-scheduled and reliable; 
Prishtina is reconstructed and clean. Telecommunications are at a satisfactory level of service 
production as well, with internet capacity at European levels and the percentage of internet 
users at 76,62%, thus higher than some EU countries (STIKK, 2013). Hence, all in all, 
Kosovo has made great leaps forward in these seven years of independence and has created 
the mechanisms and sense of a state.  
 
iii. Shortcomings and areas for improvement 
Despite Kosovo’s remarkable progress it still faces serious shortcomings. To begin with, the 
lack of rule of law remains a serious concern in cases of high-profile corruption and organised 
crime (European Commission, 2014b). Corruption continues to be widespread in the vast 
majority of institutions and organisations operating in Kosovo, referring to both local and 
international actors (Interview 5, EU Diplomat, Interview 19, EULEX Official). Although, 
drug-related crime investigations have been increased and a number of human trafficking 
groups have been dismantled, the number of convictions and drug confiscations remains low 
(European Commission, 2014a). The independence of the judicial system is contested, while 
harassment of judges and prosecutors poses serious problems. Furthermore, witness 
protection remains almost non-existent and witness intimidation is a common phenomenon, 
further hindering the prosecution of high-profile criminal perpetrators.   
 Finally, economic development remains limited. Due to high-levels of corruption 
private foreign investment is discouraged. Productivity is limited and the economy is based on 




reach 35% and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at €3,000 Kosovo is one of the 
poorest countries in Europe (World Bank, 2015). On the positive side the cost of living is 
accordingly low, increasing the purchasing power of Euro in Kosovo. Moreover, Kosovo has 
recorded positive growth rates in every year since its independence even during the global 
recession period 2008-2012. Kosovo’s growth rate continues to be positive at 3.4 % and its 
banking system is well-capitalized, liquid, and profitable (World Bank, 2015, European 
Commission, 2014a, IMF, 2015).  
 Kosovo’s most serious shortcomings are to be found in the field of human rights, 
organised crime and corruption. Laws on human and community rights are not implemented, 
while the perception of insecurity inhibits minorities from being more integrated. Although 
some progress has been made, the pace is slow and is further hampered by the increasing 
social distance between the communities. The language barrier between Serbs and Albanians 
is growing, as younger generations do not speak each other’s language (Interview 19, EULEX 
Official). By living in segregated communities and not having any communication negative 
perceptions and mistrust between Serbs and Albanians is growing (Interview 15, Kursani). 
Reconciliation programmes organised by international organisations often fail; even during 
the course of the programme members of each community tend to gather together instead of 
trying to communicate with each other (Interview 17, UN Official). Furthermore, contact and 
integration is often hindered by members within the minority community itself. Often those 
who want to integrate and participate in Kosovo’s political life are treated as traitors or agents 
of the Albanians’ by the rest of the community (Interview 1, Former NATO Officer, 
Interview 9, Civil Society Activist). It is fortunate, however, that this has gradually started to 
change. As an increasing number of Serbs accept the irreversibility of Kosovo’s secession and 




 Organised crime and corruption are extremely difficult to tackle. Even in cases where 
perpetrators are widely known, lack of adequate witness protection leads to a corresponding 
lack of testimonies. Thus, most of the time, investigations stop due to lack of sufficient 
evidence (Interview 6, UN Official). A further reason why corruption and organised crime are 
very difficult to tackle is that they involve high-profile people of all communities in Kosovo, 
who, in turn, have collaborators among the rest of the population, making the illegal network 
sizeable (inter alia, Interview 4, Kosovar Press Editor, Interview 12, EU Diplomat, Interview 
14, EU Diplomat). Moreover, corruption dominates the way society works in Kosovo 
(Interview 3, Qehaja, Interview 7, EU Diplomat, Interview 20, Maksimović). Although such 
practice is unacceptable for western standards of democracy, this is a socially acceptable and 
endorsed way of state and social function in the region (Interview 2, Miljanić, Interview 6, 
UN Official, Interview 19, EULEX Official).  
 Despite those shortcomings, the international community in Kosovo decided in 2012 
that the period of supervised independence was over. Nevertheless, international organisations 
are still on the ground providing support and expertise, assisting Kosovo to strengthen its 
institutions and reach the standards for European integration. KFOR remains in place 
guaranteeing Kosovo’s safety from external threats, while continuing with the training of the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The EULEX mandate has 
been extended until June 2016 and the EU continues to provide financial assistance under the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance50 (IPA) (European Commission, 2014a). Apart from 
the EU, individual countries also continue to support Kosovo financially with some of the 
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2013 to support the Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue, the normalisation and integration processes in Kosovo, 
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innovation, improve education and social policies, boost employment and support energy, agriculture and rural 




most important donors to be the US, Germany, Switzerland and Norway (FFO, 2015, KCSF, 
2015, USDS, 2013, RNEP, 2013). Thus, Kosovo although not under supervised independence 
any more is far from abandoned.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to assess Kosovo’s progress towards successful secession 
from its declaration of independence in 2008 to May 2015. This chapter demonstrated that 
Kosovo has made huge progress considering its young age, both in terms of international 
recognition and internal viability.  
 Internationally, Kosovo is recognised by 109 UN member states, an impressive 
quantity of recognition considering that it is an outcome of a unilateral act. Furthermore, 
Kosovo has entered a number of international organisations, while its participation in regional 
fora is growing. Kosovo has also established cooperative relations with non-recognising 
countries, which support Kosovo’s state-building process and regional integration. Kosovo, 
thus, although not fully recognised is not excluded regionally and internationally, while the 
signing of the SAA agreement with the EU enhances the optimistic prospects for its future.    
 What is of major importance for Kosovo’s course towards international acceptance is 
the normalisation of its relations with Serbia, a process that has already shown tangible 
results. The high-level dialogue between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo and the 
reaching of an agreement may constitute de facto recognition of Kosovo, albeit not de jure. 
Nevertheless, the agreement foreseeing the dismantling of Serbian structures in Kosovo and 
especially in the North, the acceptance of documents issued by the Kosovo authorities and the 
implementation of the integrated boundary management constitute significant steps forward. 




will enable Kosovo’s government to exert control over the entire territory of Kosovo ensuring 
the continuation of Kosovo’s territorial integrity. Thus, the conduct of the dialogue with 
Serbia induces positive results for Kosovo for both its international recognition and internal 
viability.  
 In terms of internal viability, Kosovo’s government exerts authority over the vast 
majority of its territory, fulfilling to large extent the criteria for internal viability this thesis 
has set. Kosovo has established a stable and safe state, able to provide order even in the 
North, with the international community’s assistance. Kosovo’s institutions are still weak and 
Kosovo faces shortcomings in several areas, especially in the areas of corruption, rule of law 
and human rights. Nevertheless, with the support of the international community on the 
ground, and the EU in particular, Kosovo makes steps forward, constantly developing its state 
structures and capabilities.  
 Thus, in seven years of independence Kosovo has managed, with the West’s 
continuous support, to create a state that is widely recognised and fairly viable. Admittedly, 
Kosovo’s unilateral secession has yet to create an uncontested state; nevertheless, Kosovo has 
managed to reach a level of international recognition and internal viability that render its 
secession irreversible. The next chapter, as the concluding chapter of this thesis, will answer 
the question of why Kosovo’s unilateral secession succeeded to such a considerable extent, 












The purpose of this thesis has been to contribute theoretically and empirically to the 
understanding of secession as a phenomenon of international relations. The field of secession, 
connected with studies on self-determination and statehood can be a very broad one; 
nonetheless, in such a broad field of study the questions of when and why secessions succeed 
remains insufficiently addressed. Secession theories being many times based on legal 
documents usually debate the question of when a secession is justified and whether and under 
which circumstances a right to remedial secession exists. Studies based in international 
relations and political theory present ideas on when a secession should be permissible and 
which groups would be entitled to this right.   
 This thesis reviewed three broad categories of secession theories. In specific it 
examined how remedial secession theories, primary-right theories and nation-orientated 
theories of secession explain the case of Kosovo. In addition some prominent alternative 
approaches to secession were reviewed, which do not fit to any of the above categories.   
 The remedial secession theories argue that an entity has the right to secede only if it 
had suffered grave injustices in the hands of the parent state. Each scholar sets their own 
criteria of what constitutes grave injustices, including human rights abuses, ethnic 
discrimination, and neglect of the political and economic interests of the in-question entity as 
well as the territory to have been annexed unjustly by the parent state in the first place. 
Nevertheless, common ground among the remedial secession theories is that an entity might 
have the right to secede after the parent state have repeatedly and manifestly failed to respect 




resort, being only allowed when all other means of co-operation and co-existence have been 
exhausted and failed.  
Remedial secession theories explain and partially justify why the Kosovo Albanians 
desired to secede. They explain their wish to secede based on the human rights violations 
Kosovo Albanians suffered under Milošević’s rule. In addition after the failure of the Vienna 
negotiations it was argued that all other means to settle the issue of Kosovo have been 
exhausted and thus its secession could be regarded as last resort.  
It is questionable, however, whether Kosovo’s independence was the last resort 
Kosovo Albanians had in 2008. By 2008 Serbia had ousted Milošević’s and handed him in the 
ICTY. Serbia has made a turn to democracy and has already begun a policy of approaching 
the EU, accompanied by efforts to strengthen rule of law and human rights protection. Serbia 
had also presented various alternatives to Kosovo’s independence in the last round of the 
Troika talks, including the option to allow Kosovo to participate in international organisations 
and use symbols usually reserved for sovereign states, offering practically everything except 
for a UN seat and right to armed forces. Kosovo Albanians, however, backed by the West, 
were not willing to accept anything sort of independence, leading to the stalemate in the 
negotiations.  
Furthermore, although remedial secession theories explain some aspects of Kosovo’s 
secession, they fail to address the issue of why Kosovo’s secession succeeded to such an 
extent. Remedial secession theories, despite their limitations, provide a useful tool for the 
understanding of the background of a secessionist attempt, potentially justifying and 
explaining on which grounds a certain entity wishes to separate from the parent state. 
Nonetheless, the issue of when a secession can be regarded as successful and what turns a 




On the opposite side of secession theories they are the primary-right theories arguing 
that secession ought to be permissible in a wider range of cases and not only as a remedy of 
last resort. Moreover, for the primary-right theories it is not necessary for a group to share a 
common identity, nationality or any other ascriptive characteristic in order to have the right to 
secede. On the contrary, these theories are based on the voluntary political choice of a group 
that constitutes a political and territorial society and whose will is to form their own 
independent political unit.  
Acknowledging, however, that the extensive permissibility these theories grand to 
separatist demands would practically lead to chaos, the majority of scholars suggest restrictive 
conditions for the application of the right. Restrictive conditions varies according to each 
theorist and may include the size of the seceding entity, whether it has disproportionate 
resources on its territory, which would seriously affect the economic viability of the parent 
state or if it is located in a region that would create an enclave within the borders of the parent 
state, instead of an independent state. 
Kosovo meets the criteria most of the primary-right theories have set. It forms an 
organised socio-political entity on a territory at the borders of the parent state, the majority of 
whose citizens desired secession. Nevertheless, as it happens also with remedial secession 
theories, primary-right theories explain when a secession should be permissible, leaving 
unaddressed the questions of when and why secessions succeed.  
Finally, the third major approach of secession theories this thesis reviewed is the 
nation-orientated theories. According to them if the seceding entity constitutes a nation, then 
by virtue of this it should have the right to secede independent of its status and treatment 
within the state. Thus, contrary to remedial secession theories, nation-orientated theories do 




secede. Furthermore, nation-orientated theories share similarities with the primary-right 
theories. However, the latter grant the right to secession to every group which is politically 
organised and desires secession independently of its national composition, whereas nation-
orientated secession theories recognise a right to secession to every group claiming that it is a 
nation.  
According to nation-orientated secession theories Kosovo Albanians would have a 
right to secede from Serbia, based solely on the fact that they are ethnically distinct from the 
Serbs. Kosovo Albanians identify themselves as belonging to a different nation and have a 
collective consciousness of their distinction. They have also been officially recognised as a 
nationality within the Former Yugoslavia, fact that would further strengthen the argument of 
national differentiation. Therefore, according to nation-orientated theories, in virtue of this 
national distinction, Kosovo Albanians would have the right to secede.  
As with the previously mentioned remedial secession and primary-right theories, 
nation-orientated theories are occupied with the groups that would have the right to secede 
and under what conditions. Thus, the majority of the existing secession theories debate on the 
morality of secession and the conditions of its permissibility. In practical terms, however, the 
broad permissibility of primary-right theories and nation-orientated theories would open the 
Pandora’s Box for further secessionist demands that would lead to chaos. Remedial secession 
theories by introducing the conditions of previous violation of rights and last resort qualifier 
offer a more reserved and perhaps a practically applicable approach to the justification of 
secession.   
However, even if a secession is theoretically and morally justified, this does not 




complexity of interrelated domestic and international factors that create the necessary 
conditions for a secession to lead to the establishment of a recognised and viable state.  
In more detail, acknowledging the gap the existing secession theories present, this 
thesis sought to contribute to the studies of secession by researching when secessions succeed. 
It proposed a novel approach, arguing that a secession can be regarded as successful when it 
results in the creation of an externally recognised and internally viable entity. In order to 
examine this assumption the thesis employed Kosovo as case study, a case of unilateral 
secession that admittedly has not resulted into the creation of an uncontested, globally 
recognised entity. This, however, not only has not weakened the argument of the thesis, but 
on the contrary, it expanded the initial assumption by revealing that a secession can be 
regarded as successful when the seceding entity has received such a level of external 
recognition and internal viability that has rendered its detachment from the parent state 
irreversible.  
While using Kosovo as a case study presents particular limitations especially as an 
entity still struggling for uncontested statehood, this thesis resolved that it would be the most 
suitable case for this research for two reasons; first, because Kosovo has been the most 
successful case of unilateral secession since Bangladesh in 1971, and second, because 
unilateral secessions are the most difficult to succeed. To begin with, Kosovo, although an 
outcome of unilateral secession, has been recognised by one hundred and nine51 UN member 
states and has established close cooperative relations with its neighbouring states, including 
those who still refuse to officially recognise its independence, and has also built an internally 
functioning, largely viable state. These achievements appear in stark contrast with the 
outcome of other unilateral secessionist attempts, many of which have resulted in the 
                                                                




formation of de facto states, remaining in the margins of international relations. Furthermore, 
separatist movements are often perceived as terrorist organisations both by the parent states 
and the international community and as such their demands receive limited support. It is also 
not unusual that secessionist attempts result in civil wars, where ultimately the secessionist 
movements are defeated by the forces of the central state. In most cases where unilateral 
secessions have reached a level of success, the seceding territories have established de facto 
states, receiving limited or no recognition by the international community. Thus, unilateral 
secessions are far more unlikely to succeed than secessions which are outcome of an 
agreement between the parent state and the seceding region or a product of state dissolution. 
Hence, the thesis assumed that by explaining why a case of unilateral secession succeeded, its 
findings would have a broad explanatory application on both unilateral and non-unilateral 
secessions, being applicable to future research explaining why past, secessions have 
succeeded, and also potentially applicable to explaining how secessions, again both unilateral 
and non-unilateral may succeed in the future.    
In order to explain why Kosovo’s unilateral secession succeeded, this thesis employed 
a process tracing methodology examining what changed during the years 1991-2008 and 
turned Kosovo’s first unsuccessful attempt to secede in 1991 to a far more successful one in 
2008. The research, acknowledging that Kosovo’s demands for independence did not appear 
suddenly in 1991, also presents the historical, economic, political and social background 
against which the first declaration of independence took place. Similarly, recognising that 
Kosovo’s successful secession is an ongoing process, the research continued to examine and 
evaluate the factors that rendered Kosovo’s secession successful after it unilaterally declared 




The thesis concluded that Kosovo’s unilateral secession succeeded because events 
during the years 1991-2008 have created the conditions for Kosovo to secure quality 
international support in favour of its independence and statehood. This quality support, 
meaning support from influential countries, promoted Kosovo’s international acceptance after 
it unilaterally declared independence, achieving this way a considerable and necessary 
quantity of international recognitions. Furthermore, through quality external support 
throughout the years since 1999, Kosovo has managed to build a viable state, fulfilling to a 
significant extent the second criterion of successful secession.   
In more detail, the analysis began with researching why Kosovo’s first attempt to 
secede in 1999 failed. The thesis showed that Kosovo’s first attempt to secede was 
unsuccessful predominantly because of the absence of international recognition. Kosovo, 
following Rugova’s peaceful approach, by not being engaged in armed conflict was not 
considered to be a major factor of instability and an urgent issue for the international 
community to address. With the Yugoslav wars having already started the international 
community was occupied with stabilising the situation in the northern borders of Yugoslavia. 
Thus, Kosovo’s demands for independence were deliberately neglected by the international 
community who did not wish to risk opening a new front in the southern part of Yugoslavia, 
or disengage Milošević from the peace negotiations for the settlement of the Yugoslav wars.   
The situation changed, however, in the middle of the 1990s with the end of the 
Yugoslav wars and the emergence of the KLA. The actions of the KLA, pursuing 
independence with a more radical approach, provoked the retaliation of the Serbian forces, 
escalating the level of violence in Kosovo. The mounting violence attracted the attention of 




resources to address Kosovo’s demands and also sought to avoid the destabilisation of the 
fragile situation in the Balkans.  
Furthermore, the Yugoslav wars had been a source of frustration and humiliation for 
the international community, whose inefficiencies were apparent on several occasions, with 
the massacre in Srebrenica, being a particular sore point. In addition, with the Yugoslav wars’ 
end, there was no reason for the international community to continue the previous policy of 
appeasement towards Milošević. In contrast, Milošević had lost his credibility in the eyes of 
the international community, who hold him accountable for crimes during the Yugoslav wars 
and Srebrenica in particular.  
Thus, the international community determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past 
and also needing to defend its role as a credible conflict manager decided to take action and 
settle the Kosovo issue swiftly. In the post-Cold War era when US supremacy in the world 
affairs was undeniable, this change of stance followed by the NATO air campaign played a 
catalytic role for Kosovo’s successful secession. First, the NATO military intervention ended 
with the suspension of Serbia’s authority over Kosovo and the placement of the latter under 
international administration. Second, the NATO intervention initiated a process that, along 
with the international administration, would subsequently secure the quality support of the 
West in favour of Kosovo’s statehood.  
Observing the events occurred between 1991 and 1999, and led to the NATO air 
offensive, the thesis noticed that they took place across four different levels of analysis, with 
these levels being, first, the local or the seceding entity level, thus Kosovo; second, the state 
or parent state level, i.e. Serbia; third, the region, i.e. the Balkans; and fourth, the global level. 
Locally, of critical importance was the rise of violence. At the state level Milošević had 




both ended and also provided experience and unpleasant memories to the international 
community, which it sought to avoid from being repeated. In addition, the European countries 
wished to avoid any destabilisation in the Balkans, as a region in such close proximity with 
major EU countries. At the global level, the Cold War had ended and the US was the only 
superpower in the international system. Thus, when the West decided to support Kosovo’s 
cause, Russia, as the supporter of Serbia was unable to defend the interests of its ally. This 
one-sided power distribution changed the conditions in favour of Kosovo, initiating the 
process of its successful secession. 
 Similarly, this thesis observed that the events that took place from 1999-2008, 
contributing to the creation of the conditions for Kosovo’s successful secession also occurred 
across four levels of analysis. To begin with, Kosovo was placed under an UN-led 
international administration, which had an effect both on the local and on the state level, as it 
detached Kosovo from Serbia. The authority of Serbia on the vast majority of Kosovo’s 
territory and population was annulled, while Kosovo under international administration had 
de facto seceded from Serbia. Furthermore, at the local level, the international administration 
created the conditions for the later viability of Kosovo as an independent state, by promoting 
the state and institution building process on the ground.  
Another event that took place on the local level and affected Kosovo’s secession were 
the riots of 2004. The 2004 riots, resulting in thousands of internally displaced persons and 
huge amount of property destroyed, created fears that a possible repetition of such an 
enormous wave of violence not only would be destructive for the international administration 
in Kosovo, but would potentially create a domino effect at the regional level. Thus, in order to 
avoid a spill over from the local level to the regional, the procedures were accelerated for the 




This led to global-level negotiations, including participants from the local and the state 
level as well, where the West proposed and practically imposed a plan foreseeing the 
independence of Kosovo, as being the only settlement that would ensure peace and stability in 
the region. The negotiations showed again how global dynamics affected the outcome of 
Kosovo’s secession, as Russia, although a re-emerging global power was once more unable to 
exert sufficient influence in order to defend the interests of Serbia. However, in spite of the 
one-sidedness of the negotiations, the fact that they occurred provided the legitimacy 
argument for the West that all means possible to settle the conflict had been exhausted and 
therefore there was no other viable solution short of the secession and the recognition of 
Kosovo as an independent state. 
This one-sided conduct of negotiations was probably the first clear demonstration of 
the enormous support the West would provide to an independent Kosovo after its unilateral 
declaration of independence. The US, the majority of NATO countries as well as the majority 
of EU countries recognised Kosovo as a sovereign and independent country shortly after it 
unilaterally declared independence in 2008. The support of those countries has been called 
quality support in this thesis because it was able to turn Kosovo’s unilateral secession into a 
fait accompli by lobbing for its international recognition world-wide and also releasing a 
considerable amount of resources for institution building and the establishment of a viable 
state.  
Also non-recognising countries support Kosovo’s international participation and 
internal viability. For instance, although five EU members continue not to recognise Kosovo 
as an independent state, the EU was able to agree for the establishment of EULEX, a mission 
on the ground aiming to assist Kosovo authorities in the field of rule of law. In addition, 




liaison offices in Prishtina, promoting Kosovo’s participation in regional organisations and 
cooperating with the local politicians and authorities. Furthermore, the EU indirectly 
promotes Kosovo’s efforts for uncontested statehood by making Serbia’s accession to the EU 
conditional upon the settlement of the Kosovo issue and the normalisation of their relations. 
Moreover, the West, by providing quality support, has managed to achieve a 
considerable quantity of international recognitions for Kosovo. Kosovo has been admitted to 
various regional and international organisations and its participation in international fora is 
gradually growing. Also through the allocation of significant resources, in economic, 
institutional and technical terms, the West and the EU, in particular, promoted the state 
building in Kosovo, securing its internal viability.  
Thus, this thesis by employing a process tracing methodology and dividing the 
research into four levels of analysis was able to reveal the complex causal mechanisms that 
led to Kosovo’s successful secession. Process tracing enabled the identification and the 
analysis of trajectories of change and causation within the studied period. The division of the 
research into four levels of analysis revealed how events in different areas created a chain of 
interdependent actions and reactions across those areas. The combination, therefore, of the 
process tracing method and the levels of analysis framework offered valuable insight into the 
causal mechanisms that led eventually to the successful outcome of Kosovo’s second attempt 
to secede. 
In this research all levels of analysis were closely interconnected, as actions at one 
level had an effect to the final recipient level, thus the local level being Kosovo. Nevertheless, 
a closer interaction can be observed between the local and the international level as events at 
the local level, for example the rise of the KLA and the escalation of violence in Kosovo, led 




the international support after the unilateral declaration of independence and its positive effect 
on the success of Kosovo’s secession is a demonstration of the interdependence between 
actions on the global level affecting the local one.  
Despite the close association between local and global level, also the study of the state 
and regional level was of critical importance for the success of Kosovo’s secession. Events at 
those two levels served as catalysts intensifying actions and reactions at the local and global 
levels as well. For example, previous experiences in the Yugoslav wars accelerated the 
international community’s actions to settle the issue of Kosovo, as also did Milošević’s 
misrule. Although actions especially at the regional level only indirectly affected the outcome 
of Kosovo’s secession, their contribution was of major importance leading the international 
actors to act in certain ways. Therefore, their research offered a valuable insight explaining 
the background against which certain decisions were met that would create the conditions for 
Kosovo’s successful secession.   
What is also observed by the study of the levels of analysis on the case of Kosovo is a 
change in the weight of the levels before and after the unilateral declaration of independence 
in 2008. Before 2008, the events at the local and the global level had a rather balanced 
interaction. Events at the local level provoked changes on the actions of the other level, as 
was mentioned above with the emergence of the KLA or with the riots in 2004 that 
accelerated the international processes for the settlement of the Kosovo issue and the initiation 
of the Vienna negotiations. Similarly, actions at the global level, such as the NATO air-
offensive and the placement of Kosovo under international administration de facto separated 
Kosovo from Serbia generating the process of Kosovo’s successful secession.   
However, this balance in the weight of the two levels changed after 2008. After 




taken the back seat, whereas a greater weight is observed on actions at the global level. In 
addition, the weight of the state level has increased, as Serbia’s actions have great 
significance for the success of Kosovo’s secession. Kosovo’s uncontested statehood still 
depends on the normalisation with its relations with Serbia, a procedure that through the 
Brussels agreement involves actors of global, state and local level.  
Furthermore, international actors provide support both for the international recognition 
of Kosovo as well as for its internal viability. The allies of Kosovo lobby in favour of its 
recognition and promote its participation in international organisations in an attempt to 
strengthen the international aspect of Kosovo’s statehood. For the moment, however, 
Kosovo’s admission to the UN and thus its consideration as an uncontested state remains 
blocked because of the refusal of Serbia to recognise it and the subsequent decision of China 
and Russia not to accept Kosovo without the consent of Serbia. Internally the international 
presence on the ground both supports and undermines Kosovo’s stateness. Kosovo is still a 
recipient of considerable funds that sustain it financially, while EULEX and NATO promote 
rule of law and ensure order respectively. Kosovo also confronts major problems in regards to 
considerable levels of unemployment and deficiency in the application of laws regarding 
minorities’ protection.  
Despite Kosovo’s shortcomings its secession can still be considered as successful and 
Kosovo can be regarded as state. Internationally it is recognised by one hundred and nine UN 
member states and this number is gradually growing. Internally, Kosovo fulfils the minimum 
requirements this research has set for the consideration of a state as viable. Kosovo’s 
government controls the means of violence on its territory, namely the Kosovo Security 
Forces and the Kosovo Police. Both of those institutions are capable of keeping order in 




leaps of improvement in seven years of independence, developing infrastructure and 
improving the fields of communication, internet access and transportation.  
In terms of the future of Kosovo as a viable state the prospects are optimistic. Through 
negotiations with Serbia, Kosovo has established its borders and the agreement regarding the 
integrated border management and the establishment of joint crossing points has shown 
positive results. Serbia accepts documents issued by the institutions of Kosovo as valid forms 
of identification, while both sides have agreed that they would not block each other’s 
European course. All the above constitute forms of de facto, albeit not de jure, recognition of 
Kosovo’s status as an entity separated from Serbia.  
In addition, Serbia has a view towards accession to the EU. One of the prerequisites 
for its entry into the EU is the normalisation of its relations with Kosovo. Thus, with Serbia 
moving closer to the EU and meeting the requirements the latter has set, Kosovo is also 
progressing towards uncontested statehood. With or without official recognition by Serbia in 
the short term, the practical normalisation of their relations would also lead to the 
strengthening of Kosovo’s internal viability. The normalisation of relations would create a 
more trustworthy environment for investments in Kosovo from which Serbian, as well as 
other international enterprises, could benefit from, increasing the productivity level and 
reducing unemployment in Kosovo.   
Finally, Kosovo has recently (2015) signed the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the EU. This agreement aims to create trade and investment opportunities 
that would enhance Kosovo’s economic growth and would reduce its unemployment. 
Furthermore, the agreement seeks to address other areas in which Kosovo displays fragility, 
such as political dialogue, justice, energy and home affairs. Lastly, apart from the benefits the 




EU that entails mutual rights and obligations, being a demonstration of Kosovo’s stateness 
and its continuing existence as a state in the future.  
Thus, this thesis has contributed theoretically and empirically to the field of secession. 
Theoretically, it has proposed an explanation regarding when secessions succeed, arguing that 
a secession can be regarded as successful when it results in the creation of a recognised and 
viable entity. In order to examine this assumption empirically, the thesis used the case study 
of Kosovo, a case that had both an unsuccessful attempt to secede in 1991 and a far more 
successful one in 2008. The thesis used a process tracing methodology in order to discover 
what turned Kosovo’s unsuccessful attempt to secede in 1991 to a far more successful one in 
2008. It discovered that changes taking place across four levels of analysis, local, state, 
regional, global, from 1991 to 2008 created the conditions for Kosovo to secure quality 
international support from influential states that would promote its international recognition 
and would support its internal viability after its second declaration of independence turning its 
secession successful. Finally, this thesis, recognising that Kosovo is neither fully recognised 
nor fully functional internally yet, expanded the initial assumption of international recognition 
and internal viability and concluded that a unilateral secession can be regarded as successful 
when the extent of international recognition and internal viability renders the secession 
irreversible.  
The findings of this research are relevant and applicable to other cases of secession 
comprising both unilateral and non-unilateral secessions. In addition the findings would also 
be relevant and explanatory to other cases of secession both successful and failed.  
To begin with, the criteria of internal viability and international recognition could be 
applied to assess the success of various secessions being both an outcome of unilateral act or 




South Sudan managed to secede from Sudan through an agreement and was quickly 
internationally recognised and accepted in the UN. Nevertheless, it has not managed to create 
a viable state, with its government being unable to control the means of violence or to provide 
order. On the other hand, there are cases of unilateral secession that remain unrecognised but 
have managed to create internally viable states that exist for more than twenty years. 
Examples of those cases would be Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus or Somaliland in the 
Horn of Africa, as both of those unrecognised, de facto states have been characterised as oases 
of stability and good governance. Thus, the criteria of international recognition and internal 
viability can be applied and further tested on other cases. 
Moreover, the four levels of analysis analytical model can be further employed for the 
understanding of the outcome of other secessionist attempts both successful or not. This 
analytical framework could shed light, for instance, on the limited success of the secessions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two cases that demonstrate similarities with the case of Kosovo, 
but have, however, great difference in the international acceptance they received.  
This type of research could take two avenues, first by employing a process tracing 
method in combination with the four levels of analysis model and try to find out the causal 
mechanisms that led to this specific outcome, testing thus once again the applicability of the 
analytical framework this thesis have used. Alternatively, the findings of this thesis can be 
applied and tested in a comparative study with the respective levels of other cases. This way 
the research will identify differences and similarities and will be able to assess how those 
differences affected the different outcomes of their secessions. Both of those possibilities for 
research have a broad applicability and can address various attempts of secession worldwide, 
from Biafra and South Sudan in Africa to Northern Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh in Europe 




Hence, this thesis constitutes the first step of a series of future research projects not 
only in the field of secession and statehood, but in the field of conflict resolution as well. The 
levels of analysis will be used in further projects to explain other secessionist attempts that 
have either failed to achieve such a degree of success, or have managed to secede by securing 
the consent of the parent state. The criteria of international recognition and internal viability 
will be used to assess the outcome of various secessions around the globe, being again either 
an outcome of unilateral act or mutual agreement. Hence, this thesis will have both a 
theoretical and a practical impact in the field of international security with its findings being 
applied on several cases, positively contributing to the studies and efforts for the achievement 
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Do you think that the secession of Kosovo was successful? 
-If so, what do you think made Kosovo’s secession possible? 
-If so, what do you think made Kosovo’s secession successful? 
-If not, why do you think so? 
 
Question 2: 
In 1991 Kosovo made its first attempt to secede, but it was not recognised by any other state 
apart from Albania; on the contrary in 2008 its declaration of independence was widely 
accepted.  
How could you explain this shift? 
 
Question 3:  
How is Kosovo different from other secessionist entities seeking recognition, which however 
have achieved either no or limited recognition?  
 
Question 4: 
What are in your view the most critical problems Kosovo confronts? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
